
C R I T O,

OR,

E S S A Y S

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.



454 CRITO or Essays on various subjects, viz.,
Politics, Education, Free Enquiry, Origin of
Evil, Rationale of Christianity, &c. 2 vols

ASTOR (AUS) SULLIVAN

C R I T O,

O R, *K*

E S S A Y S

O N

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

V O L. I.

Bronarton

Μηδεὶς μῆτε λογώ σε παρειπη, μῆτε τι εργώ,
Πρηξαι μηδὲ εἰπειν ὅ,τι τοι μη βελτερον εῖτι.

PYTHAG.

L O N D O N:

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C R I T O

o

E S S A Y S



VARIOUS SUBJECTS

VOL I

Printed for George, Foster, and Son,
and sold by them, at the Royal Exchange,
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TO

The RIGHT REV. FATHER

(Of three years old)

His R. H. FREDERIC

BISHOP of O.

May it please your Rt. Rev. R—l H—ss.

NO impropriety will, I hope, be found in my requesting the protection of a venerable Bishop, for a set of harmless Essays on moral subjects; especially, as I can, with perfect sincerity, assure your R. R. R. H. that I have not the least design upon your cakes or sweet-meats, by way of Dedication-present; in which coin only, I take it for granted, you have it in your power, at present, to gratify an author.

BEING, from my natural bluntness of temper, but too apt to "call" (as BOILEAU says) "a cat a cat," it may, perhaps be found, that in some of the following pages, I have treated, with too little complaisance, certain generally-received opinions, as well as practices; in consequence of which, my book and I may chance to have occasion for protection. And, I should think no intercession could be more powerful than that of a person of your R. R. R. H——'s figure, excepting that of a fair lady; to which charming patronage, being neither youth nor beau, parson nor rake, I pretend not to have any claim. Besides, what renders the good Bishop of O. a patron peculiarly proper for a *free* writer, is, That, if I be not much misinformed, there is not any where to be found a person, of a literary character, who exceeds your R. R. R. H. in *candor* as to matters of opinion. It is, indeed, according to all accounts, saying but little, to affirm, that there is none of the venerable fraternity, in that part of the world where

where your diocese lies, that is less bigoted to established errors, less jealous of free enquiry, and less disposed to intolerance and persecution, to warrants and attachments, than my great little patron. To speak plain English, I am no admirer of the *odium ecclesiasticum* often shewn by the *gens togata* of the other side of the water. And it is matter of great joy to all good men, that, in England, we symbolize so little with the principles, as well as practices, of the continental church. I hope the character your R. R. R. H. bears at present, will never degenerate into narrowness, and that you will, by and by, lend a helping hand toward removing what little reproach still remains on your *native* church. It were to be wished, for instance, that, as we do not pretend to *infallibility*, we did not pretend to *decide* without appeal. Yet it is to be lamented, that, not long ago, certain *definitive prohibitions* were laid on the theological enquiries of certain inferior ecclesiastics, by their superiors; taking, I suppose, the hint from the maxim, “That the ch—— has power

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“ to decree rites and ceremonies, and au-
“ thority in matters of faith.” But, if we
are not infallible, what harm can a little
honest searching after truth do us; so
we overset not our understandings in the
pursuit of knowledge, nor let ourselves be
puffed up on account of the acquisition?

Nor was it pleasing to many persons of
the freer way of thinking, to see, some
years ago, a clerical address to an illustri-
ous relation of your R. R. R. H. exciting
him to order the dreadful engine of power
to be wound up ready to crush those, who
published opinions contrary to the esta-
blished belief. I appeal to your R. R. R. H.
whether the Protestant Religion does not
at this time actually triumph over popish
delusion, by means precisely of what those
grave gentlemen shewed themselves so zeal-
ous to restrain; I mean the exercise of the
unalienable right of private judgment, and
liberty of publication.

Nor can I applaud the severities lately
inflicted (at the instance, as is confidently
affirmed

affirmed, of certain dignitaries) on a silly old man, for publishing a sheet-full of deistical ribaldry. It were well, that public *indecency* were *properly* discouraged. But may not the cure, if applied with a bad address, prove worse than the disease? May not the effect of such proceedings prove the *discouragement* of abler and modester enquirers into the merits of sundry religious opinions, received among us (as were once all the articles of the *R. Catholic* religion) but perhaps founded neither in reason nor scripture? May not the opposers of Christianity hence take occasion to pretend (and with some degree of plausibility) that they could overturn our religion, if they dared to publish their objections against it; and that it is our consciousness of the weakness of our cause that puts us on defending it by the *argumentum baculinum*? Can we do the interest of religion a more cruel injury? I do not think your R. R. R. H. would contradict me, if I were to assert, that to attack with the flaming sword of justice a feeble goose-quill, is but an unfair and cowardly enter-

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prize ; and that opposing opinions, with any other weapons than tongues or pens, is only the most probable means for *prejudicing* the indifferent in *favour* of those opinions.

I cannot, for my part, nor does, I suppose, your R. R. R. H. see that any one mortal has the least *authority* over the *opinions* of another mortal, so long as they continue mere *opinions*, whether known or suspected, whether published in conversation or writing. The *actions* of one man may prejudice another ; if, by *direct* means of them the latter comes to *suffer* in his person, his reputation, or his estate. But I see not, that my neighbour's believing in SOMMONA CODOM, or his worshipping OROMASDES, is any injury to me ; nor do I imagine your R. R. R. H. has ever given yourself the least uneasiness on account of the diversity of religious sects, which prevails either here, or in the neighbourhood of your diocese. I cannot, for my part, help looking upon religion as a matter, which lies wholly between God and

and a man's *conscience*, exclusive of all interposition; and as what, from its specific nature, necessarily *individuates* mankind; while civil power necessarily regards them as collected into *societies*.

I question, whether your R. R. R. H. is thoroughly satisfied in your own mind, that there is, *in rerum naturâ*, any *alliance* between *church* and *state*, though there is one very clearly demonstrated in a famous book written by a learned prelate. Had it not been for that demonstration, I should have been rather inclinable to think, that the less the church and the state had to do with one another, it would be the better for both. Nor do I suppose your R.R.R.H. is quite clear about the absolute necessity of a *test-law* so thoroughly established in the same elaborate work. It happens a little unfortunately for the credit of that theory, that, *cæteris paribus*, those countries have generally been the *happiest* and most *flourishing*, where the least noise has been made about religious tests, and where uniformity and conformity have been left to shift for themselves. Witness, our colony of Pennsylvania;

vania, compared with Spain or Portugal. But what are *facts* against *demonstration*?

I don't think a person of your R. R. R. H——s's catholic principles can much admire our Christian charity to the children of superstition, who spend their money among us, and pay double taxes. It is true, we pretend, we do not molest the papists on account of their worshiping a god made of dough, or for speaking nonsense to the Almighty in *Latin* (it is well if we ourselves do not sometimes address him in *English* nonsense) but because they are thought to hold certain principles dangerous to *society*. But is it not their *religion* that we attack? Is it not their places of *worship* that we shut up?

It is said, "Every society has a right to secure herself from all enemies, whether foreign or intestine." True. And accordingly our security consists (under providence) in fleets and armies, in guards and garrisons, in government, in magistrates, in laws and sanctions: not (in my humble opinion) in driving a set of nonsensical

ſenſical *Ave-Maria*-mummers from jabbering their holy spells in a mass-house, and obliging them to do the same in a parlour or bed-chamber. There have been, for many years, papists in Pennsylvania, who have been unmoleſted by the government of that country; and yet the peace has continued undiſturbed by any attempts from them.

It has been said, “Let us at least demand of them the best security they can give us for their good behaviour. Let us oblige them to take the oaths.” But I have, for my part, little notion, and I don’t suppose your R. R. R. H. has much, of the wholesomeness of oaths crammed down people’s throats. What if the accused person denies the charge of popery, and at the same time refuses the oaths on account of a scruple of *conscience*, which some ancient heathens had, and our quakers have? Are we to shew our moderation by *storming* his *conscience*? If not, I would ask whether the business is not here at a full stop? Or if, on the other hand, he,
 takes

takes the oaths, what hold have we of him, who, for ought we know, has a *dispensation* to take any oath? If we can convince his *reason*, that his religion is absurd and dangerous, and that ours is preferable, we have *won* the man to our side. Till we do *this*, we do nothing. I am persuaded, your magnanimity, my sweet Pr—ce, does not wish any thing worse to be inflicted on any profession whatever, than *reasoning*, if their opinions will bear it, or *ridicule*, if they will not; and that you would not justify the treating of any person, merely because he is thought to hold some un promising *speculative* principles, as an offender, till he has, by visible *actions*, proved himself such.

The cry, among the more un-protestant part of our protestants is, “ Let us keep “ no measures with the papists. We know “ the genius of popery to be restless, bloody, “ and hostile to liberty, civil and religi- “ ous.” Is not this, in plain English, say- ing, “ Popery is *odious* on account of its “ *persecuting* spirit. Let us therefore imi-
“ tate

"tate popery in that which is the *most odious* in that most odious religion?" But is there not some danger, lest, in using the recommended wholesome severities with the papists, we occasionally punish the innocent with the guilty? Is it absolutely certain (better, ten guilty escape, than one innocent suffer) that every individual who worships dead folks, intends to fire London? If we really believe, that every papist would be glad to drink the pope's health in the blood of a protestant, how come we to venture so fearlessly into the countries which are inhabited by these supposed heretic-eaters? And how, especially, come we to escape out of their hands with our wind-pipes un-cut?

If the number of papists among us be inconsiderable, what is our danger from them? If it bears a considerable proportion to that of the protestants; will it not be better policy for us to endeavour, by winning methods, to convert them to the truth, than by popish-like severities, to drive them from us, and unpeople the land?

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Which leads me to ask your R. R. R. H. whether the following are not more promising means for demolishing popery among us, than employing *constables* and *beadboroughs* in the work of reformation, *viz.* 1. To remove all *restraints* on the exercise of their religion; which would ascertain their numbers, would cool their zeal, and stop the mouths of their priests, so that they should not, as at present, alledge against us, that our diffidence of success in the way of fair argument, puts us on suppressing them by power. Nor would our tolerating mas-s-houses, in the least interfere with any *prudent* and *justifiable* political measures we might think proper for securing ourselves against their machinations. In SACHEVEREL's time, *persecution* was (very wisely no doubt) chosen as the best expedient for demolishing the *diffenters*: but the effect proved the very contrary. What the *lenity* of the government, in that respect, has since those times produced, I need not mention. 2. To engage the parochial clergy to look better after their *flocks*, particularly the *lambs* (*Ti-*

tyre,

tyre, *coge pecus!*) so as to prevent their being *drawn away* by the Popish foxes, or to recover them, if they go astray. 3. To furnish the ignorant, *gratis*, with well-written *preservatives* from Popery. 4. To keep constantly in the news papers, which are read by those who read nothing else, a succession of *Essays* on the absurdities and mischiefs of that fatal delusion, and well authenticated narratives, tending to expose the true character of the *priests*. 5. To find out the arts by which their proselyte-hunters gain votaries, and to *counter-act* them. 6. Above all things, to remove out of our *own church* whatever at present renders the transition from thence into Popery too *easy*. It is remarkable, that their recruiting officers never have any success among the *dissenters* or *quakers*.

I should be very sorry to see the work of persecution set on foot, even if the Papists, the most persecutable people I know, were to be the objects of it. If we begin with inflicting severities on *one* religious sect, I will not answer that we shall not proceed to break loose on *others*.

It

xviii DEDICATION.

It is true, it is pity, and it is pity it is true, as old POLONIUS says, our *laws* are formed on a plan, which does but too much countenance intolerance and persecution. And it is notorious, that in consequence of some of them, which, through the *paternal* wisdom and care of our *statesmen*, are, to the terror of many of our best subjects, left *standing*; a very great number of the most useful and valuable members of society, *unsuspected Protestants*, are liable to be severely *punished* for doing the most important *service* to their fellow-creatures, that can be done by mortals. I humbly submit to your R. R. R. H—s's benevolence, whether these things ought to be so.

Your R. R. R. H—s's character for catholicism renders you a proper person to apply to for redress of the long-lamented grievance of clitical *subscription*. Perhaps your R. R. R. H. may not have considered with due attention this deplorable affair. But it is certain, that many gentlemen

lemen would gladly enter into holy orders, who are unexceptionably qualified as to learning and morals; but from what (to use old HOMER's way of speaking) is by gods called *Integrity*, by men *Scrupulosity*, hesitate about subscribing to any thing, but the *Bible*. The present constraint in this matter is, undoubtedly, a cruel oppression on the more scrupulous part of the clergy of our church, which might be wholly removed by two simple regulations, which I beg leave to recommend to your R. R. R. H—ss's serious consideration; viz. 1. That, by mutual *private agreement*, between the leading men in church and state, persons offering themselves candidates for holy orders, who can obtain livings in the church, be ordained and inducted, on shewing themselves duly *qualified*, and willing to declare their belief of *Christianity*, as contained in *scripture*, and their abjuring *Popery*, *Jacobitism*, &c. allowing them *time* to consider of the other more *doubtful* particulars, to which their subscription is now required. 2. That clergymen, performing their several functions

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tions to the approbation of the majority of their parishioners, be *connived at* in *passing over*, or altering, in public worship, such parts of the service, as they and their congregations may judge more proper to be left out or altered.

If it should be said, “ This would be “ breaking through the *laws* and *statutes* of “ the realm ;” I would answer, some laws are better honoured by *neglect*, than by observance. And surely the neglect of the laws is so far from being *unprecedented*, that one would rather imagine, on observing how little regard is paid to them, at least to the *good* ones, that they had been, like promises, made *on purpose* to be broken.

Or, if it should be objected, that these regulations would ruin precious *uniformity*, and introduce latitudinarianism ; let the objectors step over to Holland, and they will there be convinced, that a state may be flourishing and happy with *twenty different* religions in it.

I know,

I know, young persons are not admirers of long speeches. I will therefore conclude this humble address with my sincere wishes, that to the virtues of humility, chastity, temperance, contempt of riches and honours, moderation in controversy, &c. which, according to the most authentic informations, your R. R. R. H. possesses in an eminent degree, you may go on to add as many more as there are play-things in your nursery, or syllables in your spelling-book. I have the honour to be,

(May it please your R. R. R. H.)

Your R. R. R. H.—ss's

Most faithful humble servant,

CRITO.

10 JY 60

10150

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Иヤззи

• 2 •

ESSAY I.

TO judge of political subjects, it is not necessary to be master of the sublime geometry, or the Newtonian philosophy. Plain sense, applied to *general*, instead of private concerns, comprehends the main of the matter. To judge, whether the interest of one's native country is properly attended to by those at the helm, understanding is hardly necessary. If a people be oppressed, they will *feel* it, whether they be ATHENIANS or BOEOTIANS [a]. However statesmen may magnify the importance of their office, may it not be asked, whether common sense, common honesty, and a moderate knowledge of history, be not all the endowments necessary for enabling persons in that station to make a much more shining figure than the greatest part of those, who have undertaken administration in this country? If so, what are we to think of the common cant of our ministerial

[a] The ATHENIANS were the most sagacious, and the BOEOTIANS the heaviest people of GREECE.

CRITO MINOR.

ESSAY I.

ministerial slaves, "That private persons are incompetent
"judges of the conduct of their governors?" Is the
brain of a statesman made of materials different from
that of a citizen? Or has the former a Socratic dæ-
mon [b] to consult? Does not the historic page lie open
to both alike? From what other fountain can the min-
ister draw his political wisdom? What then gives him
his boasted superiority; or on what does he found his
pretensions to mystery? The subjects in a free country
have a right to consider themselves as on the same foot
with the stockholders in a trading company. If a pro-
prietor of East-India stock sees the directors pursuing
measures detrimental to the interest of the company, he
will not, I believe, hesitate long about his being a com-
petent, or an incompetent judge of directorial politics.
He will soon make ENGLAND ring with his complaints.
The same every subject has a right to do, whenever
the conduct of the ministry becomes justly suspicious.
It has long been a problem in this free country, "How
"to punish libels against government, so as to pre-
"serve the liberty of the subject inviolate." Is there
any better way of solving this difficulty than the
Alexandrian [c]? What need of punishment at all?
If a ministry will depend, for general approbation,
on the manifest rectitude of their conduct, what
have they to fear from libellers? Besides, does
punishment vindicate the conduct of a ministry?
does it not, on the contrary, render it only the more
suspicious?

[b] SOCRATES pretended to have a sort of god (fami-
iliar spirit, we should call him) who attended him, and
gave him many useful hints. CRITO MINOR.

[c] ALEXANDER cut the Gordian knot, which he
could not untie. CRITO MINOR.

ESSAY I.

3

suspicious? Does a true church need persecution to support it? What did LUTHER answer to those, who informed him, that his book was burnt, by order of the Pope? "It is easier," says the Reformer, "to burn it twice, than to answer it once."

BUT, it will be said, "Why is the character and conduct of a minister to be misrepresented without penal vindication, any more than that of a private person?" The answer is obvious. The public has nothing to do with the character or conduct of a private person. If he misbehaves, the damage is particular; not general. If, on the contrary, a states-man proves faithless to his trust, all are sufferers. If we may freely and publicly enquire into his conduct (and surely losers should have leave to speak) redress may be obtained. If we are afraid of declaring our doubts; if we speak, or write, under the dread of warrants and attachments; we shall probably find it necessary so prudently to mince the matter, that no one may take the alarm; and then the mischief goes on till it becomes irremediable.

It has likewise been urged, "Ought not aspersion to be restrained? ought not scurrility to be punished?" I answer, In all cases, where the cure is not like to prove worse than the disease, undoubtedly they ought. But, if government is to claim a power of inflicting pains and penalties on whatever they please to *call* aspersion and scurrility, where will the necessary examination into their conduct be, when we come to have a tyrant on the throne, or a knot of tyrants in the administration? Are ministers afraid of having their conduct enquired into? Then let them (as the old woman said to King PYRRHUS, when he told her, he had not leisure to hear her petition)

tion) quit their places to others, who fear not their country's trial. If ministers will give us security, that they will fill their places as they ought, that is, with common integrity, we will insure them, that, without either warrant or attachment, they shall be treated with decency, esteem, and gratitude; and that asperion and scurrility, if, by chance, any should rise against them, shall be more effectually suppressed, and more severely punished, by the public disapprobation or neglect, than by any inflictions from government, consistent with liberty. It is the too general misconduct of states-men, and the arts of partisans, that excite in the people suspicions, sometimes indeed groundless; and render it the more difficult for the best-intentioned to keep matters tolerably quiet. Whoever, therefore, undertakes to govern, or administer government, in a free country, must not be surprized to see the many behave, from time to time, as if it were an amusement to them to walk a little way out of their wits, and, after a short turn, walk back again. Let him cast an eye along the marginal contents of the histories of *free* states both of ancient and modern times, and he will observe this kind of sport almost continually going on, unless where the intervention of foreign wars obliges a divided people to unite for their common safety. The independent people, however, by which I here understand all those inhabitants of a country, who are unconcerned in the public *administration* of affairs, are, in the furious agitations of party inseparable from freedom, less blameable than pitiable. Like the waves of an ocean worked up to a tempest, their commotion is tremendous: but, like the ocean, till roused by the winds, they are of themselves calm, till provoked by oppression, or worked up by the *heads of parties*, who, generally speaking, mean much more the gratification

of

ESSAY I.

5

of their own ambition, or avarice, than any thing tending to national emolument.

The ancient heathen GREEKS and ROMANS no sooner fell out among themselves, than they divided into two armies, for every man was a soldier; and immediately the unhappy native country was deluged with gore. In ENGLAND, it is our christian custom, on occasions of party altercation, to shed much more ink than blood. And indeed, it is happy, that our rage vents itself in this manner. For, if all the papers and pamphlets which our political contests have produced, had been printed with the latter instead of the former, (*eben quanta strages!*) the grass would by this time have been growing in our streets. I suppose the works of our political writers on both sides, since the Revolution, would, if thrown together, have, by this time, formed a monument to English patriotism [*d*], not much inferior in bulk to mount Parnassus. The great pyramid, which covers about a dozen acres of land, would, I am convinced, appear but a mole-hill, in comparison with that printed mountain [*e*].

YET during the above period of almost eighty years, it has, if I recollect rightly, happened only twice, to be of any material advantage to this nation, whether one or the other of the contending parties prevailed. The disgrace of the Tory ministry, and establishment of the Whigs at the accession of K. GEORGE I. was of capital consequence to these kingdoms. The other ad-

B 3

vantageous

[*d*] *Lege partyism, meo periculo.* BENTL. SECUND.

[*e*] The author alludes here, I suppose, to the famous *written mountains*, as they are called, in the Desert, thought to have been covered with inscriptions by the Israelites in their journey. CRITO MINOR.

vantageous change of hands was the downfall of that ministry, whose pusillanimous conduct occasioned the losses of MINORCA and OSWEGO, and who, by importing HESSIANS and HANOVERIANS, for our defence against our flat-bottomed enemy (afterwards, as well as often before, proved to be so much inferior to us) gave reason to suspect them of a design to terminate the late war in the same inglorious manner, as the preceding. At these two periods, and no other since the Revolution, as far as I can remember, the nation was substantially benefited by changes of *men*, because, indeed, the changes of *men* produced important changes of *measures*.

BUT has it not been generally seen, that the good people of this kingdom have suffered themselves to be excited to as great a rage on account of the placing, or displacing of a set of grandees, as if somewhat of supreme importance to the national welfare had been transacted? How often have we been thrown into all the confusion of Babel, on the report of one patriot's being turned out, and another's being turned in! and how often have we been calmed again, on finding, that the new hero was kicked down stairs, and the old one kicked up into his former place! Is it not a little unaccountable, that we should be so anxious about the advantage of those who care so little about ours! For what is party, but (as our humorous writer sums it up in a few words) "the madness of many for the gain of "a few?"

IN free countries (to the honour of human nature be it spoken) nothing is so trifling, but it may become occasionally

occasionally a party-affair. In ENGLAND, we divide not only about important national concerns; but if a cook-maid tells a lamentable story of her being dragged several miles, and kept fasting several days; or if an impostor sets up a parchment goblin [f], the nation presently splits into two opposite factions on the matter, and we go to battling it, as if *pro aris et focis*.

WHEN we get a few years beyond a period of national commotion, we can command a sufficient measure of tranquillity, to look back with wonder on our own weakness, in suffering ourselves to be worked up to such a tempest, about a matter so frivolous.

WHO does not now stand astonished at the violence of popular dissension on occasion of so foolish a business as SACHEVEREL's controversy? "The church," they cried, "is in danger!" The only connexion I know of between a church and danger, is, the danger of a church's getting too much power into her hands, and turning religion into a mere state-engine [g].

WHO does not now wonder at the zeal of the good people of England, on occasion of the contest between Sir R. W. and Mr. P. afterwards E. of B. Did the latter give any assurance that he would redress one

[f] This refers to the histories of ELIZABETH CANNING, and the Cock-lane GHOST. CRITO MINOR.

[g] I wonder the author should not think of the danger of an old church's being blown down in a high wind.

grievance of the former administration? When he got into power, did he depart one step from the path, in which his predecessor had walked? And yet were we not, upon the expulsion of the former party, and the establishment of the latter, as happy as if all our complaints had been redressed? And this stale dog-trick, (I ask the reader's pardon for using so genteel a word on so dirty a subject) has been with success played over and over, both before and since. We see ourselves repeatedly gulled by the false pretences of a set of ambitious or avaritious men, who set us a-raving for their profit; and we go on from age to age, quarrelling we know not about what, and agreeing again we know not how; wasting our blood and treasure in windmill wars, and our ink in party-pamphlets, the paper of which would, if unstained, have bottomed goose-pies, or wrapped spice, with equal success; in calling one another nick-names [b], with as much zeal, as if names changed natures; in hating one another for judging differently of what tends most to the general advantage; and, in short, in doing every thing, but growing wiser. For my part, I am determined not to make to myself a graven image, or the likeness of any thing in the court above, or in the minority beneath, to bow down to it, or worship it.

IN physics, it is found, that bodies heated to a great degree are proportionably long in cooling. It is not

so

[b] Whig, Tory, Majority, Minority, Jacobite, Disaffected, Outs, Ins, Courtiers, Patriots, Rogues all. Vide fifty thousand pamphlets, and fifty millions of news papers. CRITO MINOR.

ESSAY I.

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so in politics. A free people are sometimes observed to be very suddenly heated to an extreme degree, and as suddenly cooled. How long it may be before the good people of England will be cool enough to look back on the transactions of the last decad of years, with the same eye of tranquillity, as we now do on those I have referred to, page 7, it is impossible to determine. But whenever they do, I am inclinable to think, it will not be without the same wonder, as we now review the Sacheverelian, and Walpolio-Pultneian controversies.

It is pity, the independent people do not judge more consistently. If they did, they would throw the whole blame of political misconduct upon the ministry, and cut off all recrimination. It is likewise pity, on the other hand, that ministers do not shew themselves unbiased by indirect views. They would by that means roll over, upon the broad shoulders of the people, the whole charge of every miscarriage. As matters are now managed between ministers and people, the former screen their mal-administration under the plausible defence of their being forced, by the inconsistent clamours of the latter, into measures, which their better judgment disapproves of; and the latter justly accuse the former of worming themselves into power and place, with the view of aggrandizing themselves and their families, much more than of serving their country. There is this difference however, between ministers and people, that ministers may be actuated by wrong motives, and are, besides, as liable to be

misled, as other men, even when *disposed*, which, in christian charity, I sincerely believe happens very rarely, to be *faithful* to their trust. The independent people, on the contrary, are only liable to be *deceived*. They have no *indirect* view in stickling for or against a ministry. There may, therefore, be more hope of setting the judgment of the *undesigning* people right, than of reforming the bad dispositions of *crafty* ministers.

IT would be a considerable advance toward helping the well-meaning, but misled people, to a founder way of judging in political matters, if they could be brought to see their *former* inconsistencies. For example,

ONE would imagine, on hearing the loud complaints we have of late been used to, of inadequate treaties, excises, and secretary's warrants (sore evils under the sun, no doubt) that we should be *equally* severe on all, who ever had any hand in such mal-administrations; that is, on all ministries. But, no such matter. The good people of England consider it as a part of their birth-right privilege, that they shall not be confined to blame, or commend, *uniformly*; but shall be free to execrate in one ministry the very measures they allowed in another. They insist that they shall be at liberty to celebrate a noble duke for *refusing* a pension, and to approve of a great c——r for *accepting* one; to own the justness of CROMWELL's maxims, "Hang well, " and pay well, and you shall be well served;" and yet to approve of the endeavours of a popular gentleman in favour

avour of a cowardly admiral [i]; to pour contempt on a noble peer, who had very justly lost his popularity, and a few months afterwards approve of his being joined in the administration with one, who has always been, with great reason, supremely popular; to call one minister a white horse, and the other a black, and then insist on their being yoked together; to execrate the Tories for mal-administration, and think themselves well ruined, if they are ruined by Whigs. The consistency of these arbitrary approbations and disapprobations, is, I must confess, beyond the reach of my fathoming line.

WILL it not be, hereafter, when the party-fever comes to cool, thought a little unsteady, that we should celebrate the same person for violently opposing continental connexions, and for violently promoting them. The reader is desired to take notice, that none of these remarks are intended as any reflexion on a character, which, in spite of frailty, inseparable from all human characters, will ever command admiration. I only mean to suggest, that we should better shew our wisdom by laying down certain well-founded principles, and uniformly keeping to them; than by making, as we too commonly do in this country, a god of one man, and a devil of another; and then promiscuously

B 6

applaud-

[i] WHOSE exemplary punishment was precisely what first gave spirit to the late war; the success of which, but for that salutary measure, might have proved very different from what it did: and this measure Mr. P. opposed.

CRITO MINOR.

applauding, against our better knowledge, all the measures of the former, and condemning in the lump, whatever is done by the latter. Why should we not own one minister to be a great man, and yet see his failings? Why should we not confess another to be a prevailingly contemptible character, though he may have occasionally blundered into the right?

IN the war which was terminated by the glorious peace of Aix-la-chapelle, was it not the general cry, That the interests of Britain were sacrificed to those of the continent? Did we not strenuously insist, on the breaking out of the late war, that Britain should stand wholly clear of continental embroilments [k]? Did we not, a few months afterwards, rejoice at the unmeasurable profusion [l] of British money on the continent, as if we had thought the mere throwing away of money was conquering the enemy?

SUPPOSE we were to resume our original opinion. I cannot, for my part, see, that the new is better than

[k] MEMBERS of parliament were instructed to that purpose, and Mr. P. forced (forely against the will of the late K.) into the ministry, in consequence chiefly of his declarations against continental connexions.

CRITO MINOR.

[l] IT is pity, the public is not informed, by the commissioners of enquiry, of the particulars of this mystery of iniquity, which would make every Englishman's blood run cold; but would be very useful for giving us some idea of a continental war. At present we do not seem to know what we are doing, when we engage in it.

CRITO MINOR.

than the old. Suppose we were candidly to grant, that, as was many times foretold, the forty millions lavished away in Germany, gained us no material advantage [m]; but might, if saved toward keeping up a defensive *naval* war, have been of important benefit toward gaining and securing the necessary superiority over the enemy. Did we not formerly agree, That opposing France by land is warring in the very manner she desires; her *fort* being her innumerable army, as ours is our fleet. I cannot help thinking, that twenty thousand men on board a fleet, attacking, from time to time, and constantly alarming her extensive coasts in the channel, the ocean, and the Mediterranean, would have employed one hundred and fifty thousand of her men. That thus we should have done as much execution with 20,000 men, as France with 150,000; whereas, on land, 20,000 English are no more than 20,000 French. That thus we should have made a most powerful revulsion from the French army, and done service to Hanover, and the countries we were in alliance with; whereas, by making them the seat of the war, we did them inexpressible mischief. That in warring against France on the continent, we finally lose what we expend; whereas in a naval war, the main expence is laid out among ourselves. That France can never oppose our *naval* force with the more success for our not meeting her in Germany. That she never

[m] MR. P. when he was anti-continental, made, as is very well remembered, a long and elaborate speech in the H. of C. shewing, that Britain never was, nor could be, a gainer in warring on the continent. It were to be wished that that great man had published his reasons for changing so materially his opinion. CRITO MINOR.

ver has been, probably never will be, so impolitic, as to suffer us to divert her from a *more* to a *less* promising plan of operation ; that therefore, her drawing us into Germany has always been, ever will be, with a view to her own advantage, and to heighten our expence, for which very reason, we certainly ought never to suffer her to decoy us thither. That America's being conquered in Germany is not so near the truth, as to affirm, that England was conquered there. It is notorious, that the whole people once looked on continental war as ruin to England. Has there appeared any reason, why we should since have altered our opinion to the diametrical opposite ? If there has not, how is our consistency vindicable ? To put the matter at the lowest ; if we were wrong in our original anti-continenta notions, let us at least be moderate in those we have now adopted, and not, like renegadoes in religion, exclaim with unbounded zeal against the opinion which was once *our own*. But to proceed :

WILL it not be hereafter alledged, that decency must have gone, for a season or two, out of fashion ; when a set of patriots made it a matter of open-mouth'd opposition, That their King had made use of his undoubted prerogative, of choosing his own servants ? Will it not be said, " Why did not the discontented point out the Sovereign's violation of his coronation-oath, of magna charta, of the act of settlement, or treaty of union ? Why did they not either impeach the persons they excepted against, or hold their peace ? "

WHAT

WHAT matter who is minister, or who favourite, so the busines of the nation is done? If the nation is betray'd, let the treachery be pointed out, and the traitors answer with their heads. If the complaint is only, That certain grandees are not in the places they choose, what is that to the independent people? Will barking at a supposed favourite do the public business? Is it not a rule in all disputes, to attack the argument, and leave the man out? Why should not this rule be observed in politics, as well as in science? Where the clamour is so loud against *men*, is it not a presumption, that we are at a loss for somewhat to say against *measures*? Not that I know of any period, in which there might not be found substantial matter for complaint. And the quantity of this matter, when impartially weighed, is likewise, under all ministries, much more *equal*, than our violent partisans would have us think. Nor do we generally complain most of the weightiest grievances. But of this more afterwards.

SOME years ago, as is remembered by many, a certain monarch, deceased, thought proper to venture, for once, to use his prerogative, and to confer, without leave from the junto, on a particular nobleman, a place of high honour and trust. The other persons then in the ministry waited on their Royal Master in a body, and told him, they would all immediately resign, if that nobleman was not immediately disgraced. That good-natured Prince, not being a native of this country, and fearing the consequences of dissension among the great, yielded the point, and obeyed the commands of the

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oligarchy. Which transaction leads naturally enough to the following reflexions. That, in a free country, where the Prince is to consider himself as the father of his people, and consequently to regulate his whole conduct on the generous maxim, *Salus populi suprema lex*; it is proper, that he consult, in all momentous proceedings, much less his Royal prerogative, than the general *well-founded* and *rational* judgment of the subjects, especially of those, whose large interest gives them proportional weight. Nor will this ever prove derogatory from his supreme dignity: For a *free* people are to be governed in the *manner*, and, *cæteris paribus*, by the *persons* they approve of; and what the independent people approve of, is, generally speaking, therefore right, because they approve of it. But it is equally reasonable, on the other hand, that the people, especially the leaders, shew themselves tender of the honour of their prince, so far as not to render him contemptible in the eyes of his own subjects, and of the world, by compelling him to an unkingly submission to oligarchical insolence. There are certainly more delicate methods of adjusting a difference between a King and his ministry, than bullying. If, in the case I refer to, there were objections against the character of the nobleman too hastily advanced by his Royal Master, why were they not decently pointed out? If it was necessary he should quit his station, could not the matter have been privately compromised in such manner, that his degradation should have been less *sudden*, and should have appeared, to the *public*, the consequence of misconduct on his part, and to have been the *voluntary*, not the *forced* act of the sovereign? For what is a King, who has lost his regal dignity,

nity, and consequently, his weight in government? If he is to be absolutely at the beck of a *junto*, he may as well give himself up to a *favourite* of his *own choosing*, as to a set of *despots*, who assume to rule him *against* his *inclination*. On the whole, though it may occasionally be imprudent in the Prince to make use of his *prerogative*, without due attention to the sense of the people, it is the highest impudence in his subjects to resent it in the taste of the times I refer to.

I WELL remember, several years ago, when a certain personage of supreme eminence was in his minority, that I was, from time to time, informed, by a venerable person (whose monument, erected at the expence of the Princess Dowager of Wales, is to be seen in Westminster-Abbey) of the laborious and successful diligence of a certain nobleman, in superintending, and assisting, on all occasions, in the education of the amiable Pr. of W. It occurred to me at that time, that there was a great probability of that nobleman's being one day advanced to high honours. It was natural to expect that a Pr— of the best dispositions should, as all good pupils, look upon his educator as a father; and should endeavour to reward the labours of the careful guide of his youth. And, I believe, there was not, at that time any person, who did not think that nobleman's services worthy of reward [n]. I cannot say, indeed, that, from the character I had of

him

[n] PITY, that no rewards will suit, but such as imply ambition, or avarice, in the receiver, and excite envy in competitors! The friendship of Princes must be but little valued; since, we see, nobody will accept it gratis.

CRITO MINOR.

him, as a man of books, rather than of busness, I imagined he ever would choose to engage himself in any *active* station. Nor did I, nor any one else, at that time imagine, it would ever be made an objection against his being employed, that he was said to have been born on the wrong side of a river. My view in mentioning these particulars, is only to lead to the following queries.

WERE we right, when we celebrated the persons, who had formed so amiable a Pr— to reign over us? Or, were we right, when (six months afterwards) we execrated them? Were we right, when we magnified, almost beyond the pitch of humanity, that amiable Pr— himself, of whom, at that time, we had no experimental knowledge? Or, were we right, when (on finding that some great folks were disgusted about preferment) we almost lost sight of our loyalty, after we had seen the young Mon— set out with making the judges free, by giving them their places for life; discouraging, by his example, profusion, gaming, masquerading, and criminal gallantry, and reducing his revenue to eight hundred thousands a year?

We have not, to this day, proved the justness of our pretensions to judge of ministers *prophetically*, or to condemn them before they have done either good or evil. This, however, we thought fit, on that occasion to do with a very high hand. And I wish, that the persons, against whom the premature opposition was raised, had only had the virtue, and the sagacity, to confute the unreasonable clamour, by quitting the dirty track, in which almost all their predecessors have so long

long been drudging, and applying themselves to the redress of the real and important grievances of the state. Alas ! my unhappy country ! When shalt thou see thy great concerns in the hands of men, whose whole dependence for approbation will be on the irreproachable disinterestedness of their measures ? And let me add, when shall we, the independent people, learn to judge of the conduct of those at the helm, with soundness, moderation and consistency ?

WHAT was the late cry against a noble Earl ? Why, he was one of the ministry who made an inadequate peace with France [o]. What was the cry a few years ago against a noble Duke ? The very same. If therefore, the good people of England, do not, in a few years hence, demand the restoration of the noble Earl, notwithstanding his supposed offence, as they have that of the noble Duke, notwithstanding his ; let them account for the consistency of their conduct, as they best can. If the reader concludes, that I am of the party of the noble Earl, and satisfied with the

[o] WOULD Mr. PITT's ultimatum, which was indeed the basis of Lord Bute's peace, have paid the debt of the nation ? Did Lord Bute send any hostages to France ? If one inadequate treaty is bad, is another of the same sort, made by another ministry, good ? Would a single tongue have stirred against the peace of 1761, had it been made by the gentleman, in whom we place (and I own not without some reason) an unexampled confidence ? It is the best ever made for England. How unfortunate the maker, to be as much blamed, as he could have been, had he given us the worst !

CRITO MINOR.

peace.

peace of 1761, he is mistaken. My opinion is, that England ought to make no peace with France. Ceſſations of arms, ſhe may. It is our treaty-making, that undoes us; for a peace with France ties up our hands, while those of our enemy are at liberty.

IN whose ministry, I pray you, have we not been, with reason, complaining of blundering treaties, of exciſes, and of infringements on liberty? What does this lead us to think of ministers? To idolize one, and condemn another? Or to look on all with a jealous and watchful eye, as a ſet of worthies, very much, as the French ſay, *ſujets à caution*. The mere circumstance of a man's thrusting himſelf into a ſtation, in which there is ſo much to be ſcrambled for, renders his integrity and public spirit ſuspicious. What is a court, but a ſcene of thrusting and elbowing, of ſcrambling and plundering? When I ſee a ministry ſerve their country without fee or reward, I ſhall incline to think they mean the public advantage. Till then, they muſt excuse me, if I conſider them, as chiefly in pursuit of another object, ſome more, ſome leſs, eagerly; ſome with more, ſome with leſs, fagacity; none, perhaps, intending direc[t] ruin to their country; but all too ſecure of conſequences, when in pursuit of their ſelfiſh views.

I MAY, however, perhaps, ſee the great in a diſkier light than others do. Few private persons have had ſuch an opportunity of obſerving the worthlessness of many of them, as I had ſome years ago, when there was a public-ſpirited deſign laid before those of them, who ſeemed the moſt likely to encourage what

what had in it any relish of good. They first threw out their sneaking doubts, surmises, and apprehensions, that what was proposed might, though well intended, do harm; and then, one after another, basely deserted a design, which, they must in their consciences have known, was likely, with *their patronage*, to have proved eminently useful, for a purpose of supreme importance; no less than the improvement of the morals of all ranks. The design was pursued by a few private hands, so far, as effectually to confute the ridiculous cavil, of its being likely to produce bad effects, and then dropped, because the whole of its success depended upon the *eclat*, with which it was to have appeared to the public (who shewed a readiness to come fully into the reception of it) as patronised and carried on by some of the most eminent persons in the kingdom. They denied their protection to the *first proposers* of the scheme, and would not take it up, nor carry it on in any other way of their own *choosing*. Nor could I ever explain their conduct on that occasion, otherwise than by supposing that the great have reasons of state for not desiring to see the people better than their betters. But their policy is, in this instance, egregious folly: A wise and virtuous people are, indeed, less obnoxious to bribery; but, at the same time, much more governable, than those of a contrary character; this all history demonstrates. And the general character of a people should be no inconsiderable point to statesmen.

THE part, which the many took in the late contest, was, in my humble opinion, precisely that they should have opposed. This nation has been but too long rather an oligarchy than any thing else; yet the

the voice of the people was heard on the side of a junto, who complained of their being deprived of a power, which they had already engrossed but too long. A frequent change of hands is a thing always to be desired for its own sake merely. And a free people ought ever to be jealous of power too long possessed by any one set of men whatever. Some of the free states of Italy, accordingly, elect their magistrates several times in a year. Whoever will take a view of the history of the enslaving of nations, will find, that it is always the *great*, who have oppressed their respective countries, where the loss of liberty has not been owing to conquest by foreign enemies. Ought we not then to fear every thing, that may tend to the establishment of *oligarchy* in this free country; ought we not to wish to see power as much *diffused*, and as little *engrossed* as possible?

AGAIN, has it not always been allowed, that the most effectual method for *disolving* parties, is to take off, either by kind or severe means, their *leaders*? Are there, or are there not, in the nation, any of those hot-brain'd mortals formerly called *Tories*? If there are none, the pretended grievance, of *Tories* placed in stations of power and trust, is chimerical. If there are *Tories*, and if it were to be wished there were none, whether is it the most promising scheme, for this purpose, to keep up the enmity by setting them at defiance, or to win them by kindness, to a more reasonable way of thinking? Or are we indeed so shallow, as not yet to know, that a *Tory* (if any such being exists) *out of place*, is a *Whig*, or what the court pleases, *in place*? Was not then, the measure in question, viz. of employing men of different parties, precisely

cisely what we should have approved of? If it be said, We expect better things from one set of men than from another, I should think Dr. ARBUTHNOT's answer on his death-bed, to his anxious valetudinary friend, desiring him to recommend to him a physician, very applicable to the present point: "Send," says the good doctor, "for the next apothecary." Which, turned politically, will run, *mutatis mutandis*, as follows; "Employ either a Whig or a Tory, " for one is as bad as the other." But to proceed:

WILL it not be hereafter suspected, that the moral sense was oppressed by a temporary lethargy, when we carried our zeal for the good cause such lengths, as to overlook the grossest vices in those, who took what we called the right side in the political controversy, as well as the most universally-acknowledged virtues in those, whom our fancy ranged on the opposite? Does then political orthodoxy make a faint of an open adulterer? Is every person, who differs from us in politics, a miscreant? Are we not more sure of the ruinous tendency of exemplary vice, than we can be of the truth of any political creed whatever? Is there any method so effectual for bringing our own party into disgrace, as opening our arms to receive persons of publicly infamous characters? What integrity in *political* conduct is to be expected from the man, who lives *openly* in the breach of the most solemn of all *vows*? Every shameless violator of the laws of decency, is one, who sets the general opinion, nay, and his own conscience, at defiance. What hold have we of such a man?

PERHAPS it may be objected, "If those, who take the right side, will disclaim all connexion with

"openly vicious men, they will have few to stand by them;" I answer, if they should, those few will be worth a multitude of reprobates. Wherever a good man appears, he casts a glory round him. A wicked man, like a foul fiend rising, makes the place hideous. If it should be said, "There are men of as immoral characters in one party as in the other :" what can I answer, but, "O virtue! O my country (*p.*)!" To proceed,

WILL it not hereafter seem to the impartial, unaccountable, that, when a person, from whose education and understanding common decency at least might have been expected, thought proper, publicly, in print, to give the direct lye to Majesty seated on the British throne, and addressing the whole united legislature, with all the eyes of Europe on him; so many among us should *approve* of such elegancy of behaviour? Was there any thing questionable in the Speech? A member of parliament had it surely in his power to move the *house*, that it might be taken into consideration. What occasion for an open attack, in *papers* circulated among *coffee-houses* and *ale-houses*, upon a young and gentle Prince, who, himself, never treated the meanest person in such a manner? The pretence, "That the blame fell wholly on the ministry, who are supposed to frame the speeches," is frivolous; and no person of candor can, I think, avoid seeing the essential difference between what the King takes wholly upon *himself*, and what is *counter-signed* by a minister.

BUT

4 [p] ADDISON.

BUT let me add, What did the ministry gain by meddling with the offender? Did they not know, that, in England, whoever is punished is pitied, be his offence what it will? Would a British government shew, along with a conduct unexceptionably disinterested, a magnanimity superior to the cavils of the discontented, they would soon render libelling as harmless as railing on the Thames. How severe was the check given by the Spartan Ephori to the ambassadors, who had be-dawbed the benches, on which those magistrates sat! Those grave senators only ordered the cryer to publish, That no body should restrain the ambassadors from behaving themselves, while they staid at Sparta, in whatever manner they might, in their great wisdom, think fit. Would the serving them with a secretary's warrant, or an attachment, have shewn their levity, or the Spartan gravity in a light so striking? But to return,

WHERE (will it not be said by and by, when we come to cool?) was our justly-boasted English generosity, when we suffered a set of riff-raff railers and rhymesters to abuse, in the most illiberal manner, our respectable brethren the inhabitants of the northern provinces of this united island, merely because a minister, against whom we had, perhaps justly enough, taken offence, happened to be connected with that part of the kingdom, as well as with this? If Sir RICHARD STEELE thought the North Britons in his times deserving of the appellation of a *nation of heroes*, how much more would he have honoured them, had he seen them send out, as they did in the late war, almost three times their quota of men; had he seen those men engaged in every scene, where danger appeared, or glory was to be

won by deeds of valour ; and pouring, without measure, their best blood in the common cause ? And was this a proper time to fall upon them in a manner, that — But I restrain my pen : for I mean not to widen the breach.

I CANNOT with certainty foretell how this matter may appear by and by : but I can tell what will shew more wisdom in us than we have exhibited by railing at the people of North Britain (which is, at best, to much the same purpose as a scolding match between husband and wife, who had better spare themselves the trouble of falling out, as they must at any rate make it up again) I mean, our endeavouring to *imitate* them ; to imitate their wise method of instructing their *children* [q], and principling their *vulgar*. I am so fully persuaded of the ingenuous temper of my countrymen, that I will add no more on this disgraceful affair, concluding, that their own sense of their error will more than sufficiently punish it.

WILL it not some time hence be thought a little particular, that it should ever become a subject of public debate, whether the very Personage, who, not many years ago, had the natural expectation of being at this time Qu. of Br. should be *one, among others*, in a Regency ? Yet how many, among the independent people, exulted, on seeing *One* in this manner disgraced, who was, for twenty years together, the idol of the virtuous, and the unreproached pattern for a whole sex to copy after ! We may, I should think, at any time, carry our party-rage to a competent pitch of extra-

[q] SEE Mr. LOCKE's letters to Mr. MOLINEUX.

extravagance, and yet have the decency, in our anger, to let *one Family* escape unbespattered. Suppose, that what has been, at random, and contrary to all probability, thrown out against that once-admired Person, is all the while totally groundless (I should not think it would be easy to find him, who would affirm, upon oath, that it is not) let us only for a moment consider what we have been doing. We have, without any possibility of advantage from thence to our cause, been stabbing the interest of virtue. For nothing can more essentially prejudice the cause of virtue, than to shew her as deserted by her former votaries. We have been scattering firebrands, arrows, and death; we have been doing what we could to distress an innocent person; of the weaker sex; a stranger among us; one who filled, for many years, a very eminent station, in a very exemplary manner, and who has given us the most amiable Prince in Europe to reign over us; we have been harrowing the soul of this illustrious Person, by charging ——— But I again break off abruptly: For what I aim at is, Not to repeat grievances; but, To advise amendment.

THESE are a few instances, of what seem to me strange inconsistencies in our late political approbations and disapprobations; which must, I think, in some points, greatly bewilder the understanding of a ministry, though sincerely desirous to govern according to the inclinations of the independent people.

AND yet I must say, that, on the other hand, many things seem to me more difficult, than to content the good people of England. Let a ministry shew themselves steadily attentive to the interest of the nation,

and superior to the sordid schemes, we almost universally see people in their station pursue; and the generous people of this country will adore their good qualities, and make every allowance for their errors. Of this we have lately had a proof so pregnant, as not to need pointing out.

I LOOK for nothing else, however, for myself, than that many readers should conclude I am, what most people are, engaged to a party [r]. But I think I have, by blaming on both, or rather on all sides, made it difficult for them to determine on which side they shall range me. I fairly own, I have not yet seen, nor read in the history of this country, from the Revolution down to our times (the times before that happy period are out of the question) of a ministry, whose whole, or general conduct I should choose the task of defending. But, if I were attached to a party (whereas I am really not disposed to be any man's fool) I should be very cautious of irritating the zealots of either side. For I should be sorry to have my mother's reputation exposed to the vengeance of our flap-dash partizans; as I know not how far ill reports to her disadvantage might gain credit. For, though she is in her eighty-second year, she is a good looking woman, and I verily believe, not more justly hitherto unsuspected of a turn to gallantry, than was one, whom we have seen lately accused of that frailty.

WHEN-

[r] I WONDER, the author should pretend to guess, how the public will judge of him, or his book; when it is notorious, that the public are now got into a *new* way of judging, not to be guessed at beforehand. CRITO MINOR.

WHENEVER, for my sins, the spirit of ambition is sent upon me, I know very well how to get preferment. I know, I have only to bespatter the K. the Qu. the Pr. of W. the B. of O. and the Pr—fs D—r, and the rest of the illustrious list, for whom the silly godly folks pray at church: and the work is done. The wisdom of the British government, is, To shew kindness to those who have no conscience; concluding that men of principle will be their friends of course.

EXCLUSIVE of the dispute about the power of Secretaries of State in cases of libels; the subjects of the late animosities were not matter of chief concern to the kingdom. If they had, we should not have seen the great interest themselves so much. The real grievances, under which this nation groans, are chiefly the following, viz. The hideous incumbrance of a debt of one hundred and forty millions. The length of parliaments, and the inequality of the parliamentary representative. The enormous power of the court, by means of the opportunity they have of gratifying with places and pensions, those, whom they may want to corrupt. The unconstitutional evil of a multitude of placemen in the house of commons. The tremendous power of certain tribunals, from which our boasted privilege of trial by juries gives no relief. The undetermined state of that fundamental point, Whether juries are to decide in matters of law, or of fact. The scandalously immoral example, set by too many persons of high rank; and the total neglect of the manners of the low people. The universal decay of public spirit, and prevalency of political corruption. The

opportunity allowed, by neglect in the execution of our laws, for ingrossing and monopolizing the necessaries of life, to the distressing of the poor, and increasing their numbers, and the enhancing of the price of labour, and of manufactures. The wrong management, in every particular, of the helpless poor. The enormous multiplicity of useless and ineffectual oaths, and the cruel restraints on conscience, by needless lay-tests, and clerical subscriptions. The destructive effects of the licentiousness of the public diversions, and of public unrestrained lewdness, on the morals of the people. The neglect of population, and discouragements of matrimony. The intolerable expence, tediousness, and uncertainty of law, and consequent precarious state of property, &c.

WHAT honour redounds to the illustrious line of worthies, who have guided our affairs into their present happy state, I leave the reader to judge; and whether I had not reason to say (page 28.) that I should not choose the task of defending the general conduct of any ministry whatever.

ON every account, and in every view, the present involved state of the nation must be matter of anxiety to every thinking and well-affected mind. A quantity of imaginary wealth in a country, enhances the rates of all the articles of commerce, and necessaries of life. When people, by means of paper credit, come easily at what passes current as money, they will more willingly give a large price for what they want to purchase, than if they were obliged to find, on all occasions, real gold and silver coin. The continual transferring of property from hand to hand, by way

way of stock-jobbing, employs, in a very useless way, a number of persons, who would otherwise have been carrying on arts, manufactures, and commerce, to the great advantage of the nation. Were there no government funds, in which persons of property could secure their superlucrations, there must be commercial funds for that purpose, and people must employ their money in trade and manufactures. How much this would tend to the advancement of commerce, needs not to be specified. And this furnishes an answer to those objectors against paying off the national debt, who ask, "What must people do with their money, if there were no government securities?" They would apply it to a much more national use. And the consequence would be, that so many millions turned into the channel of trade, would be of the same advantage, as now the want of them is of disadvantage, to commerce. In Holland, and at Bristol, people of almost all ranks are concerned in trade.

THE national debt renders public affairs frightfully precarious. To intimidate, is almost to ruin us. What a general consternation was occasioned a few years ago by a band of Highland ruffians! And since, by a few flat-bottom'd boats! Neither of them a more proper object of fear for this mighty nation (if it had not been on account of precarious public credit) than the frog in the fable for the lion.

LET it be considered what an advantage our formidable rivals in trade gain over us in foreign markets, by means of our having an extra load of several sterling millions yearly lying on our exports, while theirs are burdened with little more than the current expen-

ces of the year. They dash out the debts incurred in war with a sponge. We must not do business in so compendious a manner. They raise money by obliging every subject to lay down the twentieth penny; and demand of the church, and the *fermiers généraux*, a free gift, never to be accounted for. We go on from generation to generation, borrowing, and spending as fast as we borrow, leaving the burden of the interest on the national commerce.

THE continuance of an enormous national debt will be productive of every kind of mischief. Let it be only considered, that one thousand pounds carried out of the nation yearly, for fifty years together, makes it poorer by the sum of one hundred and sixteen thousand pounds and upwards. Therefore, one million annually remitted abroad, to pay the interest due to foreign stockholders, will, at the end of fifty years hence, make the nation one hundred and sixteen millions poorer, the amount of what it would have accumulated to by interest only. But if we suppose the money employed in profitable foreign trade, it is not easy to say what the loss may be. Therefore it should follow, that we ought to be supremely anxious about getting free from that part of the public debt, which is due to *foreigners*; since the payment of so large a tribute (for what is it else) is the impoverishing of the nation.

AN *individual*, plunged in debt, is confessedly in a precarious condition. Why should the case be different with respect to a *nation* involved in the same manner? What would be the consequence, if the exigencies of state should one day demand an immediate supply of extra-

extraordinary money, for equipping a naval armament; and a sudden pannic, raised by our artful and insidious enemy, should restrain our monied men from venturing any farther on government security? Mere caprice, or a bad report raised no one knows how, may at any time blow up public credit. Can we then too soon get out of our present precarious condition? I do not choose, because I do not think it is the part of a good citizen, to be too explicit on so delicate a subject. If we cannot now find ways and means toward the redress of this grievance, we may depend upon its becoming more and more difficult. This will, I believe, appear from what follows.

SCHEMES there have been offered enough for paying the national debt, the respective authors of which have each been certain of the success of his own. I will not say, that this political problem is as difficult, or as hopeless of solution, as that of the longitude. But the fates of the two have nearly been hitherto alike: much proposed; but little executed. Whether any thing useful for this grand purpose may be collected from the following hints, is submitted to the public.

It has been proposed, That, as the whole amount of the national debt does not exceed a tenth part of the value of the capital of the nation, every person shall give up voluntarily a tenth part of his property, by which a fund would be raised, that would equal the sum of the national debt, and would therefore be sufficient to pay it off; which would be no real damage to any person, because, the taxes necessary at present for paying the interest annually due to the public

creditors, might then of course be abolished, so that ninety pounds *per ann.* would go as far toward the expences of housekeeping, as now one hundred. This would undoubtedly set the nation free, and put our manufactures on a more nearly equal foot with those of our rivals. But who will undertake to persuade a million of people to give up a small part of their property, to save the state? Who will take upon him to allot what every individual shall give up? Who will engage to satisfy those, who may think themselves injured in the allotment? In what manner shall merchants, manufacturers, and artists, give up their just tenths? How shall a proprietor of lands or houses, to the value of five hundred pounds, give up precisely the value of fifty pounds of his estate? These seem great difficulties. But, perhaps, somewhat might be done this way, and somewhat in others. All that can be said of any such proposal, is, *Valeat quantum valere potest.*

PRINCES have sometimes raised large sums by giving knighthoods, and other honours, for money. Might there not be offered certain new-invented honours, titles, badges, privileges, exemptions, and the like, to such, who should bring a certain sum into the sinking fund? Suppose the contributions for such a purpose to be brought in on certain appointed days, the King present, in state, and to confer in person the proposed honours, in the sight of thousands; printed lists to be published of the names and contributions, with the rewards and dignities conferred, &c. Such honours (being obtained by an act of real patriotism) would at least give a *real* lustre to those who received them: Whereas our titles, knighthoods, degrees, and the like,

like, prostituted, as they too often are, to worthlessness, no more deserve the ambition of a wise man, than the painted face of a harlot does his love.

We know, that a sum of money put to compound interest, that is, the interest added yearly to the principal, doubles itself in a certain time, longer or shorter, according to the rate of interest. Could a capital of a few millions be raised, and put to interest in the public funds, it would in time amount to some proportion of the national debt, and would be, from the first, of great advantage to public credit; as it would be somewhat real for the public creditors to trust to.

It is probable, that many of the public creditors, who have no children, nor near relations, to provide for, would be willing to accept of life-annuities for part of their stock, which would, by degrees, extinguish that part of the debt, which should be thus turned into life-annuities. But it is difficult to propose ways and means for enabling the government to pay, during the life of the annuitants, so large an interest as eight per cent.

OUR artful enemy, unequal to us in war, is but too likely to get the advantage of our tax-loaded trade; now we are at peace. If we are in danger of being excluded by them from our old accustomed ports, it is the more necessary that we look out for new marts, and extend our commerce to places yet unfrequented by our merchants, as the interior parts of Africa, behind our settlements, &c.

A CERTAIN great commercial company has been blamed for churlishly preventing private traders from carrying their adventures to places where the company has no commerce. How just this charge is, I pretend not to determine. But it has been alledged, that they have seized cloths intended by their servants for exportation, because, forsooth, they have an exclusive privilege; while the poor's rate in some clothing towns has been, through failure of the manufacture, at no less than eight shillings in the pound. If the company can get as much profit by the export of five thousand cloths, as by ten thousand, they will, perhaps, choose to export the former number rather than the latter. Thus five thousand cloths will remain unfolded, and the manufacturers will starve. All which is directly contrary to the salutary purpose of improving the sinking fund, by enlarging our trade. The same company is said to have the exclusive privilege of trading to various places, to which they neither trade themselves, nor will suffer private adventurers. This is the very dog in the manger. The African company's charter was, some years ago, bought up by the government, and a motion was then made for laying open the East India trade. But it was overruled, and their patent was renewed to the year 1766. It has often been strenuously insisted on, that all monopolies tend to cramp and diminish the national commerce. If so, they cannot be too soon abolished. A sufficient extension of our commerce would alone, by improving the sinking fund, enable us by degrees to diminish the national debt, and in time reduce it within compass.

PUBLIC honours and emoluments ought to be proposed by all governments, to the discoverers of any thing useful in arts, manufactures, and commerce. The invention of a richer dye, or a more beautiful, or more convenient cloth, stuff, or silk, than any now known; might prove of great advantage to the sinking fund. In proportion to the praise, which is due to the illustrious *Society of Arts*, such is the reproach, which falls on the G ——— t, which sees itself so shamefully outdone by a private society.

It is reckoned that the Dutch employ twenty thousand sailors, and gain five millions *per ann.* by the herring fishery in our British seas, which we cannot contrive to make it worth our while to carry on. If one compares the disadvantageous situation of Holland for the herring-fishery with our advantages, it will appear very wonderful, that we should be so helpless, as to see a neighbouring people enrich themselves with a trade, of which we ought to reap the chief profits. Why do not we carry on the fishery in their manner, if we find our own unsuccessful?

SMUGGLING, on account of its being a heavy detriment to the revenue, ought, at such a time as the present, to be particularly discouraged; of which the government do not seem to be insensible. It has often been found, that the lowering of duties has increased, instead of diminishing (as might have been expected) the revenue, by making it less worth while to smuggle. This was remarkably verified in the effects of the abatement lately made in the tea duty.

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The Dutch subjects are heavily taxed: and yet they have little smuggling, because their duties are so laid as to render it impracticable to wrong greatly the public revenues. This saves them a prodigious annual expence, which we are obliged to lay out, to the great detriment of the sinking fund.

MIGHT not the boundless tracts of good, but uncultivated, or not sufficiently cultivated land in Britain and Ireland be made to turn to the public advantage, by being either given as a security for the national debt, and a fund toward the payment of the interest; or a means for maintaining an innumerable multitude of working people for the advantage of the sinking fund?

COULD the public creditors have real security on some of the lands acquired in the late war, the danger, to which the state is obnoxious on account of public credit, would be lessened, because there would thus be a fund to answer the interest, and realize the principal, or some part of them. When St. Christopher's was taken in Queen ANNE's wars, the French part of the island was sold for the public benefit.

THE peopling and improving of our colonies never was more seasonable than at present; nor indeed can a trading nation colonize too much, so she does not depopulate herself. Could we by a chemical process hatch human creatures, and fill our immense territories in America, with men and women ready grown up to strength for labour, we might be more indifferent about our enemy's interfering with our European commerce. I think it is not to be doubted, that Britain,

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as well as our colonies, might have been by this time more populous than they are, if it had not been for the unhappy antipathy of our people to foreigners. It is notorious, that we owe to foreigners the whole of our arts and manufactures [*s*], and yet, from HORACE's [*s*] time to the present, we have, on almost all occasions, shewn an unnatural jealousy of foreigners. The anxiety we were in through fear of the Jews, is fresh in every body's memory. Even the inhabitants of the northerly parts of our own island have been, by some narrow-minded people, looked on with an evil eye, as if they crowded too fast in upon us. Could such persons think, they would understand, that, were we to drain away some thousands of working people yearly from the continent, we should only enrich this kingdom, and impoverish those we unpeopled, in proportion as we proceeded in such work; and, if we would wish North Britain ruined, and South Britain at the same time enriched, there is no way so effectual for that purpose, as to draw all the northern people southward [*u*]. One would wonder that any person who has seen the beginning of his teens, should be so childish, as not to perceive, that if a foreign shoemaker, for example, comes into Britain, tho' our British *shoemakers* may think his arrival a disadvantage to them, yet it must be of advantage to our broad-cloth manufacturers

[*s*] SEE ANDERSON's Hist. and Chronol. Deduct. of Commerce.

[*t*] VISAM Britannos hospitibus feros.

[*u*] SIR JOS. CHILD says, a country cannot be over-peopled. And indeed the idea of too *populous* a kingdom, where there is commerce, seems much the same as that of too *flourishing* a kingdom. CRITO MINOR.

facturers and taylors, because the foreign shoemaker will want cloaths ; to our linen manufacturers, because he will want shirts ; to our hofiers, because he will want stockings ; to our hatters, because he will want hats ; and to the public revenue, out of which our fleets and armies are paid, because he will consume several articles which are taxed. In how many respects therefore is this foreigner of advantage to our country, all which one narrow-hearted shoemaker would prevent ? Turn it the other way, and suppose, in consequence of the selfishness of the shoemakers of the corporation of London, for example, it were determined, that all shoemakers, but those, who are at present free of the city, should, to the number of some thousands, be exported out of the island ; would not this proceeding be severely felt by the woollen and linen manufacturers, the taylors, the hatters, the hofiers, and the revenue ?

AN increase of the number of his Majesty's subjects, both in the mother-country and colonies, would increase trade. This would increase the sinking fund, which is appropriated, and ought to be strictly applied (which, by the by, it never has been) to the lessening of the public burden. Therefore all regulations tending to the increase of the number of his Majesty's subjects are at this time peculiarly salutary. There are but two ways, by which this great purpose can be gained, viz. Importation of people from other dominions, and improving population among ourselves. By the former means the state makes an acquisition which proves of *immediate* advantage. For grown persons, the very day they land in Britain, or the plantations, may

may be set to work, to earn their living [x]: whereas children propagated in the country itself, are little better than a burden the first ten or twelve years of their existence. But, as, in every way, increasing the number of our people is an object of supreme consequence, the Marriage act, which tends to check matrimony, must be confessed to be directly ruinous. The author of the *Vindication of Commerce and the Arts*, shews that there is a deficiency of teeming women; that is, if all men of a suitable age for propagation were disposed to marry, and had it in their power, as far as relates to the expence of a family, there could not be found teeming women enough for them. Besides, it is to be observed, that a man is almost as soon capable, and continues so much longer, than a woman. So that if a man of twenty-five marries a woman of eighteen (in country places such matches are sometimes made) he will continue capable of being a father much longer than she a mother. If so, it is of the utmost consequence that *women* be married young; which is precisely what the marriage act discourages. Every year a female continues unmarried, from eighteen upwards, the King loses a subject he has a right to.

[x] THE French, in peopling Canada, obliged all masters of trading ships to carry a certain number of passengers (settlers, who wanted to go to those parts) freight-free, and allowed settlers credit for a certain small sum each, to begin with, requiring one third of the produce of the land annually, as interest, or rent. By which means they secured the actual cultivation of their lands in America. We, on the contrary, have generally given to noblemen and gentlemen, grants of whole provinces; and they have neglected peopling them, or have not had sufficient funds for the purpose. CRITO MINOR.

to. Let it be only considered how great the number is of women in Britain and Ireland, who continue unmarried many years after eighteen; or rather how rare it is to see a woman married at that age. It would be no difficult task to demonstrate, that the difference between the population actually produced in Britain and Ireland (I say nothing of the plantations, because their people marry, commonly enough, at a proper age) and what would be the effect of early marriage, would be, in every twenty years, many millions of subjects. A gentleman of Pennsylvania, well known in the philosophical world, tells me, that the people of that colony double their numbers in every twenty-five years. If the encouragement of early marriage be not an important object, there is no object of importance. In what light does this shew the marriage-act? Perhaps it may be said, "That law " restrains from marriage only those young persons, who "cannot obtain the consent of their parents." True; and a very great evil this is, and of great prejudice to the state. The very judicious author of *Les intérêts de la France mal entendus*, blames greatly, for the same reason, the French law, by which the consent of parents is necessary to the marriage of persons under a certain age. It is notorious that parents never consult the good of the state in disposing of their children in marriage. On the contrary, it is their interest, that their children do not marry young (directly contrary to the interest of the state), because, whenever they are to marry, they must be fortuned, which drains the parents of their wealth; and this evil day they put off as long as possible. The scheme of the parents is likewise, in another respect, unfriendly to the interest of the state. The parents, in general, consider nothing

thing so much, in disposing of their children, as how to match them advantageously as to fortune, as if money was happiness. This, by rendering it difficult to find proper matches, retards marriage. For, if every young woman, who is possessed of what may be called a fortune, must absolutely wait, till she can find a lover, who, besides being in every respect of a suitable character, is likewise her equal as to fortune, she must undoubtedly continue longer unmarried, than if she had only to find a man of suitable qualifications: And, if a young man of merit must not pretend to a young woman superior to him in fortune, he must continue unmarried till he has raised a fortune by industry, and marry at forty, when he should be father of fifteen children. But if a young person of fortune may match with one inferior in that respect, two young people are immediately settled in life in circumstances of comfort. If there be a provision, what matter whether it came by one side or the other, or both? After marriage, it belongs, I believe, to both. Parents, too often, consider nothing but what they call the *prudence* of the match, and accordingly throw their blooming daughters into the arms of rich, but effete old men, to comfort themselves with the thought, that it is "best repenting in a coach and "six." Such matches, however, yield cold comfort to the state. The young people, on the contrary, if left to themselves, are sure to form the very matches the state should wish; that is, they follow nature, and population is the effect.

IT has been said, "What can be more desirable, "than to have our children secured to us; especially "daughters, whose soft natures are easily deluded into "love,

" love, marriage, and ruin ; for an imprudent match is
" to them utter ruin ? True. But so it might be said,
" How terrible is it for the innocent traveller to be at-
" tacked on the highway, and robbed and destroyed !
" How comfortable travelling would be, if all, but per-
" sons of tried virtue, were chained galley-slaves ! Rob-
" bery or murder there could then be none." The point
is not so much, what will secure the children of
persons of fortune from making foolish matches ; as,
what will promote population. For population is the
most important concern in every state ; but in no state
is the prevention of a few foolish marriages (if popula-
tion suffers not) an object of any importance. It is,
indeed, wholly an affair of private, and not of public
concern. Let parents warn their children of the dan-
gerous consequences of throwing themselves away.
But let not population be put to a stand merely to pre-
vent a few tall Irishmen from making their fortunes.
I ought not to say, *prevent* ; for we see, the marriage-
act does not prevent what it was intended to prevent,
that is, persons of fortune from matching with their
inferiors in fortune. But it hinders the low and la-
bouring people, who are the number and the strength
of every nation, from coming together. They cannot
afford fifty pounds to drive to Scotland. When a cou-
ple of poor hard-working young creatures are obliged
to think, for several weeks together, of the conse-
quences of marriage, they will appear to them so
formidable, especially heightened by the awful cere-
mony of repeated publication in a church, in the mid-
dle of divine service ; that it is to be supposed, their
hearts will often fail them, and they will drop their
design. I do not mention the inconveniencies, poor
people are by the marriage-act necessarily subjected to,

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of residing a certain time in a certain parish, to render the publication of banns lawful, &c. Before the establishment of this churlish law, whenever the honest sailor returned from the Indies, not having seen a female face for several months, his Wapping landlady's daughter appeared to him as enchanting as a wood-nymph of Diana's train. To May-fair chapel they went the very next day, without loss of time for the needless proclamation in the church, or of money for a licence. And, if he staid one week on shore, the King was sure to have a new subject by the expiration of nine or ten months. Whereas now, the poor mortal may be pressed, or obliged, through failure of finances, to go to sea before the time for the needless ceremony of three proclamations elapses.

In truth, the whole apparatus of publication of banns in churches is absurd, and the celebration of marriages by the clergy and at the altar, with the pretended holiness of the marriage-state, and an office for matrimony in the liturgy, is neither more nor less, than a foolish and mischievous remain of popish superstition. There is no more of holiness in holy matrimony, than in an apprenticeship or partnership in trade. They are alike matters of mere civil concern; for in the future state there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage; and it would be full as rational to oblige every tradesman to have the banns of apprenticeship published in the church, and the indenture signed at the altar, according to an office prescribed in the liturgy. Nor is any thing more frivolous than the pretended usefulness of publishing banns to prevent artful men from marrying a plurality of women.

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We see, that, in fact it does not prevent polygamy. For indeed there is nothing easier, than for a designing fellow to deceive such women as are silly enough, by marrying, with banns published, in one part of the country by one name, and a month after in another by another name. If therefore the present indebted state of the nation renders it more necessary than ever to consult speedy population, and if matrimony encouraged naturally tends to promote population, it seems manifest that now is the time for abolishing the marriage-act, the natural tendency of which is to hinder matrimony. Our national wisdom with respect to matrimony seems to be in general directly opposite to that of all antiquity. Do our laws shew the least attention to marriage and population? Has marriage, has population, by our laws, either advantage or honour? Do we inflict any discouragement on voluntary celibacy? We take the life of him, who deprives the King of a subject: but we excuse him, who prevents his having ten. We lay every hardship on the married house-keeper, and ease the bachelor lodger. If there is a place or emolument to be given, we bestow it as soon on the selfish bachelor, the enemy of his country, as on the valuable head of a family, the furnisher of soldiers, tailors, and manufacturers.

PROSTITUTION is directly ruinous to population, on which the very being of every state depends. If it does not furnish a gratification of the natural desires which men have, or should have, for the other sex, at least it produces the extinction of them, as foul water will quench fire as soon as clean. It renders the

female sex odious to the debauched (which in cities is the greatest) part of ours, who associate the character they find prevalent in those, whom alone they know, with the modest part of the sex, whom they do not know. It produces general imbecillity and impotency, through unequal and immoderate indulgence of appetite (which matrimony excludes) and spreads poison through the blood of a whole sex, which proceeds from father to son, from generation to generation, destroying the breed, and debasing the species. A small tax laid upon every house in all great cities, would raise a fund for employing officers to apprehend bad women, and for curing, maintaining, and instructing them in some employment, by which they might, instead of a nuisance, become of advantage to the community. To this might be added a law, rendering every parish, in which any such women were found, liable to a heavy fine, as counties are now obliged to indemnify persons robbed between sun-rising and sun-setting. Thus men of warm constitutions being deprived of the present too easy means of gratifying or stifling their desires, would be obliged to marry; and thus matrimony would come again into request, and population would be the consequence. At Paris the police from time to time sweeps the brothels, and sends the women to America, where they marry with the Indians. If the *first* debauching of innocent young women were under proper discouragement, the axe would be laid to the root of prostitution. He, who is convicted of the heinous crime of robbing a virgin of her modesty, ought to be obliged by law to marry her, or find her a husband,

a husband, on pain of fine, imprisonment, banishment, &c. In some countries this is law, and in all ought to be so. For what can be more injurious to the state, than a practice, by which multitudes of the young, beautiful, and unthinking, are rendered not only miserable in themselves, but useless to the community, by being deprived of an opportunity of marrying, and consequently of being fruitful? How ridiculously unequal are our punishments! We gibbet the wretch who has stolen the value of five pounds; and we excuse the infinitely greater criminal, who has ruined a modest virgin, brought her to debauchery, disease, and perhaps untimely death, who, but for him, might have been the mother of ten children, and they, the parents of an hundred. It is probable, that the number of lewd women, who infest the streets of this great city, to the utter destruction of modesty among the younger part of the male sex, amounts to many thousands. Is there no better way of dealing with such unfortunate creatures, than sending them over and over to Bridewell, where they are only more effectually, if possible, secured against all chance of amendment? Can they be no way rendered of service to their country, in so great a want of hands, to render labour cheaper? There are hardly any of our manufactures of silk, wool, or flax, some parts of which may not be executed even by persons who have not been from their youth brought up to them.

THE gallows deprive us every year of many hands, which might be usefully employed. It is greatly to be doubted, whether human authority extends to the depriving a fellow-creature of the sacred gift of God, and hurrying him into eternity with all his imperfections on his head, for the trifling offences, which, according to our laws, condemn multitudes to the gibbet every year. Where there is no blood shed, nor violence intended, death seems to me a punishment too severe, both for the magnanimity of our national character, and the merciful spirit of our religion. Nor is hanging, in experience, found to be a sufficient sanction. Hard labour, and hard fare for life, with impossibility of escape, would deter many daring offenders, who only laugh at Tyburn. But the art of rendering a people virtuous, lies much deeper than this [x].

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[x] IT is from ignorance that they speak, who would persuade us, that nothing is necessary for making a state great and happy, but a body of good laws. What chiefly tends to the establishment of a state, is, a judicious police, founded in habitual modesty, temperance, integrity, valour, and patriotism. The general prevalency of these dispositions in a people, is not introduced by laws or sanctions, but by education, example, and a wise exertion of that discretionary power, which ought to be entrusted to magistrates, whereby they can discountenance vice without directly punishing it, and win the subjects to that voluntary love of rectitude, which force will never produce. For laws added to laws, and sanctions heaped on sanctions, serve only to shew an unruly and perverse

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IT has been computed, that the number of prisoners in all the gaols in Britain and Ireland, seldom falls much short of forty thousand. How ridiculous is it to suffer such a multitude to continue, for many years together, useless to the community? Not useless only, but hurtful. Every prison ought to be a work-house. Offenders ought to be obliged to work, as part of their punishment; For idleness is oftenest the cause of their coming into such places. And debt-prisoners ought to have it in their power to do somewhat, by their industry, towards alleviating the distress of their confinement.

MANUFACTURES, for which a vent in foreign countries can be found, are a more valuable fund of riches to a nation, than mines of gold and silver; inasmuch as it is more to be wished, that the people be industrious,

disposition in the people, who would not otherwise require such a variety of terrors to restrain them. The sagacity of governors appears in their shewing, that they have the address to plant their laws in the hearts of a tractable and well-disposed people. The most tremendous penalties will not restrain men of ungovernable dispositions. Those whose minds have received a proper bent, will behave well, though left to themselves. The business, therefore, is not so much to find ways of punishing offenders, as to form the minds of the people so, that they shall have no disposition to offend.

The substance of this note is taken from ISOCRATES's Areopag. Orat. celebrated by DIONYSIUS HALICARN. tom. II. p. 40. BENTL. SECUND.

industrious than idle. Therefore every eating mouth, without a pair of working hands to it, is an evil to be avoided in every well-regulated state. As, on the contrary, the greater the number of industrious people in a country, the more flourishing that country. When the wise King of Prussia was blamed by his clergy (according to the character of the *gens togata* in all countries, ever raging for the phantom of religious conformity) because he had admitted into his dominions, certain foreigners, without taking an account of their religion ; his answer to them was, That he had given particular orders, that every single foreigner of them should bring with him, or her, one pair of hands, one mouth, and one back. And while I am writing this paragraph, I read in the news-papers the following article from Petersburg, Octob. 10, 1764.

“ HER Imperial Majesty having been informed, that
“ many ingenious foreigners, who are versed in the
“ science of divers valuable manufactures, may be in-
“ duced to settle in the dominions of Russia, by re-
“ leasing them from present confinement for small
“ debts ; a scheme is on foot to draw as many such
“ useful persons to Petersburg, as can be got ;
“ and her majesty’s ministers and agents at foreign
“ courts, are to receive orders to engage every arti-
“ cer, who may be willing to settle in Russia, and
“ whose debts do not exceed one hundred rubles.”

IF, in our present circumstances, an increase of the number of subjects be supremely desirable, and if it be certain, as has been publicly proved, that the prac-

tice of inoculation for the small-pox, if generally prevalent, and judiciously managed, would save many thousands of infants yearly, it follows, that inoculation ought, by all wise methods, to be encouraged. But, inoculation tending to spread the infection among subjects unfit for it, which may prove fatal to many; it ought never to be practised in any city or large town.

I CANNOT, I own, see the wisdom of discouraging, as has lately been done, the bringing of children to the Foundling-hospital. What is laid out by the public for receiving and maintaining exposed and deserted young children, is money given for purchasing people. Is there any purchase so valuable to a state? But it is said, the universal reception of children into the hospital encouraged lewdness. It would, in my opinion, be as reasonable to alledge, that the hospitals for accidents encourage people to get themselves broken bones. Is a young woman's disgrace and ruin the less certain, in the case of her losing her virtue, for the hospital's preserving the fruit of her wanton amour, which she, or the father, might otherwise be tempted to destroy? It was farther alledged, that the general reception of children into the hospital encouraged idleness in the working people. But truly if the poor are, through negligence of the public, to be left a prey to a set of devourers, commonly known by the appellation of Engrossers, I think the least the public can do, is to relieve them in another way, by easing them of the burden of part of their children, which the villainy of unrestrained engrossers disables them from maintaining. The attraction between a mother and the legitimate fruit of her love is so strong,

strong, that I should think nothing but absolute necessity would prevail with a married woman to banish her infant (perhaps for ever) from her sight. And if a father and mother are in circumstances of such distress, as to be unable to maintain their legitimate offspring, is it consistent with either humanity or policy, to deny that assistance, which can so easily be afforded? For what is a sum of fifty or one hundred thousand pounds per ann. to the nation, laid out in a way which must in the end be of such advantage to the nation? In the Foundling-hospital at Paris, and the nurseries belonging to it, they have constantly no fewer than six thousand of different ages; the greatest number of which, the people of the house told me, are supposed to be legitimate children. There were brought in, during the half hour I staid there, three objects, that would have moved pity in a statue. And every infant they receive, they look upon as saved from almost certain death. Their funds have of late fallen miserably short; which they very much lament. For they are of opinion, that foundling-hospitals are very useful. So much they differ from us in this point!

If it should be thought that fifty, or one hundred thousand pounds per ann. laid out in portioning young persons, would be more for the public advantage, than supporting the Foundling-hospital, I have no objection. The latter sum divided into twenty-five pounds to each young person (which might be given as a reward of attested industry and good behaviour) would enable four thousand people yearly to marry, who at present cannot, or cannot so early in life. This would, in half a century, make so valuable an encrease of po-

pulation, as is scarce, without calculation, to be imagined.

ALL manner of machines and inventions for reducing the price of labour of every kind, particularly saw-mills, ought, at such a time as this, to be encouraged. If our rivals in trade use machines more than we, they infallibly undersell us at foreign markets.

THERE is, as I have said, no greater evil in a manufacturing country, especially in the circumstances in which ours is at present, than a number of eating mouths without working hands to them. For whatever enhances the price of labour, prejudices our trade at foreign markets. It would therefore be a good regulation, that the idle poor should lose their right to public charities and lawful settlements, and be sent to the plantations, when they come to want, instead of the alms-house. There ought to be kept in every parish, a register of every inhabitant, man, woman, and child. Whenever any person becomes, through idleness or wickedness, a nuisance in the place where he lives, complaint ought to be made against him to the magistrate. These complaints ought to be entered in a register, which register ought to be searched when such person comes to be past labour, and in want of a settlement. If it appears, that he has been frequently complained of, on account of misbehaviour, his settlement ought to be according to his deservings. By our present management of the poor, there is hardly any encouragement attending good, or punishment for bad, behaviour.

THE taxes on leather, coals, candles, soap, beer, and cyder, do most directly and immediately affect our manufactures. For the working people pay these taxes. If it were possible to abolish such taxes, working people could live, consequently could work, cheaper. But it is at the same time certain, that no tax, which does not extend to the labouring part of the people, will produce a considerable revenue, because they are the multitude. Persons of property, and who are independent on commerce and manufactures, are, in all countries, comparatively with the whole, but a handful.

A CAPITATION-TAX might be raised at a much easier expence to the government, than those of the customs and excise. Therefore, a capitation-tax imposed, and the excise taken off, would add to the sinking fund the whole, or the greatest part, of the annual expence now laid out in maintaining an army of excise-men, tide-waiters, &c. and the popular odium against duties and excises would go a great way toward reconciling the subjects to a capitation-tax. Sir MATTHEW DECKER's recommendation of this kind of tax, instead of the others now in use, is very well known.

THERE is undoubtedly a *ne plus ultra* in taxing, as in other things. But, perhaps, there are still some articles untaxed, that might bear being burdened, for the benefit of the sinking fund.

FIRST, and above all others, in every state, the heaviest of all taxes ought to fall upon voluntary

tary celibacy. The effects naturally to be expected from the prevalency of this worst of evils, are, the decrease of population, and the increase of prostitution and unnatural lewdness. If therefore voluntary celibacy ought not, by the wisdom of states, to be discouraged, I know not what ought; and, next to the infamy of the offenders in this way, is that of lawgivers, who do not now, as in former times, exert their power to discourage voluntary celibacy, and encourage marriage. These two ought, indeed, to go together. And how governments answer to their own consciences (if they have any) their suffering a set of harpies to render marriage so discouraging, by artificially enhancing the prices of every necessary of life, they best know.

WHEEL-CARRIAGES would probably bear an additional tax. For people will rather pay severely, than give up their luxury. The same may be said of saddle-horses, swords, and laced cloaths, &c.

Dogs (excepting those belonging to shepherds, butchers, and drovers) ought to be taxed, partly with a view to the benefit of the sinking fund, and partly for the purpose of lessening the useless and dangerous number of those animals. Gentlemen of fortune, who keep packs of hounds, and substantial housekeepers, who have mastiffs in their courts and yards, ought, in such times as these, to be ashamed to refuse paying a reasonable tax for them.

PLAYHOUSE and Opera-tickets ought, in all reason, to pay a considerable tax.

THE three sister-professions, called Learned, are not treated by us with unexceptionable impartiality. Two are richly endowed, and the third (almost as useful as either of the other two) left to shift for herself. First, as to Divinity, it may be proper, that they who serve at the altar, live by the altar. But I do not remember the chapter, and verse, which directs, that the followers of Him, who had not where to lay his head, shall enjoy *princely revenues*, while their country is involved in debt. We know, that in some countries, the church is, from time to time, called upon to contribute, by free gift, to the exigencies of the state. And truly, if there be so strict an *alliance* between them, as we are, by one of the heads of the church, assured there is; the state has a reasonable demand on the church: For *allies* are always expected to contribute, in cases of exigency, their adequate *contingent*. Perhaps it may be alledged, that the alliance between a *Protestant* church and state is different from that which subsists between those of the *R. Catholic* sort; and that we are not *obliged* to imitate popish customs, when expedient, merely because we *voluntarily* imitate some of their least laudable practices. *Haec in medio relinquo.*

THEN, as to the Law, here I shall have a decent opportunity of venting a little of my *splendida bala*. I cannot help thinking, that the glorious *uncertainty*, *tediousness*, and *expense*, of the law, might, on such an

occasion as the present, be made to yield some glorious *prunings* for the benefit of a necessitous state. Suppose, that every lawyer's bill were to be taxed according to the time and expence *needlessly* lost in the suit ; what a fund would this raise ! For I should propose, that the tax should increase in a progressive manner ; to be raised by *stamps* on the paper for writing the lawyer's bills ; which, in my humble opinion, would be better policy, than taxing our colonies by *stamps*. For, if our colonists should take lasting offence at our forcing them, in a way *unusual* to them, to do that which they have always been *willing* to do in the way which *suits* them, I know not, but the consequences may be worse than those of either offending or impoverishing the lawyers. At worst, we should only be *always* obliged to what we are *often* forced to now ; that is, to fly from courts of *law* and *equity*, to private *arbitration*. In France, all the differences among relations, and some other kinds of suits, are decided by arbitration. And if we had a regulation, That whenever *one* of the parties, in any dispute about private concerns, was *willing* to submit to *arbitration*, the *other* should be obliged to stand to the award ; and if there were made out, by authority, a brief *digest* of the laws, by which it might be barely *possible*, without supernatural sagacity, to find out and reconcile their meanings ; we should see ninety nine in an hundred, of the grievances of law removed. For my part, I cannot understand how, on right principles, any man can make a *trade* of doing *justice*, or why one should be obliged

to pay for obtaining his right. Therefore the law ought, for the benefit of the sinking fund, to be severely taxed. And there is no danger of over-straining this point.

It has often been proposed, That, for the advantage of the sinking fund, places and pensions should be taxed. If I were consulted on the ratio of this tax, I should advise, that it might be at least one hundred per cent. The heaping of pensions, to the amount of many thousands a year, on persons in easy, often in affluent circumstances, to be continued from generation to generation, and the keeping up innumerable needless posts and places, with exorbitant salaries annexed to them, at an enormous national expence, to the great encouragement of idleness, and exciting of factious contention, and to the heavy detriment of the arts, manufactures and commerce, while the state is almost swallowed up in debt; is so directly contrary to the policy we ought to observe at such a time as this, and so barefaced an acknowledgment of a total indifference about the public interest, when it comes in competition with private, that there is no power in language equal to the setting forth of its atrociousness. Yet how long has this glaring abuse been, without effect, complained of! How has every succeeding administration increased the evil! If any thing good were to be hoped from statesmen, it might have been hoped, that in our times, a little moderation in this particular might have been seen, when we have so cogent an argument for public frugality, and when our gracious Sovereign had set so remarkable an example of it, in restricting his demands to eight hundred thousand pounds per ann. of which sum, very little above se-

ven hundred thousand remains to His Majesty, after the deduction for other accounts. QU. ANNE's revenue (when money was more valuable than at present) was seven hundred thousand pounds per ann. and she had no family, of any consequence as to expence, compared with what his present Majesty has, and hopes to have.

IT is reasonable enough, that those, who apply the whole of their time, and labour hard in the service of the public, be maintained by the public. But why must a gentleman of fortune, or a man of quality, be hired like a sordid mechanic, and at exorbitant wages, to do what may be dispatched in a few hours a-day, or perhaps a-week, and will scarce defile the tip of his finger, or discompose one curl of his full-bottom. To descend to the meanness of pocketing the paltry gettings of the laborious multitude; "to "wring," as SHAKESPEAR says, "from the hard "hands of peasants their vile trash;" are they *great*, are they *patriots*, who, in times of public exigency, can do this? If a King wanted a pair of shoes, he could hardly expect to have them without paying for them; because honour is not a proper reward for a shoemaker. But if the King has occasion for a person of fortune and rank to superintend the weighty affairs of state, must he pay the nobleman with the same dirt which pays the sordid artizan? Be it so, if it must. But then, let not the tinselled thing pretend the least superiority over the shoemaker. They both serve their King for money. They are both alike hirelings. The great spirits of antiquity made their poverty their glory. Witness EPAMINONDAS, PHOCION, MANIUS CURIUS,

CURIUS, ATILIUS REGULUS, FABRICIUS, &c. all persons in high stations, which put the acquisition of riches in their power; but they had the virtue to despise them. The brave WALSINGHAM died so poor, that he left not enough to bury him. When Lord SUNDERLAND was displaced, and had a pension offered him, his answer was, "If I cannot serve my country, I will not plunder it." And it is much to the honour of a noble Duke now living, that he imitated this great example; while others, of whom better things might have been hoped, acted a different part. Unattached to any party, unobnoxious to all, and alike an enemy to the corrupt practices of those in power as of those in disgrace, I care not whom this may sting. "Let the stricken deer go weep." Every industrious subject has a right at least to complain, where he sees the fruit of his labour devoured by a set of overgrown blood-suckers; such are all those placemen and pensioners, who, having of their own by inheritance, or being able by industry to gain a competency, receive, on any pretence, any of the public money in times of public exigency. Why are trustees of roads, churches, and other public works; governors of charities; jury-men; sheriffs of counties; city magistrates; justices of the peace; church-wardens, and the like, expected to serve their country for nothing? Why should not persons of high quality, and large property, take care of that state in which they have so large concerns, and do that business which is so much their own, generously? If they dread the rigour of the labour, let them take it by rotation. As we proceed at present, one would imagine the state was looked on, not as the object of general care, but as a fat carcase

for

for a set of ravenous beasts, called Grandees, to worry one another about.

"REWARDING with money throws a false glare
"on worthlessness, and disgraces merit. Such as
"serve the crown for reward, may in time sacrifice the
"interest of their country to their wants. Greediness
"of the public money may produce a slavish com-
"plaisance so long as the crown can pay, and mutiny
"when it cannot. Motives of interest will prove an
"improper and weak foundation for our duty to our
"King and country[*y*]."

IT is generally thought, that if a new assessment were made, and the land-tax were equal, it would be better for the revenue, and would only be worse for those, who at present bear a smaller part of the public burden than they ought. It would therefore be particularly arch in any land-holder to oppose the equation of this tax. Whoever desires to avoid his just share of the public burden, ought, in all reason, to lose a proportionable share of the public advantage. It will perhaps be said, "Who will persuade the legislature to tax themselves?" To which can only be answered, If there is not in the nation virtue enough to save the nation, all is gone. I wish, gentlemen would consider, that whatever is laid out for lessening the public debt, is so far from being lost, that it must necessarily prove of general advantage. Perhaps, some sets of individuals may find, that in contributing to this great

great and good work, they must bear a little more of the burden, and reap a little less of the advantage, than others. But surely their patriotism must be at a very low ebb, who would hesitate on this account. But if they should, they must abide the consequences, and may live to see confusions arise on this account, which may make them wish they had given a little, to preserve the remainder.

THUS I have proposed almost twenty different species of ways and means towards alleviating the cruel burden under which my country groans. If some of them be unpromising, perhaps they are not all so. I will here give an abridged view of them together.

1. THAT every person of property contribute a certain sum toward the extinction of the debt, and that honours, privileges and other invitations, be given to encourage contributions.
2. That a sum be raised, as a capital, to be put to compound interest, in order to its increasing, as a security for part of the public debt.
3. That stock-holders be requested, and advantages proposed, to engage them to accept of life-annuities in part of their debt, by which such part would be extinguished with their lives.
4. That our commerce be, if possible, extended to new marts, whereby the sinking fund would be benefited.
5. That monopolies in trade be looked into, and, if found prejudicial to general commerce, abolished.
6. That smuggling be effectually discouraged, and duties on certain articles lessened, where likely to be of advantage to the sinking fund.
7. That lands in America be made a partial security to the public creditors.
8. That our colonies be peopled, improved, and encouraged, and indus-

industrious foreigners invited to come and settle in Britain and the plantations. 9. That matrimony be encouraged, and the marriage-act abolished. 10. That public prostitution be discouraged, and prostitutes set to work. 11. That fewer criminals be punished with death. 12. That an industrious disposition be encouraged in the people. 13. That all prisoners be employed. 14. That inoculation be encouraged and properly regulated. 15. That some money be yearly laid out, either for the maintenance of the children of the poor, or for enabling them to marry. 16. That the taxes be put under such regulations, if possible, that they may tend less to the enhancing of the prices of manufactures. 17. That, for the benefit of the sinking fund, some additional taxes may be laid, as on voluntary celibacy, on wheel-carriages, saddle-horses, dogs, public diversions, the richer clergy, lawyers, placemen, pensioners, and all other nuisances. 18. That the land-tax be equalled.

If none of these, nor any other ways or means hitherto proposed, should be thought, by the heads of the nation, promising of success, I will add one other, to which I am pretty sure they will have no objection (whether more likely than the above to contribute to the purpose of lightening the national burden, I submit to their great wisdom) viz. To repair to ARTHUR's, and there hold their usual patriotic and public-spirited councils, and then sit down contented, when they have done as much as their predecessors have done, and as much as their more considerate contemporaries expect of them.

THE reader sees, that I have gone but a little way in treating of the heads of grievances mentioned page 29. If the publication of this series of Essays be continued in farther volumes, what I have to say on some of the other articles may probably be hereafter laid before the public.

E S S A Y II.

I COULD almost wish, that every person qualified to put in black and white as much common sense as a grey goose-quill [a] will hold, would write upon education. If there be, in the circle of human enquiries, an inexhaustible subject, this is it. And if from the rubbish of a folio the reader should rake out one useful thought, the drudgery would be well bestowed.

I WOULD, methinks, have every man publish what he remembers of the workings of his own mind in his youth ; what objects, occurrences, temptations, misled him into vice : and what circumstances, accidents, mif-

[a] THE reader may perhaps imagine the world would not contain the books that should be written. But if he considers how few are qualified to write a sentence of common sense ; it may be questioned, whether our stock of books would be much increased, if the author's proposal were to be executed. I think, it is a saying of the Mess. de PORT ROYAL, " Le sens commun n'est pas si commun que l'on pense." CRITO MINOR..

misfortunes, instructions, or corrections, drove him back into the way of virtue; where his education left him defenceless; by what degrees he degenerated from the first institutions he received; how the returning light of reason broke in upon his mind, when eclipsed under error and vice; what made him lose his former hold of principle, and what afterwards powerfully convinced him, that vice is what a man cannot seriously resolve to abide by.

THEN I would have every parent, who can think, lay before the public whatever he has in his experience found useful or hurtful to his own children, for the purpose of improving, securing, or correcting their manners, as well as of opening and enlarging their understandings.

BUT especially I should desire to see the remarks of all such masters of places of education, or tutors of single pupils, as had made sagacious observations on the dispositions and capacities of the youth committed to them, and on the means they had found most successful for gaining the great purposes of education. These remarks, if made in the manner and with the minuteness I wish, would compose a large fund of materials, from which might be extracted a very extensive plan of education; in the same manner as the history of diseases, and the methods of treating them by different physicians, with the various consequent successes and failures, are the most useful reading for those who study the art of medicine. The proper methods of managing either the mind or the body are to be learned only by experience and observation.

The

The internal structure of both is of a delicacy too exquisite for human theory to reach.

YET I am sensible, that this, and whatever else could be proposed for improving our plan of education, would still leave a multitude of *desiderata* unsupplied, so long as things are in their present state.

THE two objects of education, are, 1. To form the disposition. 2. To cultivate the understanding. To think of their vastness, is, as if one was to attempt to form an adequate idea of making and regulating a solar system. Yet I would myself, with all my modesty, undertake to educate, with some success, a few well-disposed and capable subjects, if I might have a few little circumstances altered in my favour; as,

1. To be myself metamorphosed into an angel. Human abilities will never produce any thing *great* in education [b]. I should, in consequence of this rise to a higher station in the scale, expect to find myself qualified to enter, in a manner superior to human sagacity, into the dispositions and inclinations of young persons; to know prophetically when they were going to deviate into vice; to give them timely warning of their danger; to catch them, when they dissembled; to shew them to themselves; to check them in their course of wickedness, by letting conscience loose

[b] HE, who can, in his *practice*, in education, or any thing else, come up to his own ideas, must have but mean conceptions. CRITO MINOR.

loose upon them; to follow with an immediate preternatural punishment every deviation, and every good inclination or action with an instant reward; to trace out the precise weakness, which occasioned such or such a wrong propensity; to apply a certain remedy to the disease; to find where there was any thing wanting or any thing superfluous; to know how to supply and how to retrench; to new-model, or almost new-make, the mind itself; to clear, mechanically, a muddy understanding; to soften a naturally-unfeeling heart; to abate the superfluous impetuosity that is found in most young minds; to plant emulation where nature had sown no seeds of it; to kill revenge before it struck root, or eradicate it where it was sprung up; to cool the ardor of an irascible temper; to quench the sulphureous steam of lust; to settle a dissipated brain; correct a wild imagination; humanise a brutal disposition; subdue a licentious spirit; give sentiment to a callous breast; rouse heroism in a sordid mind; in short, to plant, water, and nourish up to perfection, every great and every good disposition, that can ennable a rational nature.

THEN, my angelic faculties would enable me to communicate knowledge in a method incomparably more extensive, more pleasing, and more expeditious, than any known among mortal teachers. But that I should value less, than the forming of the disposition. For, without this latter, superior knowledge can only serve to qualify a being for acting the part of a mischievous dæmon. Both accomplishments together, I mean sagacity and goodness of disposition, would form a character, to which an angel might be proud of having been preceptor.

THE longevity of my new state would give me an opportunity of educating the fathers first, and then the sons. An educator naturally gains an ascendancy over the mind of his pupil. I should therefore expect those who had once been my pupils, to be so partial to my angelship, as to be willing to trust to me, without reserve, the education of their children, and to be fully satisfied of my qualifications for the purpose. This would make a great difference from the present state of things, when every parent of thirty years of age modestly concludes, that he understands the delicate art of education better than those, who have made it their sole study for thirty years of mature life. I should not, therefore, if even possessed of angelic abilities, pretend to execute completely my function in educating the *first* generation; but should, in many instances, expect to be disappointed of success. For what could even an angel produce in the mind of a pupil, which, as fast as he swept and garnished it, was, by the imprudence or Fordid communication of a mean-soul'd or meanly-educated father, defiled with every low and unworthy sentiment? But when I had once worked up the fathers to some tolerable confidency, I should have hopes of applying myself with advantage to the education of the sons. And with *their* sons I should expect to have still better success.

THAT I might be sure the instructions I gave my pupils, while under education, should not be defeated by the fatal influence of ill example, I must likewise have the world new-modelled on a plan totally different

different from the present. Among other necessary alterations, I should choose to remove from off the premisses, whether to the world of the moon, or where else, I have not yet considered, some millions of the most incorrigible of the species. I suppose every reader will understand, I mean our tyrants, viseurs, ministers, and other leviathans of power. And let it be only considered (as the removal of the grandees out of this world would be, *ipso facto*, the annihilation of the greatest part of human wickedness) what an advantage my pupils would gain by the single circumstance of their living in a world, in which there was hardly a duke, an earl, or a lord [c].

WITH only these two changes, one in myself, and the other in the world, I could engage to exhibit a specimen of education considerably beyond what has yet been executed.

PERHAPS the reader may, by this time, be disposed to remonstrate on the inutility of a set of proposals so romantic and impracticable. But I see not why a free British writer must be *confined to possibilities*,

while

[c] THE reader may perhaps wonder, the author should not mention priests, lawyers, whores, &c. But it is to be supposed, he took it for granted, that, as SPENCER says, the *primary cause* of wickedness removed, the effects would of course surcease. Were there no foolish or wicked men at the *head* of the world, the mischief of our *diminutive* offenders would go but a short way.

CRITO MINOR.

while a citizen of Geneva [*d*] is admired for publishing seriously a new method of education, in which almost all, that is *his own*, is *impracticable*.

OBSERVING, that many people, taken with that author's neat and sprightly manner of expressing himself, are, by what he has written on education, drawn into an opinion, that the method hitherto pursued in all civilized countries is fundamentally wrong, I have a mind to examine, a little, his plan, so far as it may be called a plan, and enquire how far what is peculiar in it may be adopted, and the present rejected. This will give me an opportunity of laying before the public a few detached thoughts on this endless subject, which may, perhaps, be found not unworthy of some attention.

HAD this author been ever so well satisfied of the superiority of his own conceptions on the subject of education, and had he even established the credit of his method on the only foundation it could safely rest on, I mean success repeatedly *experienced*; it would still have been but decent to have presented his thoughts to the public with some air of diffidence, as he was to oppose the universal practice of all the educators of youth of all ages and countries, and the judgment of the best writers on the subject, ancient and modern. M. ROUSSEAU's manner of shewing his modesty, may be seen by the quotations below [*e*].

ONE

[*d*] M. ROUSSEAU, author of *Emile, ou de l'Education*.

[*e*] See vol. I. p. 23.—*Un précepteur, lequel, &c.* “A master, who teaches him every thing, but to know himself,

ONE of the first of Mr. ROUSSEAU's peculiarities

“ self, to improve himself, to conduct himself properly, “ and to make himself happy.” Who told M. ROUSSEAU, that masters never teach these most essential parts of knowledge? P. 24. “ *Ame venale! Crois tu,*” &c. [apostrophising a father, who proposes to maintain a tutor for his son,] &c. “ Sordid creature! Dost thou think to give “ thy son a master for money? Do not deceive thyself; “ he is not a master, but a servant, and he will quickly make thy son a slave, like himself.” P. 30. *Le maître ne regarde le disciple,* &c. “ The master looks upon the “ scholar as a heavy burden, of which he longs to be “ unloaded.” P. 73. *Que faut il donc penser de cette education barbare,* &c. “ What then must we think of “ that barbarous education, which sacrifices the present “ to an uncertain future?” Then follows a long detail of the cruelty of making a boy learn to read, &c. *Qui sait,* &c. “ Who knows how many children perish the victims “ of the extravagant wisdom of fathers and masters?” No father, nor master, ever had a spark of humanity, till M. ROUSSEAU drew his quill. P. 93. He condemns Mr. LOCKE, and all who are for reasoning with children. P. 97. *D'insenses instituteurs,* &c. “ A set of “ wrong-headed instructors, think to do wonders, by “ making children wicked, in order to teach them what “ is good.” P. 100. *Selon le progrès naturel,* &c. “ Ac- “ cording to the natural process of things, children “ ought to be educated upon a plan directly contrary to “ that commonly followed.” P. 101. *Prenez le contre- “ pied de l'usage,* &c. “ Take a course directly contrary “ to that which custom has established, and you will be “ almost always right.” In five thousand years, the world has produced only one man, who has had understanding enough to draw a right plan of education.

ties is, his requiring of every father, that he educate his son himself [f].

XENOPHON and PLUTARCH differ a little from ROUSSEAU. They tell us, the Persians and Spartans educated their youth in public schools, on purpose to prevent the bad effects of parental indulgence. But their public schools were indeed on a different plan from ours. However, it is merely romantic to propose, that peers, or members of the other house, persons in public employments, merchants, tradesmen, and in general the *busy* part, that is, the greatest number, of fathers, should take upon them a charge, which, supposing them in every respect qualified, must, if duly attended to, employ the greatest part

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P. 102. *O hommes! est-ce ma faute, &c.* “O men! is it “my fault, that you have made all that is right, diffi-“cult?” P. 104. *Toujours sermonneurs, &c.* “Ever “preaching, ever moralizing, ever playing the pedants; “for one idea you give them which you think good, you “suggest twenty bad ones; full of what passes in your “own heads, you see nothing of the effect, which you “produce in theirs.” All the SOLOMONS, the XENO-
PHONS, the QUINTILIANS, the LOCKES, blind as moles. MR. ROUSSEAU the only clear-sighted individual of the human species. But I must quote half the book, to give a view of the arrogant and self-sufficient contempt shewn by this writer for all who have ever meddled with either the theory or practice of education before he undertook the subject.

[f] *Comme la véritable nourrice, &c.* “As the mo-“ther is the only proper wet-nurse, so the father is the “only proper master.” Vol. I. p. 22.

of their time, and render it impossible for them to fill their respective stations in life. Upon Mr. ROUSSEAU's plan, a father could be nothing but a father. Now, however that might have answered among the old Arcadians, or the modern Swiss, it would be ridiculous to propose it for Britain, France, Holland, and the other commercial countries of Europe.

If we consider fathers with respect to their qualifications for this important office; many are almost wholly illiterate. What sort of education could they give their children? Many illiterate men are rich. Is it proper that the son of a man of fortune should be brought up, as if he were to earn his living by hedging and ditching? What would be the consequence, if fathers were, in general, to educate their children, but that every generation would, as to knowledge, fall short of the last; till at length, in a few ages, knowledge would come to be, in Britain, nearly about the same pitch as it was in king ALFRED's days. Is this to be wished?

I HUMBLY submit to the consideration of any person of common understanding, whether if every man were only to make his own shoes (it is easier to make a shoe than a man), people would, in general, be as neatly and sufficiently shod, as they are at present. Aye, but, says M. ROUSSEAU, the additional zeal with which the father would apply himself to the education of his own son, would more than make up for the difference in ability between him and a professed master of youth. But, with M. ROUSSEAU's good leave, I expect to have a much better pair of shoes made

me by a professed shoemaker, than my warmest zeal or self-love could enable me to make for my dear self. Can any one imagine, that skill in the most curious of all arts, viz. that of educating youth, is attained without much study and much practice? Can any one imagine, a father, merely by becoming a father, becomes qualified to be an *educator*? Instead of agreeing with M. ROUSSEAU, that the father has, in consequence of his fathership, the advantage (for educating his son) of a better qualified stranger, I should turn it the contrary way, and say, the father, though he should happen to be, personally speaking, better qualified than the stranger, will not be likely to educate his own son with so good success as a stranger of inferior personal qualifications. Accordingly, it is notorious, that many times judicious fathers have exchanged sons, during a certain period, that each youth might be under the care of a stranger, rather than of his father. And it is common to see a father, who intends his son for his *own* profession, place him, during his apprenticeship or clerkship, with a stranger, of the same profession, rather than have him at home, knowing that a youth will not be likely to take the same liberties with a stranger, as with his father; and that a stranger will not be likely to prejudice the youth by that faulty indulgence, into which paternal tenderness is too apt to deviate.

Is it not, besides, to be expected, that a man who has given himself chiefly to study, and has been but little hackneyed in the wicked ways of men, should have a more delicate way of thinking upon matters of right and wrong, which implies his being better able to explain those subjects to youth, than a man

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of business, whose hurrying life deprives him of the advantages requisite for that purpose? Would M. Rousseau's delicacy wish the youth to be educated in the common sentiments? Were some young persons educated by their parents, what sentiments must they have? Can weak or worthless parents give their children sentiments, which they themselves have not? If Mrs. Crab, in the fable, is to educate her daughter herself, Miss will certainly walk backward all her life long. But if, like a prudent mother, she puts her young lady under the care of a capable dancing-master, she may have all the advantages a person of her make can have, for learning the forestep and side-step, in the minuet, as well as the back-step. One difficulty of forming the youth to wisdom and virtue, arises from the circumstance of their imprudent, or vicious parents, having so great a share, as they have, in the moulding of their dispositions, previous to their coming into the hands of masters, and from the master's work being demolished, as fast as he builds it up, by the hopeful lessons the children learn from time to time in their fathers houses. But of this more hereafter.

THOUGH I have said, that the greatest part of fathers are, through deficiency in point of literature, in no respect qualified to give their sons such an education as, in this enlightened age, is requisite for all above the station of working mechanics; it does not follow, that I must, with the learned and ingenuous Mr. Hurd [g] allow the established clergy to be

[g] In his elegant Dialogues on the use of Travel.

as fit as any other persons, for being the general educators of the youth. So far as an educator of youth is obliged to be qualified in classical learning, there is no order of men that can more justly claim the office, than the established clergy of this country. But, till diverse alterations are made, and grievances redressed, (which the reader may see judiciously and modestly pointed out by certain of the clergy themselves, in a book intitled *Candid Disquisitions, &c.*) the clerical tutor will labour under several disadvantages, peculiar to his own sacred order. Tied and bound with the chain of subscription, how should he be expected either himself to expatiate freely in search of truth, or to lead those under his care to an indifferent enquiry into subjects of supreme concern to be understood?— But I break off here, leaving out several pages, which I had written on this lamentable subject; the farther pursuit of which would carry me too wide of my purpose, and would occasion my expressing myself in a manner, which would, perhaps, offend many, without any good effect.

WHILE this Essay was in hand, the Rev. Dr. BROWN's piece entitled, *Thoughts on Civil Liberty, &c.* was published. What he writes on the importance of virtuous manners and principles (besides salutary laws) as a permanent foundation of civil liberty, is undoubtedly just, and has often been observed, as particularly by ISOCRATES [b], SALLUST, HORACE, &c. And his observation, that education is of supreme consequence toward forming virtuous manners

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[b] See above, pag. 49.

and principles, is undeniable. But when he comes, (page 156) to propose a *general* and *prescribed* improvement of the laws of education, and (page 157) a *prescribed* code of education, to which all the members of the community shall *legally submit*; — here I must humbly beg leave to differ from the learned and ingenious author. We have already, in *liberal* matters, but too much *legal prescription*, as well as *subscription*. And I hope we shall sooner see education and learning laid open, than farther trammelled by additional *state impositions*. We know, by sad experience, what effects the interposition of authority produces, whenever it is employed out of its proper sphere. The learned and ingenious author seems to have inadvertently thrust one thing into the place of another; I mean, *law* into the place of *regulation*. It would certainly be of good service, if care were taken, that the masters of public schools, who are *appointed* to their charge, be men of known sound political and moral principles, and that those, who appoint the masters of such schools, do, from time to time, examine the youth, in order to know, whether they are properly educated in those respects. *Private* places of education must, in a free country, be left to themselves. There could be no imposition more tyrannical, than to oblige parents to have their children educated in a manner they disapproved of. As to a *prescribed* code of education, I see not how it could be made at all more effectually instrumental toward the purpose of forming virtuous manners and principles, than we find the learning by rote the church-catechism, at parish-schools, is for establishing good principles among the vulgar.

THUS far I had written on Dr. BROWN's code-scheme, when Dr. PRIESTLY's ingenious piece on education was published. That author bestows more pains in confuting the doctor's proposal, than I should think necessary. For there seems to be little probability of its being ever executed, or even thought of, by government.

Dr. PRIESTLY endeavours to shew, That the interposition of public authority in education would defeat the intention of education, by preventing improvements, and fixing it unalterably at the low degree of perfection it has attained. That it would be, to the most extreme degree, cruel and tyrannical to deprive parents of their children, and educate the latter in any manner they might not approve of. That the code-scheme would open a door to a complete religious tyranny, and would destroy freedom of enquiry. And, that a fixed code must, though suitable to the present state of the nation, become, some time hence, altogether incompatible with it.

To return to M. ROUSSEAU's notion of the necessity of every father's educating his own son; if man be, by nature, intended for society [i], one would imagine, it should be natural to put him, as early as possible, into a social state, that he may grow up, even from his infancy, a social being. While he

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[i] It is true, M. ROUSSEAU is against all society. But what then? Suppose M. ROUSSEAU were against eating and drinking?

continues in his father's house, I think no one will pretend he has any taste of *social* life. There he is my young *master*. There this world appears to have been made neither for CÆSAR nor CATO; but for Mamma's own dear boy. To give him an idea of society, he must be placed along with others, who shall appear to him in all respects on a foot with himself, so that he shall look on himself as only one among many, and shall form no expectations of any peculiar honours, or advantages, but what he may acquire by merit. The society he is to be placed in, must consist of a competent number; else there will not be scope for social improvements and habits. It must not be too numerous; lest, as in the great world, there be too little opportunity of looking minutely into the characters and behaviour of individuals, and guilt escape in the crowd. It must be select, dismissing, with disgrace, all ill-disposed members, whenever detected, and found to be irreclaimable. Every reader, who has perused the works of our great MILTON, will understand, that I am speaking of the plan of education, which was drawn and executed by him, and is now encouraged in Britain, France, Holland, and I suppose all the civilized countries in Europe; beyond which there seems no reason to suppose, the wit of man, even if a second ROUSSEAU should be born, will ever start one better calculated for obtaining all the advantages education can bestow, and for avoiding the disadvantages of a home education on one hand, and those of a public school on the other.

Oh! but, says M. ROUSSEAU, this separation of young persons for education, will break the sacred

bonds of family affection (*k*). But I say, Fathers, take care to have your sons well principled. They will then love what they should love, and hate what they should hate. Is there any danger that a well-principled youth should want affection for his relations? He may not, indeed, be so weakly fond of them, nor they of him, if he be early separated from them. Perhaps they may love, or at least *esteem*, one another more, for being less familiar with one another's weakness and misbehaviour. Be this as it will, I had rather a son of mine loved me less, so his love were the effect of *principle*, than that he doted on me from *instinct*; and that he loved his narrow circle of relations moderately, and his country supremely, than his family to excess, and his country indifferently. And nothing seems more likely to narrow the mind of a young person, than confining his views to the small circle of a few brothers and sisters, and fawning domestics. But I have, I think, above, shewn sufficiently the disadvantages, and, in many cases, the impracticability, of a home education.

ANOTHER of M. ROUSSEAU's peculiarities is, his objecting to a preceptor's being paid [*l*], that is, maintained. It is true, ARISTIPPUS, in DIOGENES LAERTIUS, tells a father, who grudges the expence of having his son educated by him, that, if he put him under the care of a slave, as he proposes, he will make his son a slave too. But there is some difference, I hope, between a free subject, of liberal education and sentiment, who is master of himself, and depends not absolutely

absolutely on any man, and a wretched captive under the absolute dominion of his purchaser. If we pay a physician for his prescription, and yet *find*, that we obtain as much benefit as if we had it *gratis*, why may not, as SENECA says, a person properly qualified for educating youth, be maintained by those to whom he consecrates his time, depriving himself of all other opportunity of gaining a subsistence? Would M. ROUSSEAU have the sordid artisan, who makes me a table and chairs for my parlour, handsomely paid, and maintained by me and the rest of his customers; and would he have me barren of bounty to the liberal educator of my son, who furnishes his mind with the divine qualifications of wisdom and virtue; who spends his days, and wears himself out, in the important service of forming youth to all that is good, and all that is great?

M. ROUSSEAU, objecting to a master maintained by the father of his pupil, and being obliged to acknowledge the impossibility of every father's discharging this duty himself, at last, proposes [m], that the father find a *friend*, who will undertake it *gratis*. Which scheme is as rational as to recommend the man in the moon. Accordingly M. ROUSSEAU himself declares, he never will undertake an office of such difficulty either for love or money [n]. And then he comes round again, and insists on the father's discharging the duty himself [o]. Thus this arch philosopher gravely sets himself to recommend a scheme, which he himself owns to be impracticable. But then

he writes such pretty French! — No wonder he is admired — by those who want only to be amused.

Mr. ROUSSEAU endeavours to prove the impropriety of the present method of education by a pretended fact. The governor, says he, commonly looks upon his pupil as a tiresome burden, of which he longs to be discharged, and the pupil on his governor as a rigid curb on all his pleasures [p]. But the direct contrary to this, is what we learn from experience. And I dare appeal to all the *able* and *faithful* educators of the youth of Britain, whether they do not find, that all, but the hopeless part of their pupils (and with some young persons no plan of education, not even our author's, would prove effectual) do both love and esteem them while under their care; leave them with reluctance; and are ready to shew them the highest honours, next to their parents, during the whole of their lives. And if we look back to past times, we shall see EPAMINONDAS, ALEXANDER the Great, the Emperor AURELIUS, and other persons of princely rank, making it a point of duty to shew the most distinguishing favour to the faithful guides of their youth. Even NERO himself, while he continued to act like a rational creature, shewed a very high respect for his masters BURRIUS and SENECA; the latter of which found himself obliged, on account of the envy which the emperor's favour drew upon him, to request that his generosity to him might be lessened. The speech of the philosopher is still extant [q].

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THE reader would think it strange, if I should here pass unmentioned (though touched upon in the former essay) a remarkable *modern* instance of esteem on the part of a R——l pupil for the conductor of his education. My dutiful affection for the former inclines me to wish, not that less esteem had been shewn (for that would be wishing for what would have demonstrated a comparative want of goodness and grace, in a mind, which, we are agreed, is abundantly furnished with both); but that the same degree of esteem had been shewn in any other way, which might have proved less obnoxious to the discontented. Be the merits of this affair, politically considered, what they will, the regard (call it, if you please, partiality) shewn by the illustrious pupil to the educator ought, in my opinion, to have drawn from us approbation, not reflexion; and may serve as a strong confutation of Mr. ROUSSEAU's remark, of the pretended natural hatred between the tutor and pupil. I cannot help adding, that both the ancient and the modern tutor would have, in my humble opinion, appeared in a more advantageous light, had they both acted a different part from what they did, in the matter of accepting the marks of gratitude bestowed on them by their Royal pupils.

ANOTHER peculiarity of Mr. ROUSSEAU's scheme is, That, according to him, the less teaching the better; and none at all before twelve years of age.

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He expatiates [r] on the cruelty of interrupting the gaiety of youth, by putting that early age on so severe an exercise as thinking. One cannot help wondering, in the perusal of M. ROUSSEAU's *Emilius*, that a man of his understanding should venture to travel such lengths into a *terra incognita*. Prudence directs ever to ground our hopes of success on some foundation. Now, on what foundation can M. ROUSSEAU build his hope of ever making a man of him, who, at twelve years of age, is as unpractised in every thing that leads to improvement, as with us a child is at three or four? I cannot see it to be at all less reasonable to advise the tying up of a leg or an arm till twelve years of age, than the suspension, till that age, of all exertion of the faculties of the mind. At least, if we follow experience, we shall judge so.

M. ROUSSEAU seems to found his opposition to the received method (of putting children as early as possible on becoming what we want them to become, that is, reasonable creatures) on the natural disposition of children, which leads them to continual dissipation, and sets them against all exertion of any thing mental. It is true, that application, or study, is more unnatural to a child, than turning his hands into feet, and his feet into hands. SOLOMON observed the same almost three thousand years ago. " Foolishness," says he, " is bound in the heart of a child." Shall we let it

it remain? "By no means," answers the wise monarch; "let the rod of correction" (if other means prove ineffectual) "drive it far from him [s]." "Barbarous!" cries the wiser ROUSSEAU [t]; "you do not know "that he will live to the age, when your instructions will be of service to him." What then? Do we not take the same care of his health and support during his infancy and youth, as if an oracle had informed us, he should live to fourscore? Yet, if he dies at six, our past care of his health is lost. If we are to do our duty by him in respect of his body, notwithstanding the precariousness of life, what dispensation have we for neglecting his mind, merely on account of the uncertainty of life? As to Mr. ROUSSEAU's bitter lamentation [u] over the sufferings of childhood and youth; as I know of no occasion for their suffering, unless when their own wilful misbehaviour renders punishment necessary; and as I am sure that, in England, childhood and youth are the happiest parts of life, I desire to be excused joining in the doleful ditty; and I believe more of our youth will thank me, when they come to maturity, for advising their improvement, than M. ROUSSEAU for consulting their ease at the expence of what is more valuable than ease.

IF Mr. ROUSSEAU meant only the cruelty of whipping little boys into as much Latin by eight years of age, as might reasonably be demanded of them at ten, I should not differ from him. But, it is well known,

known, the present age is grown wise enough to see the inutility of so much correction; so that M. ROUSSEAU's lamentation comes half a century too late. We are indeed got a good way into the opposite error, of sparing the rod even on occasion of wilful and inexcusable misbehaviour, which, SOLOMON says, is hating the child. It is true, the Orbilian or Busbeian plagiosity [x] is not yet wholly banished from our public schools. Establishments are wont to be the last to quit the old *mumpfimus* for the new *sumpfimus*. But indeed the *posteriori*-method of teaching is more indispensable in public than in private places of education. For the masters of those day-schools have hardly any other means of getting the better of idleness, or checking bad dispositions in their pupils, than by inflicting immediate corporal punishment.

M. ROUSSEAU, in the very beginning of his book, declares war against all improvements on nature. But I wonder for what purpose we have mental and bodily powers given us, if we are never to exert those powers in changing or improving any one creature, or thing, beyond the state, in which nature puts them out of her hands. A colt unbroke is in a perfect state of nature. Is his natural state his best? Is he of any use while in his natural state? The surface of the earth, in all new-found countries, is covered with wood, or else is wholly fruitless; and a child, left to himself, would run about wild, till he passed all the teachable time of life. According to M. ROUSSEAU, it is wrong to interrupt

interrupt the happiness of the frisking colt and disipated youth, by applying them to what nature made them capable of, though wholly disinclined to. According to M. ROUSSEAU, it is rebellion against nature, to grub up the woods, to dispossess the native roarer of his dominion, and to cover the face of the country with the yellow harvest. Must we then bid farewell to art, to manufacture, to education, to all that polishes life; and cry, Welcome bears and tygers, Welcome savage wretchedness? Better M. ROUSSEAU had never been born!

It does not appear easy to reconcile M. ROUSSEAU with himself in many parts of his scheme. He seems, for instance, to condemn the common practice of putting children as forward in learning as may be; on account of the interruption it will occasion to their amusements, and consequently their happiness. And yet he likewise condemns the common method of education, for its supersedeing too much the use of reason in the child, as the parents and masters direct him in every thing, and leave no room for his own invention. On which account he commends the Spartan method of whetting the wits of their little ones, by making them steal their dinner, before they could have it, with an ugly clause annexed to the condition of the obligation, That, if they were caught in the fact, a severe drubbing was the consequence. But I believe our tender British mammas would choose to send their tender little masters to Westminster-school itself, if even Dr. BUSBY was still at the head of it, rather than to Sparta to get their genius excited by learning to steal with a good address.

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on pain of being beaten almost to death, if detected.
Is this author the friend, or the scourge, of youth?

A BOY of common parts, may, between the age of six and twelve, be, in full consistence with his happiness, taught to read English well; to write a fair hand, some principles of drawing, and some readiness at handling his pencil; a considerable knowledge of figures; a little of geometry and use of the globes; enough of Latin grammar; and as much of the language as to construe an easy author; with a little of the Greek grammar; and enough of the French to understand a common author, and a little of the speech. Suppose another child brought up to the same age of twelve, in M. ROUSSEAU's manner, that is, with a mind as unimproved as that of an Indian, unless he takes to study of himself, which is an event little to be expected. I ask any reasonable person, whether the supposed advantage the latter has of the former in happiness, is of consequence enough to lose for it the use of so many years of the most tractable part of life, and run the hazard of the mind's growing too rigid ever to bend, as it ought, to the study of useful knowledge? Were there any road through life, in which there lay neither fear, nor care, nor labour, nor unhappiness, it might be the more proper to keep a child from tasting the bitter cup. But, as the lot of man is; what is gained on the whole by, so effeminate, and at so terrible an expence, keeping childhood free from all the common and unavoidable troubles of life, only to make them the more poignant in mature age? By twelve, a boy begins to form some connected notions. If till then, life has been to him

Elysium,

Elysium, he naturally concludes there is no such thing, in *rerum naturâ*, as hardship. This is supposing M. ROUSSEAU's notion just, viz, That a boy left to himself, and never drawn away from his amusements, is the happiest of all beings. But may it not be questioned, Whether a competent admixture of application, by way of variety, excluding severity, will not improve his happiness?

Be this as it will, it does not appear to me, that the *pleasantest* education must be the best. The old philosophers, who, with M. ROUSSEAU's leave, wanted not sense, used to say, No person was so unhappy as he, who never had tasted unhappiness. And that the gods trained men for future glory by hardships. That they loved good men, but with a *father's*, not a *mother's* love. ROUSSEAU says, Let a boy enjoy himself in uninterrupted pleasure, till he be twelve years old.

“Who shall decide, when doctors disagree [y]?”

M. ROUSSEAU urges, as an argument against all teaching before twelve years of age, that no person under that age (prodigies excepted) ever understood well two languages. It is not easy to know what M. ROUSSEAU may mean by understanding *well*. But, waving this, does it follow, that a child must not attempt the *rudiments* of languages before twelve, because before twelve he is not likely to be *master* of several languages? The earliest years of childhood

hood are peculiarly proper for learning some things, for the very reason, which M. ROUSSEAU advances against their learning any thing, viz. Their not being yet come to the perfect use of their reason. Spelling, declining nouns and verbs, and all the dry elementary part of learning, if not mastered before the age of reason, will be so disgusting to a mind, which begins to have an appetite for what is more manly, that it will most probably (I speak from knowledge in repeated instances) set it effectually against all that sort of learning.

ON the head of Geography, he says, a boy has not an adequate idea of the globe of the earth. A man as big as one of the giants of Guildhall, has not the hundredth part of an idea of a globe twenty five thousand miles round. What then?

ON History, he says, To understand history, the reader must enter into the causes, &c. And because a boy cannot do this, he must not be taught a sketch of the four monarchies. Does every grown person, who reads history, enter deeply into causes? They will not, if M. ROUSSEAU can prevent it. For he says expressly [z], Those are the worst histories, which help the reader to profit by the study of history. Can any one help thinking, that this author affects singularity, and is as pedantic in his new-fangled way, as the masters, he is so severe upon, are in the old tried method? I appeal

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to the experience of all people, who have been themselves educated, whether they do not find, that their beginning every branch of learning early, has proved an advantage, and enabled them to go more readily in mature life, to the higher parts of those studies, of which they had (mechanically enough, without doubt) learned the dry elementary parts in their childhood.

ON Morals, he says [a], young people have but little notion of the importance of instructions relating to their happiness in life, or in futurity. It is true they are not capable of much thought about any thing at a distance. But have they no memory? Do we not all recollect, as we grow up, instructions which we conceived but grossly, at the time they were given us? Does not our recollection of the anxious and affectionate labours of our wise and kind parents, and teachers, in our earliest years, affect us with impressions very useful to us as we advance in life? Can we think of the pains they took to inculcate upon us sentiments of virtue and honour, without being led to reflect, that, to them at least, virtue and honour must have been matters of great consequence? Do we not find, that they have, by their awful warnings, made our way to vice thorny? That they have set upon our minds an edge of delicacy, they would not otherwise have had, and which accordingly those persons are strangers to, who had not the same instructions, but were let alone till vice and folly

folly got the first possession of them? Do we not, if we go astray, find, that those very consequences follow our misbehaviour, which they threatened? Have they not thus furnished us a clew, whereby to find our way out of the labyrinth of vice, into which we have wandered? What if a youth is incapable of casuistry? What if he cannot master WOLLASTON, LOCKE, and CLARKE? Every child of six years old, sees the justness of that simple precept, which directs us to do to others, as we may in reason expect them to do to us in like circumstances. And the proof, that he understands the justness of this precept is, His applying it spontaneously, on any proper occasion that offers. And very soundly will the youngest heads judge in matters of right and wrong, as they best know, who have been most conversant among young persons; which, from various particulars in M. ROUSSEAU's work, it is evident, if he had not declared it himself, he never has been. However that may be, parents and masters! Remember you are not to answer to M. ROUSSEAU. If you decline informing your children and pupils fully of all their duties and obligations, beware of the consequences. In spite of his speculative and un-authorised rant, experience will convince you, that you have it in your power to give them just notions of morals; and that the earlier you begin this work, and the more copiously you discourse, argue, and question, with them, the more you exemplify from living characters, from well-devised fables, and from history (taking care not to disgust them by an excess of seriousness, or by protracting the conversation to a length too tedious), the more clear their con-

ception will be in mature life, of the obligations they are under, and of the excellence of virtue and deformity of vice. Do you --- does M. ROUSSEAU --- know of any knowledge more valuable than this? Is there any method of communicating knowledge, but by teaching? Is there a possibility of teaching in M. ROUSSEAU's manner, by things and experience, in a child's narrow sphere of action, the thousandth part of what ought to be taught of morals?

M. ROUSSEAU has penned an imaginary dialogue between the master and the child, which, he thinks, must shew, convincingly, the impossibility of communicating to a child any notion of right and wrong, and effectually discourages parents and masters from all attempts to teach young people morals by words. I desire to save the reader and myself the trouble of any remarks on this dialogue; and shall take the liberty of drawing up another by way of counterpart to his, and leave it to the reader to decide between us.

MASTER. Do you know, Master JACKY, why Lying is forbidden by the laws of the school?

PUPIL [*of six years old*]. I suppose, Sir, because it is a bad thing.

MASTER. Why do you conclude, from its being forbidden, that it is a bad thing?

PUPIL. Because I suppose none but bad things are forbidden.

MAST. Let us see if that be so. Tell me some things, that are not forbidden.

PUPIL. We are not forbidden to eat, drink, or play.

MAST. And those, you think, are not bad things?

PUPIL. No surely, Sir; for if we did not eat, drink, and play, we should not be well.

MAST. True. But are you allowed to eat or drink every thing; to eat unripe fruit, for example, or too much at a time of good fruit; or to drink cold water when you are hot?

PUPIL. No, Sir; because, if we did, we should be sick, and die, and should be put in the pit-hole for the worms to eat.

MAST. Right, my brave boy. You may depend upon it, that parents and masters mean nothing but the good of such pretty little urchins as you; and that they love you tenderly, and are anxious about you, or else they would not take the trouble of forbidding you to do this, or bidding you do that. And whenever any thing is forbidden, you may be sure there is some harm in it, though, perhaps, you may not know, as well as they, how great the harm of it is. You remember the fable of the young cock, who would look into the well in spite of his mother's prohibition; and, fancying that his image in the water was another cock, dropped into the well, and found, when too late, that mamma was wiser than he.

FROM

FROM such an introduction, a parent, or master, may proceed to point out the evil nature, and consequences, of every vice, to which early youth is inclinable, and may open to his pupil by degrees, a prospect into social life, by which, when he comes to be a member of society, he may at least have the same advantage over an uninstructed mind, as a person, who has, in the country, studied the map of London, has over another, who has not, when they both come first to this great city.

No, no, cries M. ROUSSEAU, "Maitres ! peu de "discours." Masters, keep your advices to yourselves. Don't so much as tell your pupil, that, if he provokes a dog, he may bite him, a horse kick him, or a bullock gore him ; that if he climbs trees, or walls, he may chance to fall, and break a leg or an arm ; but let him alone, and when he suffers for his folly, he will take better care of himself afterwards. As you are, for fear of moral infection, to educate him in the most retired part of the country you can find, you must take your chance of a bone-setter, ignorant, or skilful, or none at all. So that he may get himself, with great success, a cheek torn off, or a crooked leg, or arm, which will serve him for life, as a continual monitor --- when too late.

M. ROUSSEAU does not, indeed, say this in so many words. But I appeal to his readers, whether his dumb-teaching scheme does not amount to this. It is true, he directs you to put out of his way every thing, by which he may hurt himself, that is, you

must not have a tree, a house, a river, a garden wall, a horse, a bullock, or a dog, within six miles of the place where your pupil is to reside. And as the number of single pupils, placed, in order to prevent moral infection, at competent distances from one another, would overspread the land, the reader is left to judge what levelling and evacuating there must be, to save a few words speaking. *Ob these Wits!*

M. Rousseau proposes to annihilate all use of verbal admonition, or warning against vice, by contriving matters so, that the child shall never think of doing any thing wrong. In the matter of dissimulation particularly, he labours to shew the possibility of preventing the child's being ever under any temptation to lying. Make him believe, (says our author) that what he ought not to do, is impossible [c]. Make him, if you can, say I too. But suppose I give my two little boys, one of five, the other of six years old, an apple each. The eldest thinks his brother's apple preferable to his, and therefore desires to have it rather than his own. Perhaps he may think two better than one. How am I to manage matters so, that he shall seriously believe it impossible for him either to make an unjust exchange with his brother, or to get possession of his property, by force, or fraud. How am I to contrive, that when he has committed this piece of injustice, he shall really believe it impossible for him to deny the fact, when his younger brother complains to me of the injury.

PREVENTION

PREVENTION is undoubtedly preferable to correction, and innocence to repentance. But I cannot help wishing to see all schemes and proposals accompanied with one convenient circumstance, I mean practicability. It will be possible to prevent all the faults, to which both early and riper age is obnoxious, whenever M. ROUSSEAU obliges the world with the discovery of a new chemical process, by which all the weakness, the self love, the passion, and appetite, which have hitherto been found in human nature, may be extracted out of children, and mortals at once transmuted into angels. But till this valuable secret comes to be known, we must be contented to keep, or make, young people as good as we can, by using the most probable means experience (not imagination) points out.

Mr. ROUSSEAU pretends to shew that a child may be kept from all temptation to lying. Yet he would not have the children of a family by any means educated separately; nor can it be on his plan; because the parents are the only masters; and one individual father cannot well be in five or six different places at the same time, educating separately as many sons. I should therefore be glad to know Mr. ROUSSEAU's magic for keeping from a family of three or four, the common vices of strife, envy, peevishness, violence, lying, and the like. Let two or three boys amuse themselves only with gathering pebbles. If there be thousands to choose from, I will not answer that they shall not quarrel about them; nay, I am sure they will, by the time they have been an hour

or two engaged in that employment. From quarrelling it is but one step to violence, injustice, lying, and so on.

It is undoubtedly of great consequence to keep from a boy, as much as possible, every temptation, or suggestion, that may lead to error or vice. Therefore it were to be wished, that parents were infinitely more delicate on that point, than, generally speaking, they are. But it is utterly impossible, by any management whatever, to prevent all moral infection, unless there could be discovered in the different parts of the world, ten millions of separate uninhabited islands, one for each pupil, and ten millions of tutors, each a prodigy, (for such, according to M. ROUSSEAU [*d*], a tutor ought to be) to retire with the young people, and secure them against all intercourse with mankind. For no person, who knows how debauched the common people are in the remotest country places, will think a young person absolutely secure in the country, any more than in town. There is, besides, an obvious ill consequence necessarily connected with a rustic education, viz. That it will almost infallibly expose the youth to be the dupe of the first and clumsiest knave, who may think it worth while to deceive him. Let your son see the world early, under proper conduct, whatever M. ROUSSEAU may speculate, else he will quickly feel it. Shut not your daughter up from the sight of young

[*d*] Vol. I. p. 24. Un gouverneur! O quelle ame sublime! &c.

young men, unless you would have her run away with the footman.

WERE there any certain means known for keeping youth from vice, it would be worth while to risque every loss of improvement for the sake of what is of so great consequence. But, when M. ROUSSEAU has condemned his pupil to ignorance and a country dunghill, for the fifteen first and most tractable years of his life; there is nothing material gained, and the loss is beyond estimation, as beyond recovery. M. ROUSSEAU pretends, that no vice is the natural growth of the human heart; but that people become vicious and ill-disposed by infection, and wrong education only. But how then does it come to pass, that we so commonly see the children of the same parents, educated in the same principles, among the same set of people, perhaps in a remote country place, turn out so different in disposition and character; one a saint, the other a fiend? How comes it that worthless parents often leave behind them children of the most eminent characters for virtue, and contrariwise? They, who know by experience, the nature of youth the most perfectly, know, that some subjects are incapable of being, by any means within the reach of human sagacity, brought to good. Even among horses, dogs, and bullocks, we find, that different individuals are plainly of different radical tempers, before they are undertaken by men, and, many times, this difference predominates to the last, in spite of all that can be done to break those animals of their bad dispositions. In our species, it is with virtue as with knowledge; the mind of the pupil must be

naturally capable of them; else the angel GABRIEL will not produce them in it; unless angels have the power of *new-making minds*. And yet this does not supersede education. For education pretends only to make the most of a subject, such as it is.

IN order to set a youth against passion, M. ROUSSEAU directs to bring him in sight of a man in a passion; and tell him (a flat lye!) that the poor man is in a feverish fit [*e*]. If the pupil himself happens to fall into a passion, the same falsehood is to be pursued, and he is to be treated as one that is ill, I suppose, with bleeding, blistering, and clystering, and if he provokes his father, mother, or master, they are to pretend he has thrown them into a fever. I wonder whether they must bleed, blister, and take clysters too, to keep up the spirit of the farce. I should think this hardly avoidable, because the boy will certainly know, that, in England at least, people in fevers are generally so treated.

Is it not strange that the same author should propose deceiving a child so grossly, and should likewise blame the use of fables in education, as, hiding the moral, for that plain *truth* ought to be spoken to a child. Is it speaking plain *truth* to tell him that an *angry man* is a *sick man*? Is it not representing what is highly culpable as a mere misfortune? Than which what can be more contradictory to the true nature of things? M. ROUSSEAU himself, confutes, in my opinion, his

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[*e*] Vol. I. p. 105. Ce pauvre homme est malade; il est dans un acces de fievre.

own proposal [*f*], by owning, that it will be necessary to take great care that the child be not undeceived. But undeceived he will certainly be at last. Is it not better to tell him the plain truth at first? To shew him the folly of violent rage about a trifle, (for what else are all the subjects of anger and contention)? to teach him to mark the staring eyes the foaming mouth, the distorted features, the human form made to resemble that which is given to dæmons and furies, to inform him that unbridled rage produces fevers, convulsions, madness, murders, and hanging. This may be of service to youth, as being what they will afterwards find to be a true representation of the matter.

He likewise gives his pupil a false account of the duty of alms-giving, viz. That when it was settled, that some should be poor and others rich, it was done on the condition that the rich should maintain the poor, which all the rich promised at their coming to the possession of their estates. What is this pupil to think of his governor by and by?

M. ROUSSEAU himself seems to be diffident of the universal success of his preventive method. For he treats largely of punishment. But if vice may, in all cases, be prevented, what occasion can there be for punishment?

M. ROUSSEAU's peculiar method of punishing is, by the parent's or tutor's ordering matters so, that the natural penal consequences of the pupil's misbehaviour may be made to teach him ; and that, by no means whatever, the parent, or master, shall, on any occasion, shew themselves in the least displeased, give any verbal instructions, or inflict any positive punishment, as from themselves. But unfortunately, in almost every instance our author brings, of the application of his consequential punishment, you plainly see, on examining it, that it is in fact, no consequential punishment, but a positive infliction, as much as a whipping. Nor is there a bare possibility of finding a sufficient number of real consequences to answer universally the necessary purposes.

M. ROUSSEAU seems, as above observed, not to have clear ideas of natural consequences ; but often proposes, instead of them, positive inflictions. As in the case of a boy, who breaks the windows repeatedly on purpose. Shut him up, says M. ROUSSEAU, in a room where there are no windows to break, till he has, at the instigation of somebody sent by you, proposed to give over that practice [g]. This treatment of the boy is natural, and proper. But is not this a positive punishment directly inflicted by the parent, or governor, as much as a whipping ? Thus even M. ROUSSEAU himself is unavoidably drawn into the old method, and forced to own the insufficiency

ciency of his own for all cases. The only proper natural consequence from breaking the windows, would be, letting them remain unrepaired, till the rain or snow, driving in upon his head, gives him a cold, and a fever. This, accordingly, M. ROUSSEAU likewise proposes. His sufferings by the disease, and by the doctor, says he, will certainly cure him of breaking windows in sport. But how, if he dies in the midst of this humane experiment? No matter, says M. ROUSSEAU, he had better be dead, than be ungovernable. Will any father, or mother, out of Bedlam, give their consent to the hazarding, in such a manner, the life of a child, for the purpose of correcting a fault, which a farthing's worth of birch will correct? Is the unmeaning vivacity of a child to be punished with death? Is this the same author, who laments, like a very NIobe, over the sufferings of a boy learning his lesson? *Nil fuit unquam tam dispar sibi* [b].

IN the present state of things, the consequences of our actions follow at such a distance, and in so inadequate and precarious a manner, that the worst faults into which youth are apt to fall, are not likely to bring any immediate corrective inconvenience upon the offender; nor can they, in most cases, by any contrivance, be made even to *seem* to be the natural causes of punishments. Some of the faults, into which young people most commonly deviate, are dissimulation, idleness, passion, pilfering, cruelty, cow-

ardice, rashness, profaneness, pride, prodigality, obstinacy, lewdness. Let us now try to imagine a method for inflicting M. ROUSSEAU's consequential punishments on these vices. In the case of dissimulation, which happens to stand first in the list, M. ROUSSEAU proposes [i], that, instead of blaming the child for lying, he be punished by the natural consequences of the lye; and mentions charging him with faults he did not commit, and rejecting his vindication of himself, as not to be regarded on account of his having forfeited all belief. But surely M. ROUSSEAU must have strangely forgot himself here. Wits have short memories, says POPE. It is a principal part of his dumb-teaching scheme, never to accuse, never to tell the youth, in so many words, that he has done wrong; but to leave it to the consequences of his actions to convince him, that he will be a loser by continuing in such a practice. How then is Mr. ROUSSEAU to charge him with faults, he did not commit? or rather, what will he suffer by being charged with what he is not to be told is a fault? I say nothing of the disingenuity of accusing him falsely; nor of the danger of his seeing through the contrivance.

NOR will M. ROUSSEAU's proposal, of punishing the lye by affecting to disbelieve him even when he speaks truth, answer on all occasions. You will, for the most part, be obliged to believe him. He complains of a colic. He says, he is hungry, or thirsty; tells

tells you, he has hurt himself. Are you to deny him relief in his real necessities? And how can you punish him by your affected disbelief, otherwise than by denying him somewhat necessary to him? Will not this prove dangerous?

THE natural consequences of idleness, and neglect of improvements, do not come on before the time comes, when we want to put those improvements to use, that is, before mature life. A child, or youth, may be made to feel the disadvantage of not being able to read: but you cannot make him suffer by any natural or contrived bad consequence from his reading ill or improperly; it is the same of writing, and every other improvement. You may, indeed, contrive that some relation, or friend, shall desire him to exhibit, and shall disapprove of his bad performance. But this would be no natural consequence from the thing itself. And you may contrive in the same manner to convince him of his deficiency in Hebrew or Arabic. A natural consequence of the thing itself, would be his finding another employed preferably to him, on account of his deficiency; or a loss occasioned to him by his faulty writing, spelling, reckoning, and so forth. But how can any such consequence be brought upon a youth? It is therefore manifest, that M. ROUSSEAU's consequence-teaching scheme will fall miserably short in this, and most other cases.

IF it be, (as most certainly it is) absolutely necessary, in this age of refinement in art, science, and commerce, that a youth be accomplished in a variety

branches, and to a considerable degree of perfection, in order to be, in mature life, on equal terms with his cotemporaries; it will follow, that he must absolutely begin his improvements at a very early age, and pursue them with a very close attention. Suppose my son to be, as I believe most people's sons are, more given to play than study, I should be glad to learn of M. ROUSSEAU, how I am, by *things*, without words, to cure him of indolence and dissipation. How am I to make him experience the disadvantage arising from the want of a multitude of accomplishments, which cannot come into use, till he comes into mature life. For M. ROUSSEAU is too original a genius to suffer me to have recourse to the common methods of alluring children to industry and good behaviour by direct rewards, and deterring from bad, by punishments. They tend (he says) to produce dissimulation, timidity, a mercenary temper, and other wrong dispositions [k]. But the Governor of the universe, who knows, I believe, as well as M. ROUSSEAU, the tendencies of things, seems to have laid the main stress of his administration on proposed rewards and punishments. This clearly shews, that *wisdom* is one thing, and *speculation* another. If it be said, children differ from men, and are to be otherwise worked upon; I answer, neither children nor men can be hurt, by exciting in them a desire of happiness, and fear of punishment. And if little children be drawn to industry and good behaviour by what they may innocently enjoy, and deterred from negligence by what is a real and natural evil, what harm is done? The wisest and best man may

may endeavour to improve his fortune by lawful (which are generally the most successful) means, with a direct view, among other objects, to the enjoyment of the innocent gratifications, which a competency affords, and poverty denies. The wisest and best man may be more temperate, than otherwise he need, through fear, among other considerations, of bringing upon himself the severe pains of the gout. I do not deny, that rewarding and punishing may, as every thing else, be injudiciously managed. But that is no reason, why they are to be laid aside, though it is for their being well considered, before they be used. A child may innocently love play: Therefore he may properly be deprived of play by way of punishment. He may innocently desire to have his natural appetite satisfied: Therefore he may have his dinner more plentifully and at an earlier hour served up to him, as a reward.

BUT, after all, does not M. ROUSSEAU's consequential punishment tend to produce exactly the same effects with a positive infliction. I punish my little boy with a whipping, because he will not give over breaking the windows. M. ROUSSEAU punishes his EMILUS with a fever, occasioned by the rain, or snow, coming in at the un-repaired pane of glass. Is not pain the punishment? is not the fear of pain the deterrent, in both cases alike? What should then make the latter punishment so much more eligible than the former, as to balance the risque of the poor child's life in the infliction?

M. ROUSSEAU declares war against all the means ever used for alluring youth to their improvement,

and emulation among others. *Emulation*; he thinks, is only another word for *hatred*. But this is merely relative to the *disposition* of the person emulating. A *malicious* temper will find a pretence for hating excellence itself. To *Momus* even the Goddess of Beauty seemed but plain. But, do we not *emulate* our masters in arts and sciences? Do we hate our music-masters, our drawing-masters, our language-masters, and our philosophy-masters? Was there ever a great mind without emulation? Is not a disposition to emulate excellence to be by all means encouraged?

OUR author says [*I*], A boy is to know nothing of authority, duty, obedience. But if you would have him to do any thing, let him know, that one good turn deserves another, and he will be glad to gain a debtor. To say nothing of what one would think should be an objection to this management in M. Rousseau's judgment, if he were to be consistent with himself [*m*] viz. That this is teaching the boy to act on mercenary principles; to say nothing of this, I appeal to any person who is experienced in the ways of children and youth, whether this method is likely to have the signal effects which M. Rousseau expects from it, so much beyond a constant sense of authority. M. Rousseau himself owns [*n*], that children have no regard to what is at a distance. Besides, how are these returns of kindness to be regularly made! And how will this fordid traffic agree with

[*I*] Vol. I. pag. 223. Parlez lui, &c. [*m*] See vol. I. p. 95. [*n*] Ibid. p. 115.—leur vue bornée, &c.

with the generous precept of returning good for evil, and shewing kindness to the undeserving? And is the father of forty years of age, to treat the son of fifteen with the same respect as the son is to treat him? It must be edifying to be present at a dialogue between the two, which may be imagined to be carried on in the following manner nearly, supposing both father and son to be named JOHN.

FATHER. JACK, come down stairs. Here is your uncle THOMAS come, and wants to see you.

SON. Not I, Old JACK, I am busy here whipping my top.

FATH. But your uncle has something to say to you, JACK, and you know he is gouty, and cannot go up stairs.

SON. Let him stay where he is then, old JACK: for I shan't come down, I assure you.

FATH. If you don't come down, JACK, I will refuse you the first thing you ask me.

SON. If you do, old JACK, I will refuse you the next thing you ask me; and then we are even you know.

FATH. But harkye, JACK, if you will come down stairs to oblige me now, I will come up stairs to oblige you another time.

SON. I thank you for nothing, old JACK, I shan't want you to come up stairs.

ON M. ROUSSEAU'S scheme of no authority, no duty, no obedience, here is, I should imagine, a full stop to all business, and the son fairly master. For the father must yield, and has it not in his power to stand out. He can't refuse his Emilian boy his dinner, or any of the necessaries of life. He must not pretend to force him down stairs, unless he will run the risque of a black eye, or a tooth beat out. The father and the son being exact equals, the son is to think himself no more concerned to oblige the father, than the father the son. And the son being, according to his age, more obstinate, and more inconsiderate, has the whole advantage over the father. Nay, it will be natural to expect that the son, as he feels himself encreasing in bodily strength, and sees the father declining, should resolve to force his father into a compliance with all his desires, which are not likely to be always the most reasonable. This will be only turning the tables against the father. For the father, if he followed M. ROUSSEAU'S directions [o], ruled the son by mere force. But to go on with our examination of M. ROUSSEAU'S silent consequence-teaching scheme.

THE natural consequences of passion, are rather harm to the object, than to the angry person, unless when carried to an extravagant excess; especially if he has the prudence to attack only those, who are weaker than himself. How then are we to turn the consequences of anger upon the child, so as to make them punish him?

M. Rous-

M. ROUSSEAU's method of breaking him of an inclination to fighting, is, If he beats the meanest person whatever, let the person so treated drub him till he has enough of it [p]. What effect is this likely to produce, if unaccompanied with *verbal* instruction (which, according to M. ROUSSEAU, is heresy) but putting him on revenging the rough usage received at the hand of one stronger than himself, on the next person weaker than himself, at whom he chooses to take offence? M. ROUSSEAU's method may convince him of the danger of attacking one who is master of him. But the intention should be, to make him look on such a practice as in itself mean and ungentleman-like. Therefore, I should sooner advise, that the person he attacks should hold him, or bind him, and tell him, that, if he pleased, he could destroy him with a few blows; but that no civilized person used such sort of practices, and that only drunkards and lawless people quarrelled and fought, and were taken up, and put in Bridewell, or the stocks, and left for some time to themselves (as he should be) to study philosophy, and the government of passion.

BUT an ill temper in a child does not always go so far as to fighting. A peevish, fretful, spightful disposition is as unamiable, and as much requires to be early eradicated, before it becomes habitual, as that which breaks out into rage. And here, a child confined to M. ROUSSEAU's state of solitude, will be

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at a great disadvantage on his consequence-teaching principles. For a peevish child living solitary will have nothing to correct his temper; he who lives with others, will of course be disliked by them, and will unavoidably suffer by his wayward disposition. They will ridicule him, thwart him in every thing, and refuse to share with him their cakes and fruits. They will exclude him from all share in their amusements. So that he will be obliged, in mere self defence, to correct his untowardly disposition. All which must be lost in a solitary education.

THE natural consequences of a turn to covetousness, cheating and pilfering, are ill-gotten gains, which detection and distrust turn to losses. Dishonesty in grown persons often punishes itself. But it is not easy to punish children or youth in a sufficiently effectual manner, by any natural or seemingly natural consequences from tricking. Or supposing it were, would any parent, or master, be thought by his son, or pupil, to know that he, his son, or pupil, has been guilty of so rank an offence, as cheating, or stealing, and not shew his abhorrence in words, in the most expressive words he can find? On such an occasion, or that of any other atrocious crime, there is no doubt, but all possible means of determent and reformation, are to be used, and the matter on no account to be trusted solely to a set of precarious vamped-up consequences. The consequences of his offence are, if possible, to be turned against him with their utmost force. He is to be punished by them, and by positive inflictions besides; and the abominable baseness of

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the offence, is likewise to be set forth in the most striking terms language can afford. And M. Rousseau may speculate as long as he pleases: but boys are not wood nor stone any more than men. They may be impressed by words and reasons properly accompanied, timed, and circumstanced; and one sentence kept in, or uttered, may be the ruin or the saving of a child.

YOUR son happens to take it into his head, that *craft* is *sagacity*. M. Rousseau will not suffer you to teach him to distinguish between two things so different. He lays his little plots so deep, that you cannot detect him, at least you cannot clearly convict him. He repeats his stratagems, varying them according to exigencies and occasions. And nature in some children furnishes a wonderful variety of this sort. At last, you catch him. You try to bring M. Rousseau's consequence-punishment upon him. He feels the inconvenience—from what?—from his having *dissembled*? — or from his being *detected*? — M. Rousseau will not give you leave to tell him, that *disimulation* is in *itself* base and odious, whether detected or not. And as the boy sees no *disapprobation* of his action in you, how is he to think of its being in *itself* blameable? All therefore, that is left for him to think, is, that he was too thoughtless in laying his measures so *clumsily*; and that he must take care that they be finer another time. This was precisely the case among the Lacedæmonians. That military people, in order to accustom their youth to martial stratagem, both offensive and defensive, made it a rule never to punish, in their boys, a theft *artfully* performed.

performed. So that when JACK SPARTAN was scourged in consequence of his being convicted of petty larceny in the matter of a cheese or a cabbage, he understood, that his whole fault was, letting himself be caught. Why should your son think otherwise, if you never teach him the intrinsic evil of craft and dissimulation?

THE natural consequence of cruelty in a young person, is hurt to the unfortunate cat, puppy, bird, or insect, which happens to come into the hands of the little tyrant; or, perhaps, hurt to himself from their resentment. It is easy to propose a way of dealing with him, which may tend to break him of this bad disposition. But it will not be M. ROUSSEAU's scheme, of turning the *consequences* of his own bad *disposition* against himself. Give him such a gripe as shall make him cry out. Then tell him you have as good a right to divert yourself with his pain, as he with the sufferings of a cat, or a puppy. By this you inflict a positive punishment upon him, and convince his understanding, that cruelty to the weaker is base and odious. This latter is the very object you ought to have in view. And your punishing him thus by a positive infliction, is (contrary to M. ROUSSEAU's notion) more eligible than the only penal natural consequence of his proceeding, viz. the cat's scratching him, the puppy's biting him, or the insect's stinging him; none of which (even if you could depend upon the animals acting their part properly, and entering into your views) has the least natural tendency to impress his mind with any horror against the *vice* of cruelty.

cruelty; and will only suggest to him the necessity of taking better care of *himself*, whenever he thinks of giving himself the diversion of teasing animals armed with claws, teeth, or stings. And this objection against M. ROUSSEAU's consequential punishments, viz. That they do not of *themselves*, tend to correct wrong dispositions, or implant right ones, unless accompanied with verbal instruction, (which he expressly forbids) holds very generally.

THE natural consequence of cowardice, is sleeping in a whole skin. How is a consequential punishment to be got out of this? If a child or youth shews too much effeminacy and timidity in attempting or going through what is unavoidable in life, you may help his infirmity by shewing him, that the object of his fear is much less formidable, than it appears, by laughing at his whimsical apprehensions; by shewing him the baseness of cowardice, and the nobleness of true courage; by gradually familiarising him with such objects, as have been wont to alarm his fears; by shewing him, that others perform without hesitation, what he thinks so tremendous a task; by holding up to him the characters of heroes illustrious in story; and so forth. But scarce any of these comes within M. ROUSSEAU's scheme; because his whole education is to be acted in dumb shew, and excludes books.

PROFANENESS brings, naturally, neither immediate reward, nor punishment. Is a boy then to go on swearing and blaspheming, till he acquires an unconquerable habit of this most inexcusable of all vices? If it should be proposed, that every body fly from the place

place he is in, lest the divine vengeance drive the roof down upon him and them, or the earth open and swallow them up; or that he be shut up by himself till he declares his repentance; this is a proper manner of dealing with him. But it is not M. ROUSSEAU's natural consequence; for it is visibly a direct infliction from the parents or governors. One great objection, I should imagine, with M. ROUSSEAU, against positive punishments, is, that the child may consider them as the mere effect of ill-nature in the parent, or master; which M. ROUSSEAU thinks he will not be led to do, if the punishment be consequential. But this will very seldom be found to answer. When he shuts up his pupil for wantonly breaking the windows, or for disturbing his rest in the night; what is to hinder the child's arraigning his justice, or suspecting him of caprice, any more than if he had punished him with the rod? But to proceed;

How is a boy to be cured of pride by the natural consequences of that vice? If it should be said, It draws upon itself the contempt of beholders, and, in that manner may be trusted to punish itself; to this it is natural to answer; The case is the same with every vice. But what contempt can M. ROUSSEAU's solitary pupil be exposed to? His pride will not, therefore, in such circumstances, punish him; it will not of itself, deprive him of his dinner, his diversion, or his nightly rest. With proper instruction, he may be brought to think rightly of himself, and to behave with proper modesty; but verbal instruction is incompatible with the whole tenor of Mr. ROUSSEAU's plan of education.

PRODIGALITY naturally produces want. But youth has no forecast. And experience shews a child, that his reducing himself to absolute poverty, by spending at once all he is possessed of, brings no material inconvenience upon him; therefore teaches him no lesson of frugality in his management of the next shilling he comes to be master of. While he has any thing in his pocket, he longs to lay it out, and when it is all gone, he is easy. He still has the necessaries of life furnished him, though his pocket cannot furnish a penny. And if M. ROUSSEAU, upon his pretended consequence-teaching scheme, should propose, that, to accustom him to give some attention to his expences, he should be made to pay, or at least to shew that he is able to pay, so much toward every meal, or be worse served; this would be no natural consequence, but a positive punishment, and the boy would, at seven years of age, understand it as such.

OBSTINACY will often, of course, punish itself; but not so regularly, so certainly, nor so effectually, as to supersede all use of verbal admonition, and positive correction. If your son refuses to do what you would have him, or will do what you would not have him; you may be obstinate in your turn. But this is not punishing him with his *own* obstinacy, but with *yours*; therefore is not M. ROUSSEAU's scheme. Besides it is to be considered, how far we may safely set an example of returning evil for evil.

As to lewdness, our London youth of the present age, are as knowing at eighteen, as their fathers were at twenty-eight. How are their parents, or masters, to teach them by *things*, without words, the evil of wenching? M. ROUSSEAU will say, let them carry them to the hospital for incurables. Shrewdly thought of. But the youth who keeps a surgeon in fee, or a mistress for himself *exclusively*, as he believes, will be little moved, I doubt, with the view of distress, which he thinks he has taken effectual precautions against ever being *his*. By accustoming him to hear virtue and sobriety recommended; by presenting to him just, that is, deformed pictures of debauchery; by leading him to a sublime way of thinking; by shewing him the fatal consequences of bad habits indulged; by such means as these, a youth may, perhaps, be saved from the most dangerous and most universally destructive of vices. But all this is inconsistent with M. ROUSSEAU's scheme.

WHENEVER the consequences of a child's wrong behaviour can be made to punish him, there is no doubt, but this should be attended to, and I suppose all judicious parents and masters have made a proper use of consequences, some thousands of years before M. ROUSSEAU was born. But I suppose no judicious parent or master ever has, I hope none ever will resolve to observe an absolute silence, or decline informing their children, and pupils, by words, of all they are capable of being taught; which I know to be much more than unexperienced persons (as M. ROUSSEAU shews himself to be) can imagine.

LET us suppose a case the most favourable to M. ROUSSEAU's scheme, of teaching by consequences only, without words, that it may appear, whether reasoning joined with it will improve or injure it.

YOUR son at ten years of age proves to be of a good growth, of a bold spirit, and but little afraid of offending, in short, a boy of the true English breed. He terrifies you, from time to time, by his rashness, so that you expect him, every day, to be brought home to you with a dislocation or a broken bone. You do all you can, to excite in him some sense of fear for his own person, as well as of obedience to you. He neglects your kind advice ; falls from a tree in your garden, and breaks his leg. You take care to have the bone set. M. ROUSSEAU will not suffer you to say a word to him, on his being able to run about again. But I beg leave to appeal to the reader, whether the following short remonstrance can do any harm, or whether it may not be of service.

“ You are now, JACK (thank God) quite cured.
“ But you don’t know what an escape you have had.
“ You must know, JACK, that it is very common for
“ people who break their bones, to lose the limb they
“ break, and perhaps their lives. For, if the bone
“ be broken in two or three places, or mashed, the
“ limb must be cut off. Sometimes a mortification
“ comes on so fast, that the cutting off of the limb will
“ not save the life. You would not like to die and be
“ buried ? Or to have a leg cut off, and stump about
“ on timber toes all your life afterwards ? If then you

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“ love

“ love your life, or your limbs, keep hereafter on
“ plain ground, and out of harm’s way. For as your
“ fall from the tree was what you did not expect, so
“ you may be hurt another time when you as little ex-
“ pect it, and may not come off so well as you have
“ now.”

CAN any man in his wits think such a speech on such an occasion, unseasonable, or hurtful? Does it not naturally tend to impress the boy with a greater sense of danger from climbing, than would have arisen in his mind from the mere fracture of the leg? Would he of himself, have found out, that he was in danger of a mortification, and a consequent amputation, or death?

SUPPOSE the consequence not to have proved so bad; and that, in falling from the tree, the little libertine has come off with only a scratch on the cheek, or forehead; can it do any harm to remonstrate to him on the danger he escaped, of having the same scratch, which by mere good luck, or providence (not through any management of his) took his forehead, or his cheek, prove the destruction of an eye? I own, I should think a father, or master, an idiot, who could let slip so fair an opportunity without making such a use of it.

IT is true, that some boys are of so daring a temper, that consequences, neither alone, nor accompanied with remonstrance, will restrain them. But this does not affect the present point between M. ROUSSEAU
and

and me, which is merely, Whether young persons are to be reasoned with, or not.

OUR author proposes, that all teaching be by things, not words. And yet, in order to secure his pupil from the danger of moral infection, he insists, that he be confined to the most remote and solitary part of the country that can be found. But in this retirement, sequestered from all intercourse with his fellow-creatures, especially from those of his own rank, how is M. ROUSSEAU to conjure up those experiences, which are to teach his pupil?

M. ROUSSEAU has such an antipathy to reasoning with young people, that he runs the hazard, I should think, of putting his pupil on suspecting him of caprice, or tyranny. "Never command any thing. Assume no authority. Only let him know, that you are strong, and he is weak, and at your mercy. If you would have him not do any thing, restrain him by main force, and not by authority [q]." Now, I should think, if a parent, or master, gives the youth a reason, why he restrains him, he gives himself at least a chance for impressing the youth with proper sentiments. If he acts by main force, there is not even a chance for this. A youth may often, perhaps, as M. ROUSSEAU says, misconceive the instructions given him by his elders. But if he has no instructions given him, what will his conceptions then be? My little boy, at table, puts his hand into the dish, and lays hold, without

ceremony, of the wing of a chicken. How am I to prevent his doing so another time? By tying his hands behind his back, while he is at table? This is, if I mistake not, restraining by main force. If I do this without signifying my meaning, what is JACK to think of his father's wits? If my telling him peremptorily, that he shall not dine at my table, unless he behaves himself in a decent manner, will effectually keep him to his good behaviour, what need of manacles either of iron or brass?

I CANNOT, for my part, see, what grand advantage there is in this silent *thing-teaching*, which is to set it so much above the method used with us and our fore-fathers, and, I suppose, if all the truth was known, with M. ROUSSEAU himself. You must not bluntly order your son to learn to read. You must contrive a long-winded political scheme, of sending a card for him to his cousin's, to eat strawberries and cream; and you must put every body out of the way, that he may not get the card read for him, and then he will see the usefulness of reading, and will desire to learn. This grand machination, for so trifling a purpose, puts me in mind of a certain curious mechanical-headed gentleman, I have read of somewhere, who would not have in his house stairs to go from floor to floor, but scaffolds, suspended by ropes, with windlasses and pulleys, as they have in theatres, for hoisting up and sinking their witches, ghosts, and devils.

Will it not answer every end as well, and save a world of invention and stratagem (which if the boy happens

happens to find out, had better never been tried, as he will then suspect every person and every thing) fairly to tell him, that every body does learn to read, that nothing can be done without it, that if he will take a very little trouble, as all other boys do, he will soon get over the chief difficulty of it, and that if he wont do as he is ordered, he must be compelled by punishments and mortifications of various kinds.

WHEN you have brought your boy to undertake the labour of learning so much of reading as to be able to feel out the sense of the strawberry-card, you have gained hardly any thing. You must erect a new battery, before you can prevail with him to take the trouble of perfecting himself so as to be able to read print and writing readily, and to express the sense of what he reads to others by accent, emphasis, due attention to stops, proper rises and falls of the voice, &c.

Is a child of six years old a *human* being? Or is he a *brute*, till he comes to be of age? Is not the faculty of *reasoning* (more or less accurately, more or less extensively) the unalienable characteristic of every human creature, that is past speechless infancy, and is not an idiot? If this be the case, why is a child never to be *reasoned* with? If M. ROUSSEAU had urged the propriety of instructing a minor in such a simple and familiar manner, as should suit his *narrow* views, and *weak* apprehension; if he had advised to be brief, to be mild, to be entertaining, to turn precept, as much as possible, into example, nobody would have objected. But to tell us at one time, a

child has not *capacity* enough to understand any one verbal instruction we give him, and at another, he will *instruct* himself by observing the natural, or contrived consequences of things, without our giving him the least assistance; if all this be consistent, I know not what is contradictory.

THE point in dispute, viz. Whether youth are to be taught any thing by *words*, lies between M. ROUSSEAU and all the world. For the wisest men of both ancient and modern times, all writers on education, inspired and uninspired, have inculcated the propriety and necessity of copious *verbal* teaching. Thus MOSES, the most antient of lawgivers, repeatedly directs his people to teach their children the laws and statutes he had given them, and to explain to them the origin of the ritual observances he had prescribed them [r]. And JOSHUA, his successor, renews the same order [s]. ISAIAH the prophet, gives a complete idea of education in a few words, saying, that it is giving line upon line, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little [t]. The royal Psalmist invites children to come and hearken to him; for that he will teach them the fear of the Lord [u]. And SOLOMON calls on children to hear instruction [x]. The honest apostle PAUL must never never have read ROUSSEAU. For he gives repeatedly an express verbal precept. "Children, obey

[r] Exod. xii. 26. Deut. iv. 10. vi. 7. xi. 19.

[s] Josh. iv. 6. 21, 22.

[u] Psal. xxxiv. 11. viii. 32.

[t] Isa. xxviii. 9, 10.

[x] Prov. iv. 1. v. 7. vii. 24.

"obey your parents [y]," &c. And supposes that fathers "exhort and charge their children [z]," and "keep them in subjection [a]. Nor does any body doubt whether the ancient plans of education, prescribed by the Persian, Spartan, and other lawgivers, did not comprehend copious verbal teaching. At least what we have of them from XENONOPHON and PLUTARCH, lead us to think they did. SENECA and QUINTILIAN are directly against M. ROUSSEAU's dumb-shew education. "It is of great advantage for mature life, "that youth be properly instructed. Those *precepts* "sink deep into our minds, which are imprinted on "them in our *earliest* years [*primis etatibus*] and we "are naturally most tenacious of those things, which "we learned when we were boys. Let no age be "thought so tender [*tam infirma*] as not to be capable "of understanding the difference between good and "evil. For the mind is the most capable of being "formed, when it is most disposed to yield to those "who direct it [*præcipientibus*]. Therefore a *boy* is to "be warned, [*monendus*] that he must not indulge "wantonness, passion, or licentious inclinations. "Childhood [*pueritia*] is to be carefully kept out of "the way of flattery. Let him [a child] hear the "truth of himself; let him be told roundly of his "faults; let him, when he has done amiss, be afraid "of his parents and masters; let him always reverence "them." PLINY, in his letter to CORELLIA HIS-PULLA, recommends to her, for her son's master,

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JULIUS

[y] Eph. vi. 1. and Coloss. iii. 20.
ii. 11. [a] 1 Tim. iii. 4.

[z] Theſſ.

JULIUS GENITOR, "a man of a grave and strict behaviour, of whom her son would hear nothing but what would have a tendency to make him wiser and better, and who would be as diligent in giving him good advice, as she herself, or PLINY." Again, QUINTILIAN, "Let a master speak much [*plurimus ei sit sermo*] of virtue and probity. For, the more he warns his pupils, the less occasion he will have to chastise." And HORACE celebrates his father for the many useful lessons he had taught him, and examples he had pointed out to him, some for his imitation, others to be avoided; which method, he says, first put him on attending to moral subjects, and accustomed him to take all opportunities of examining himself, and correcting his failings. ROLLIN, indeed, approves of instructions given indirectly, that is, out of the ancient authors, rather than directly from the master. But M. ROUSSEAU's pupil is to have no verbal instruction either from the dead or the living. For his governor is to be dumb, and he himself is never to look into a book. M. ROUSSEAU says expressly, *Je hais les livres*; "I hate your nasty books." LOCKE recommends reasoning with children from the earliest age; by the same token, that M. ROUSSEAU ridicules that wise and great man for it, and says in his preface, that the subject of education was quite new after Mr. LOCKE wrote, that is, Mr. LOCKE had as good never have written. He adds, indeed, giving himself an air of modesty, "Perhaps the subject will be new after my book too." Now we will give M. ROUSSEAU leave to use what freedoms he pleases with himself and his book; but it would have become him to have kept at a little distance behind

Mr.

Mr. LOCKE, and not to have passed the same censure on Mr. LOCKE's book, as on his own. There will never, I hope, be any comparison thought of, by any judicious reader, between LOCKE and ROUSSEAU, till the latter has obliged the world with *additions to our knowledge*, of equal importance with those we owe to the former.

M. ROUSSEAU insists, that reason discovers itself very late in mankind (very late, it must be owned, in *some* individuals) and therefore is not to be used as an instrument in education. But, if man is properly a moral agent, it were to be expected, that, generally speaking, he should be capable of exerting this faculty rather early in life. I say, *capable* of exerting it: for his *actual* exertion of it, so as generally to regulate his conduct by it, in spite of overpowering passions and temptations, is not so certainly to be expected. Now, if reason be our only guide through life, (without reason what can we make of revelation)? If without reason we can do nothing; we cannot be too early put upon exercising this useful faculty. Children will be awkward at using it: so will they at using the limbs of their bodies. On that very account they ought to be put upon practising, in order to their learning the proper use of both. Are youth to learn reasoning, without any one's reasoning with them. Try what progress your son will make in any one art whatever, by himself, without *books* or *masters*. It is true, M. ROUSSEAU, foreseeing, I suppose, that such objections as these would be started by the readers of his romantic scheme, has gravely proposed that his *EMILIUS* should learn music and drawing, without help

of masters: but woe to the *ears*, and *eyes*, that are doomed to the entertainment of hearing his self-taught music, and examining the drawings he will produce without a master. Unfortunate masters! Against whom M. ROUSSEAU seems to have not a *natural*, but an *artificial* antipathy, as if *help* were only another word for *hindrance*, and as if, contrary to the common sense and united voice of all mankind, the abilities of *one* could produce more than those of *many*.

HE seems in several parts of his *EMILIU*S, to affect a great admiration of the shrewdness of the *savages*, whose whole reasonings, (the extent of which we know is very great) are the effect of each individual's *unassisted* experience. He therefore proposes that his *EMILIU*S be educated, as nearly as may be, in the *savage* manner. No reasoning, no teaching, no book, no master, no authority, no reward, no punishment, no emulation, no honour, no shame, (I was going to add *no sense*) let nature work, let him draw every thing out of his *own* funds, and you will see, reader, what *speciosa miracula* he will exhibit. Yet he will have him learn a mechanic trade, not by *himself*, but of a *master*; how consistently with his scheme, is submitted. One would wonder, that M. ROUSSEAU should once mention the *savages*. Does he not precisely in them see the peculiar disadvantage of being deprived of *teaching*? Are they not the dupes and slaves of every civilized nation, that can make their advantage of their labour. Are they not unacquainted with all that serves to ennable human nature, or polish life? Are they not the very disgrace of the species? Have they any thing of

of humanity, but the figure, and even that brutified, or diabolised, by their barbarous manner of setting it off.

" You would have (says he) your pupil *teachable* " when young. This is making him a dupe when " grown up [a]. What can be more arbitrarily pronounced ? Figure to yourself a youth so happily disposed to obedience, that he never disputed his *father's* or *master's* directions. Must he therefore, of course, be ready to give himself up to be led, or rather misled by every *sharper* ? Because he *finds*, by experience, that his father, and governor, are his wisest, best, and kindest friends ; is it to be expected, that he should, when grown up to years of discretion, place the same confidence in persons, of whom he has *no experience* ? What must the parents and tutors have been employed about in their care of the minor, if they have never warned him of the danger of being deceived by *strangers*, nor of the difficulty of finding out the real characters of artful and designing men ?

IT is true, M. ROUSSEAU forbids warning him of any danger ; and advises to trust to the informations he will gain by experience [c]. But I hope no father or master will follow this advice. I will not answer, that a minor, brought up in a retired part of the country, and uninformed of every thing, but what his narrow sphere of experience will have taught him,

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shall

[b] Vol. II. p. 27. *Vous voulez, &c.*
p. 28.

[c] Vol. II.

shall not come to the gallows. How, if his father drops, before he has received any general instructions, or seen any thing of life? He is twenty years old, with the prudence of six. He falls into the hands of a knave. I leave the reader to imagine the rest.

M. ROUSSEAU opposes all use of books, because a child can retain nothing but words, and words are not knowledge [*d*]. The words of a fable, are not the fable, nor the words of history, history. But what is to hinder any, but dumb masters, such as M. ROUSSEAU and his followers, from informing the child of the sense of the story, and making him tell it in his own words, so as to shew that he is fully possessed of the meaning as well as the words? And how can a child be put upon better employment, than exerting his reason in finding out the meaning and moral of fables, riddles, and short stories? I think his criticisms on FONTAINE's Fables, are much too affectedly delicate, and in many particulars wrong.

M. ROUSSEAU will have his pupil learn nothing by memory. One would think he opposed the received method of education only for opposition's sake. Is it not an accomplishment in a youth to be able to repeat by memory, and pronounce justly, a passage of an elegant author, containing a set of beautiful and useful moral sentiments? Will not some parts of them be likely to remain in his memory the longer for their having been treasured up in it at an early period, before

fore it was crowded with a variety of other ideas? Will not this be of advantage to him in the course of his life? Or are all mankind idiots? for all mankind are of this opinion, M. ROUSSEAU only excepted.

M. ROUSSEAU forbids carrying youth to church, or making them mutter prayers. It must be owned, that to lay great stress on positive religion in early life, and to torment children with large passages of scripture, long prayers and catechisms, psalms, hymns, and the like, to be said by rote, without understanding, can answer no great end, and may do harm, by disgusting and setting them against every thing serious. But I cannot see why a child of seven or eight years of age may not be taught, that he and his parents, and their parents, back to the first of mankind, and the whole visible universe, are the work of a powerful and invisible being; and that all people, both savage and civilized, have always thought it their duty to worship this great Being, and that it is doing children honour to let them be present where their parents, masters, and superiors are assembled for this solemn purpose. It is remarkable, that the venerable Psalmist has the misfortune to differ from M. ROUSSEAU: for he calls upon children, as well as adults, to praise God [e]. And he, who makes the principal figure in the New Testament, directs, that little children be brought to him, and not forbidden [f]. But this is not the only instance of our author's differing in opinion from that extraordinary person. They who
judge

[e] Psal. cxlviii. 12.

[f] Mark x. 14.

judge M. ROUSSEAU wiser than MOSES and the prophets, than CHRIST and his apostles, than the whole company of both ancient and modern writers on education, have only to follow his directions, and educate their children in the Chickesaw, or Cherokee taste. Others will, perhaps, judge it righter to put young people early into the track, in which they know they must walk through life.

Mr. ROUSSEAU forbids putting youth upon giving charity, because before twelve years of age (whatever may be the virtue of this wonderful twelfth year) there is no sentiment, and a boy's imitation of virtuous actions is only the imitation of a monkey. I will not contend with M. ROUSSEAU about the fact of a boy's being at eleven years and eleven months a monkey, and becoming *human* a month after. But I really think it may be of service to a child, to *accustom* him to do *mechanically* what will be *virtue* in him, when he comes to do it from *reason*. Whoever considers the effect of practice and habit, in rendering any particular action, or a general course of action, easy and natural, will, I think, agree with me in this [g].

Thus have I thrown together a few strictures on *some* particulars of M. ROUSSEAU's plan of education; of which the shining excellencies are *vanity* and *fancy*. What indeed was to be expected from an author, who fairly declares that he knows nothing *experimentally* of his

[g] See BUTLER's Analogy, LOCKE, and almost all the authors on education.

his subject, and that he chooses rather to be accused of broaching *paradoxes*, than of following *prejudices*? A judicious author would have turned this last thought the direct contrary way; would have been modest in proposing *theories*, in a matter of mere *experience*; and would rather have offered somewhat in improvement of the *tried* methods of education, than spent his time in amusing the public with a set of whims, which those, who have actually employed themselves in the education of youth, must despise as romantic and impracticable.

WHAT he has advanced, in his *EMILIUS*, in dispragement of the evidences of *christianity*, which comes very oddly into a book on education, is neither *new*, nor of any great *consequence*. If any person thinks it worth while to confute him, the task will not be difficult. It will be only having recourse to a few writers, who have fully answered these objections, when first started. *Nec habet victoria laudem.*

WHAT he writes against the practice of physic, seems to me much more irrational than it would be to advise us against repairing our houses when they want it. For the curing of innumerable distempers, which otherwise would be fatal, is as certain an operation, as the repairing of a decayed dwelling-house, by which it may be prevented from falling on the head of its inhabitant.

I AM often in my own mind thankful, that it was not my fate to be born a *genius*; since, to be a *genius*, of the species I at present speak of, is, to see every thing in

a ludic-

ludicrous light, that has been believed, or practised, by one's fellow-creatures; to be ever running away from *common sense*, and *experience*, in pursuit of *untried speculations*, and *schemes in the clouds*; and to produce nothing of which mankind can make any *advantage* in life.

BUT, to moderate this severity, let me give Mr. ROUSSEAU his due praise, and that the *greatest* that can be given a man. He is, according to all accounts, a person of a *virtuous* and *amiable* character. What I have written against him, I intend in mere support of truth; and should be very much concerned to find I had offended him, or any man of worth.

WITH all due submision to M. ROUSSEAU, the miscarriage of youth, is not, as he pretends, chargeable principally, nor to any great degree, on their *masters*; but on the *frailty* of human nature in the youth themselves; the misconduct of *parents*; and the universality of bad *example*. Has it ever been heard, that a penitent, in the article of death, when, as the poet says [*veræ voces eliciuntur*] people speak without art, or disguise, charged his offences on those who had the care of his *education* [b]? This flewns, contrary to M. ROUSSEAU, and DR. BROWN, that it is not

[b] I should imagine, that, above all other orders of men, *legislators*, and *magistrates*, are most frequently and severely reflected on by those, who die in despair; and above all other magistrates, those of a certain great *metropolis*.

CRITO MINOR.

not so much *education*, as the *world*, that wants amendment.

As there is hardly any preacher so indifferent, whose doctrine is not better than the practice of his audience, so there are few, if any, educators of youth, whose instructions do not naturally lead to a better behaviour than we commonly see in life. There is, I am persuaded, hardly any educator, who does not endeavour to discountenance vice and folly, of every species, in his pupils. But the cruel pity is, that many *parents* do not sufficiently second the endeavours of masters, nor support them in the discharge of this most important part of their duty. There are few children so sturdy of spirit, as to think of setting themselves against the world. Their parents and masters are, to them, the whole world. Did a child see his parents and masters firmly leagu'd together, to check, in him, every wrong disposition; he would quickly give up all hopes of success in so unequal a conflict. But parents too commonly think of their *children's* faults, as they do of their *own*. They trust, in both cases, to a too fatally precarious repentance. They say, "It is a boy's trick. He will know better by "and by." Thus they often apologize for vices, at which they ought to shudder.

WHY does not common sense enable parents to distinguish between those weaknesses which naturally correct themselves, as maturity advances, and those which are likely to *increase* with age? Your boy weeps for apples and cakes: There is no great danger of his exposing himself by the same species of folly at thirty.

He

He loves an unlucky frolic with all his heart: It does not certainly follow, that he will prove a blood, or a buck. He shews much more attachment to play, than to his book: He may, notwithstanding, prove, in mature life, as diligent in business, or study, as others. But is the case the same with a disposition to gluttony, to peevishness, to craft, to selfishness, to revenge, to tyranny, to pilfering, to insolence, to lewdness? I should as much expect a son of mine to grow up, without help, straight in body, from crooked; as to become, without discipline, amiable in mind of odious, virtuous or vicious. What, indeed, is to be expected of a child whose *natural* disposition is vicious, and who meets with no considerable *discouragement*, on that account, from his *parents*; but that he should go on and prosper in the same hopeful way? At seven years of age, he knows, that the master's authority is only delegated. He thinks it is the business of masters to be often finding fault, as of preachers in *every* age to expatiate on the vices of the *age*. But if he found his parents of the same mind with his masters, he would naturally conclude, there must be somewhat very black in what even *their indulgence* could not overlook. If parents do really *love* their children, they will be, above all things, anxious about their *happiness*. Can parents think their children in the way toward happiness here or hereafter, with vicious dispositions growing up in them? Is it not of infinitely more consequence that your son be *well disposed*, than that he be *rich*? Yet you hope against hope, against probability, that he will be *well disposed*; but you use the utmost *diligence*, and never

never think you can be too sure, of his being in the way toward riches.

OUR youth are almost universally overset at their first entrance into life. We hurry them into maturity at such a rate, it is no wonder we see them so often fall short of discretion at the proper age of maturity. What can be conceived more ridiculous, than to see a company of ten gentlemen and ladies gaping, listening, and admiring the pert incoherencies which are thrown out by a boy of six years old? Can the poor child think himself less than the eighth wonder of the world? Not that I would presume to dispute with her ladyship, the fact, that her own dear boy is (as every lady's *own* dear boy) an arrant angel, or the propriety of his governing her, and the family. All I would venture at, (and that may perhaps be thought too presumptuous) is, to beg, that she would please to consider, whether it be absolutely necessary, that the angel *know* his own importance, and whether this knowledge may not be likely to produce in his mind dispositions, which may, by and by, prove troublesome to manage.

I VERY well remember, that I was myself, much more benefited by the *checks*, I received in my youth, than by the commendations and encouragements I met with. For example, having, when a child, behaved saucily to the nursery maid, she complained to my mother. The good lady took me severely to task. I defended myself by observing, that I was a gentleman, and she only a servant, (pride soon springs up in the human heart) on which account I saw no great necessity

cessity for much ceremony on my part. To which my prudent parent answered in a strain which will seem, I suppose, very uncouth in our times of unbounded maternal indulgence. "What do you mean," says she, "by your being a gentleman? Is it that you are 'MOLLY's betters? I would have you to know, that "every well behaved *grown-up* person is your betters, "while you are a child. If you live to be a man, and "behave well, you may then, perhaps, be a gentle- "man. But a child is a child, and nothing else." And being, at about twelve years of age, in a pretty large company of relations, the conversation turned upon some disputable subject, I do not remember what. I took upon me to offer my sentiments, and very solemnly began my speech with, "It is my op- "nion, that"—Upon my uttering these words, an uncle, who was present, cuts me off short, crying out, "Pray, gentlemen, and ladies, as ever you would de- "sire to edify, listen to this learned person's profound "opinion." On which I immediately fled the room, leaving my opinion unexplained, and resolving in my self, that whenever, in time coming, I pretended to give my sentiments on difficult points, I would take care to be out of hearing of uncles, and other superiors in years and understanding.

M. ROUSSEAU is, undoubtedly, in the right in teaching, that a child, or youth, is on no account to be led, by the behavior of his parents, to think himself of any extraordinary consequence. Youth is naturally presumptuous and wilful, if we even use our utmost diligence to check those dispositions. Yet we see too many parents ever solicitous lest their children's

spirit,

spirit, as they call it, should be broke. If I knew of a chemical process for extracting nine parts in ten of my son's *obstinacy*, (*spirit*, in *youth*, is nothing else) I should certainly not grudge the charge of the experiment. Do we find that our sons *want spirit*? Do we not find, that they have spirit enough to run into all sorts of folly, and to break the hearts of their parents? When men come to staid old age, do they not confess, that they had, in their youth, but too much spirit? Do not almost all men wish, that they had had less spirit; that they had had more fear; that they had feared God; that they had feared vice? Is not rashness and fearlessness the most general cause of bad conduct, both in early and riper age?

FOR my part, I care not who knows it, I am the professed admirer of *modesty* in the youth of the *male* sex, as well as the female. Youth, compared with mature age, is deficient in almost every respect. Modesty therefore highly becomes young persons; and if they do not know themselves, their parents ought to know them, to treat them accordingly, and teach them to behave accordingly. We despise even an *adult* person, let his endowments be what they will, who, in company, engrosses the whole conversation. How monstrous then to encourage a *child* in such preposterous behaviour! I know, it is pretended, that this way of bringing up children tends to whet their wit, and improve their understanding. But the real effect is diametrically contrary. Let the *adult* part of the company carry on the conversation, suiting it judiciously; the child has some chance for improvement: but when he talks all, who learns any thing? Will his

pouring

pouring out, without restraint, his indigested crudities, ever make him wiser? Is it by hearing the conversation of the wise, or by talking at random, that the ignorant improve? Is it natural, that uninstructed childhood should be encouraged to do what is checked in the same individual, when he becomes more capable of it? Ought the boy of twelve to be encouraged in holding forth in presence of his elders; and is the youth of eighteen to be curbed? The London youth, who has been brought up in unrestrained freedom of speech in all companies, may, perhaps, be more lively and entertaining, than he who has had a modest country education. But which of the two has the soundest judgment? Which startles you oftener by bringing out what is improper, or indecent?

A MINOR ought, in every respect, to be treated differently from an *adult*. I do not mean that austerity, much less, rigor, is to be used, in forming the minds and manners of youth; but that a continual impression should be, by the contrivance of those who have charge of them, kept up on their minds, of their weakness, and incapacity to govern themselves; which would lead them to *desire* the advice and protection of those, who have more experience than themselves. But I appeal to all, who know the present method of bringing up children, whether it does not tend to produce the directly contrary effect; and whether we do not accordingly find, that it does produce it with great success; so that it is rare to meet with a youth of twelve years of age, to whom a man of forty dares to offer his advice, on the score of his superior *age* and *experience* merely, without the certainty of being insulted.

sulted. The pretty creatures do undoubtedly, by this behaviour, shew themselves possessed of a competent measure of that admired property, mentioned above, called *Spirit*, (vide *Pertness*) but for my part, I should think it for their advantage that they had less spirit, and more *docility*; and I very well know, that the more there is of the former in a young mind, there will be the less of the latter. How different our conduct, from that of the wise ancients, who gave every elder person an authority over his juniors in mere consideration of the difference of age.

By the behaviour of some parents, one would imagine they had a plot to defeat their own intention in giving their children education. If they have not, they are strangely inattentive to their manner of speaking of education, and educators, in the hearing of their children. It would be easy for parents to give their children as much inclination to go to a place of improvement, as they generally have aversion. They have only to speak cautiously themselves, and request of their friends, never, in the hearing of the children, to throw out the least hint in disparagement of masters, or places of education; but, whatever they may *think*, to *speak* always, in the hearing of the minors, honourably of both. And to give their domestics to know, that if they impress the minds of the children with the least prejudice against their improvement, they may expect to incur their severest displeasure. It is notorious, that servants are wont to threaten children with school, as with raw-head and bloody-bones. And it is common for parents to fetch their children from the place of their improvement and happiness by way of gratifi-

gratification. How is it to be expected that a child should be contented with his condition, that he should place (as undoubtedly in his immature age he ought) an implicit confidence in his master, next after his parents, or that he should give his chief attention to his improvement; when his parents themselves suggest to him, that it is a hardship to be at school; that home is better; that masters are sometimes in the wrong; and that money, not the improvement of the mind, is the *summum bonum* of mortal man?

It is too common for those parents, who have no other idea of worth than being worth so much money, to speak, in the *bearing* of their *children*, of those, to whom they commit the care of their education, in the same contemptuous and purse-proud style, as they do of the tradesmen they employ, who are inferior to them in wealth. The folly of this conduct does not only consist in the grossness of estimating a man's merit by what has often no connexion with his merit, sometimes is the very disgrace of his character: but chiefly in its leading the youth to think meanly of those, whom if they do not honour, they will not obey, nor be benefited by. To be despised by a sordid worshiper of *Mammon*, is no great mortification to a gentleman, who knows himself possessed of those qualifications which alone form a respectable character; but it is seriously vexatious to a faithful educator to see an unthinking parent, by an unguarded manner of speaking, confound all his measures for the improvement of a promising youth.

SUPPOSE a parent to be clearly convinced of the misconduct, in a particular instance, of the person, to whom he has committed the education of his son; is it necessary, that he set a child of ten years of age on a tribunal to judge his master? An educator of youth is but a man. His *difficulties* are great beyond the conception of all but those who know them by *experience*. He may, therefore, without disparagement to his general abilities, chance to fail in a *particular* instance. If he has the *modesty*, which becomes, and is, indeed, the characteristic of a scholar, he will, with pleasure and gratitude, listen to a judicious parent, who, in a decent and *private* manner, informs him of his mistake. Why then should any parent, by rendering the conduct of a master suspicious in the opinion of his *child*, defeat his *own* intention, and render fruitless the expence bestowed by himself, and the labour by the preceptor? By such conduct all concerned are losers, and no one a gainer.

LET those, who have experience in the difficult and important work of educating youth, declare, whether they do not often find, that the persons who place the youth under their care, are *dissatisfied* precisely with those very parts of their conduct which they ought to *commend*, and contrariwise.

IF a cabinet-maker is to make a bureau or a table for a gentleman, the eye of the customer can generally determine with judgment of the sufficiency of the piece, when finished. But how uncomfortable is the case of the educator of youth, who is at work for a set

of employers, who, too generally speaking, know not what he is about, or whether he performs like an artist, and makes the most that can be made, of the materials he has to work upon!

SUPPOSE the cabinet-maker's customer to enter his shop, while he is at work for him; find fault, at random, with his method of proceeding; blame him for working according to the best rules of his art; take the tools out of his hand; confound all he is about; and then charge the poor artist with the ill success himself has been the cause of. Would not every spectator judge such a proceeding unfair? But this is very nearly the conduct of multitudes of parents in our times.

To win the hearts of too many parents, a master must do what his own judgment (if he has any) will condemn. He must indulge his pupil in every thing. He must never find fault; much less correct. If, constrained by his obstinate misbehaviour, he lays the true character of the son before the father, imploring the assistance of *paternal* authority, where he finds his own insufficient, the consequence to be expected is (as Mr. ADDISON observes) the loss of the favour of both father and son. Tho' this prospect is not to prevent the faithful tutor's discharging conscientiously his duty, and taking his chance of consequences.

MANY young persons are apt, suddenly and capriciously, to take offence at the conductors of their education. It is extreme weakness in parents to listen to the frivolous, and generally false complaints of their

children. *

children. They often frame to themselves an *interested* design in misrepresenting their masters. An artful boy, if he thought he might have an idle day between his leaving one place of education, and his going to another, would accuse his present master of almost any crime, in order to be removed; but it is to be observed, that no parent's *own* son is artful.

Most young persons are enemies to *study*. They will, therefore, almost universally, endeavour to *escape* the trouble of learning whatever costs any labour to acquire. And it is too common for parents to humour the idle disposition of the youth, by dispensing, at their childish request, with their application to what would be of important advantage to them in mature life.

IT is very common for flattering, would-be-thought friends, to busy themselves in directing their acquaintance with respect to their choice of places of education for their sons. Those persons being generally ignorant, often guide their acquaintance precisely to the very place, that is the least proper, or advise them to quit that which is the most eligible. To be qualified to direct in so important an affair, it is undoubtedly necessary, that the adviser be a judge of what is a truly good education; and that he know thoroughly the plan and conduct of those educators, he takes upon him to speak in favour, or in disparagement of. But it is usual for parents to place their sons where their *neighbours* and *acquaintance* place theirs. And houses of education are often raised, and supported, by *connexions* rather than by merit.

IT is common enough, as well as shameful enough, for parents, moved by caprice, or pride, or some other reason of equal weight, to remove their sons from under the care of one master, and place them with another; and then (in order to justify their fantastical conduct) to magnify, or even *invent* accusations against the place of education they have quitted. “ The pu-
“ pils are neglected; their table is but indifferent;
“ they are punished with too much severity, and so
“ forth.” Do such parents consider the mischief they may do in thus wantonly and cruelly attacking so tender a character as that of an educator of youth? Do they make their neighbour’s case their own? Do they observe the golden rule, of treating others, as they would themselves be treated?

IT is an egregious weakness in parents to shew, in the choice of educators for their sons, an attention to our little religious divisions and subdivisions. Would not a dissenting father act more wisely, in committing the care of his son to an able master of the church-persuasion, than to a weak one of his own principle; and contrariwise? I would, for my own part, sooner employ, in the education of my son, a roman catholic, however I dislike the profession, who could think with the freedom of a ROLLIN, or a FENELON, and would make his pupil like himself, than a narrow-minded bigot, who believed fifty church-of-England articles, and would teach my boy to look on all, who differed from him, or would think for themselves, as proper objects of persecution, and in a state of damnation.

MANY parents too plainly shew themselves but indifferent judges of the qualifications necessary for an educator of youth. Were it otherwise, we should not see them so often, in choosing masters for their sons, prefer a Frenchman, or a Swiss, merely on account of his possessing a foreign speech, perhaps without the grammar of his native tongue, to much abler men of their own country? Do parents conclude, without enquiry, that every foreigner, who comes hither in quest of a maintenance, has a deep insight into human nature, and has mastered all that is necessary to qualify him for enlarging the understanding, and forming the heart? Were the accomplishment of speaking French of much more consequence, than it is, it may surely be acquired at a much easier rate, than that of sacrificing to it the whole education. Let a youth be instructed in general grammar, and classical learning, so as to be qualified to read a common Latin book; he will want only a few months application to render him capable of reading a French author, that, and most of the other European languages being so much rooted in the Latin; and if he passes the last half-year of the time of his education in a protestant family in France, where he will not hear or speak one sentence of English during his abode in the country, he will acquire more of the speech than by having a French or Swiss tutor, or master, in England, for ten years together. What is then the use, or where the judgment, or the patriotism, of fetching over multitudes of illiterate, and meanly-qualified French and Swiss, and employing them in the education of our sons, to the rejection of our own abler countrymen?

SOME parents (and those not in narrow circumstances) pay no small attention to the point of *cheapness* in the education of their children, consulting economy in an affair of a *liberal* nature, as much as in matters of commerce and profit: whereas they ought to take it for granted, that a *cheap* education in this *expensive* country, must be a *scurvy* one. How can an unhappy man, whose employment scarce maintains him, think of any thing *worthy* or *generous*? How is he to inspire his pupils with sentiments, which his pinching circumstances will not suffer to rise in his own mind? Ever anxious about his private economy, ever in dread of bankruptcy and poverty, how should he apply a due attention to what is sufficient alone to engage the whole man, with the abilities of an angel, and undisturbed by every other solicitude? To preside in a house of general education, a person ought to be furnished with the necessary apparatus for general improvement, as a set of the best books on the several arts and sciences, the principles of which are to be taught; and some of the most necessary instruments, as globes, telescopes, microscopes, &c. The purchase of all these will amount to no inconsiderable sum. But, if parents will not contribute liberally for the purpose, how are they to be procured? Parents ought therefore to find out capable men, and to give them such encouragement, as may enable them to apply themselves with comfort and pleasure to their laborious office. But what is to be thought of the *prudence*, or the paternal *affection* of those parents who feed on venison and turtle, who roll in their gilded chariots, and amuse half the week at their country houses; yet choose

choose that education for their sons, which costs the least, and are afraid of over-paying the severest of all labours, the labours, which to reward in an adequate manner, is beyond the power of both parent and pupil. Hear *QUINTILIAN* on the subject, “ You purchase of a physician, for a trifling fee, what is inestimable, health. You receive from your educator knowledge and virtue. Do not imagine, that “ you have acquitted yourself of your obligations to “ those who have done you such important services, “ when you have paid their legal demands. You “ ought to think yourself indebted to them while you “ live.” A generous tutor desires, however, only to see in the *youth*, who have been under his care, and in their *parents*, a proper sense of *gratitude*. He does not wish to plunder them of their money. But what probability is there of the pupil’s valuing that education which he sees his father reward *meanly*? If the pupil does not honour his preceptor, is he likely to follow his directions? Will he honour him, whom his father does not honour?

SUPPOSE the master were to imitate the magnanimity of the parent, and to grudge bestowing a little extraordinary trouble in *teaching*, as the frugal parent grudges a few annual pounds in *rewarding* his care? “ No,” says the parent; “ that must not be. The master is *generously* to wear himself out with the fatigue of teaching; and we are to reward him as frugally as we can. A place of education is a learning-warehouse.” [Little do they know of education, who think, the master’s *chief* work is, to teach *languages and sciences*] “ And why should we not, as

“ at other warehouses, get the best pennyworth we can for our money ?” Let parents, who are in easy circumstances, lay their hands on their hearts, and consider the following paragraph.

TWENTY pounds (or even fifty) saved by pinching the educator of your son, will be nothing in your son’s fortune ; if you should be able only to afford him one single thousand. But three hundred times twenty pounds, generously given by as many fathers (an educator of youth may in his life time have three hundred pupils under his care) will put a useful member of society, in easy circumstances ; withheld, will leave your son’s best friend, next after yourself, in want and distress, to comfort himself, in his old age, with the reflexion, that a set of ungrateful people have assigned the retribution of his labours to One abler, as well as more willing to reward them.

PERHAPS some good-natured reader (as there are always enough ready to lay hold of any thing by the wrong handle) may alledge, that Mr. author is himself an educator of youth, and harps on this string for his own advantage. To put a stop to this suggestion at once ; the author is in such circumstances as to have no occasion for any such artifice : but he knows, that many able and faithful educators of youth in England, are not encouraged, by those who reap the fruits of their labours, in the manner they deserve.

Now I am got into the chapter of evils under the sun, I cannot help lamenting the lot of many of our promising youth, who, by the (perhaps) well-meant, but,

but, in my humble opinion, ill-judged conduct of their parents, are deprived of what there is no good objection against their obtaining, and would prove the supreme ornament and happiness of their lives, I mean *liberal education*. It is too often seen, that the principal attention of parents is fixed on the means for obtaining exorbitant *riches* for their children, as well as themselves. Yet every hour's experience teaches, that nothing contributes less to the improvement of a person's *happiness* than *superfluous* wealth. "My son," (says the sagacious citizen) "shall be a merchant: therefore 'he shall have no knowledge, but what is merely 'commercial. Scholarship often proves an *avocation* 'from business."

IF, indeed, you mean to make of your son a mere machine for getting money, a very little knowledge will qualify him for that illustrious station. The time was, accordingly, when a trader was to know nothing beyond the narrow circle of his own business; when the maxims were, "Keep your shop, and "your shop will keep you; Many a little makes a "mickle; Need makes the old woman trot;" with others of the same generous strain. Had a man of business of those sordid days known half of what our traders now are familiar with, his credit would have suffered for it. And yet the difference between the extent of our trade at present, and that of those narrow-minded times, shews experimentally, that liberal knowledge does no way disqualify men for commerce. Were our mercantile men still more generously educated, it would be better, not worse, for them, and for the public.

IT has been alledged by some, that youth may be sufficiently improved, without being taught the learned languages. But this is a gross deception. For, so long as we must communicate and receive ideas by words, it is indispensably necessary, that youth, if they are to learn any thing, be let into the meaning of the terms of art and science. There is no way of getting at the perfect understanding of any one language, without knowing a little of the others, with which it is connected, and from which derived. And I need not mention how much our native language is connected with, and derived from others, as the Latin, French, German, Saxon, &c.

BESIDES, it is notorious, that there is no way so ready, or so certain, for acquiring a grammatical knowledge of the modern tongues, which proves oftentimes of great advantage in active life, as a competent knowledge of the Roman language, the mother of them all. A good Latin scholar, accordingly, finds but little need of a master for French, Italian, Spanish, German, &c.

CONSIDERING how erroneous our translation of the N. Testament is (which, at least, is a *curious* book) it may be worth a little time, and it will not cost much, to acquire knowledge enough of the Greek, to be able to read it in the original. It is common enough to learn Spanish, merely for the pleasure of reading Don Quixote in the language, in which it was written.

WHAT demonstrates the necessity of knowing more than *one* language is, that no judicious person proposes, for a complete English teacher a *mere English* scholar. Every one, on the contrary, would insist, that he, who proposed to teach English *grammatically* and *critically*, be a *classical* scholar. If he, who is to be the English teacher, must absolutely know other languages, besides the vernacular, the reason of this necessity arises from the impossibility of being master of the English language, without knowing the others, in which it is rooted, and from which it springs. But what need of words? I would only ask, whether a mere English scholar can read a *Spectator*, or a news-paper?

IT is diverting to observe, to what extremes persons, who get into opposite ways of thinking, drive their respective opinions. One set of parents, to do honour to classical education, celebrate that of the public schools, only on account of what is its peculiar disgrace; viz. Its confining the whole of education to two dead languages. Their antagonists, that they may shew themselves superior to pedantry, insist, on the other hand, that classical education is wholly unnecessary, but for those who are intended for the learned professions. What demonstrates, that they are both in the wrong, is, that without *general* education, a person finds himself almost on every occasion at a loss in carrying on those improvements of mind, without which man is a mere animal.

It is but a vulgar error, that education *of course* disqualifies a person for a due attention to matters of profit. No man of *prudence*, learned, or unlearned, will neglect his important concerns in life, on account of any avocation whatever. On the contrary, we see our learned physicians go on with the drudgery of visiting their patients; lawyers spend their lives in the study of crabbed cases, briefs, and precedents; and educators of youth go over and over, with their pupils, the first principles of languages and sciences, without weariness and disgust. Those gentlemen are not, by their liberal education, disqualified for attending to what has as little of liberal in it as any commercial employment whatever. The truth is, that the misconduct, which is unjustly charged on *too much education*, is really owing to *too little prudence*, which would have shewn itself whether the imprudent person had had any education, or not.

It is very satisfactory to observe *consistency* in people's reasonings. "My son," says the money-getting man, "shall learn nothing at school that may draw aside his attention from business." If there be any danger of this consequence from his having a little more education than is *merely necessary*, do you educate him to love card-playing, gadding to music-gardens and theatres, and every species of heightened luxury? Have these liberal improvements no tendency to *divert* him from a due attention to business?

It is matter of concern to see our youth hurried away in the midst of their education, to be needlessly

lessly confined to a compting-house for *seven* years, where all that is to be learned, might be fairly mastered in *three*. Accordingly, a *five* years clerkship is thought sufficient for the incomparably more difficult and extensive profession of an *attorney* at law. While a youth continues at a place of education, it is the unpardonable fault of those who undertake the charge of him, if he is not at least *in the way* of learning (as far as nature has furnished capacity) somewhat *ornamental* and *useful* every day. At fourteen and upwards, he begins to be capable of attending to what is manly, and of improving at a greater rate than in his earlier years. Could he have two or three additional years education at that age, he might, by proper management, be qualified to support a character much superior to that of many of our wealthy citizens, whose riches serve only to render their sordid education, and mean ways of thinking, more conspicuous.

It is pretended, that men of business are found to *lose* great part of their classical, and other acquisitions in a few years after their quitting the places of their education, and engaging in business: That therefore the time bestowed on them is lost. This may be in part true. But the cause? Is it not, that they were hurried away *too soon*, before they attained a sufficient maturity of *judgment*, to profit by what they learned, or had even time enough to make the proper *acquisitions*? Can it be expected to happen otherwise?

A COUNTRY *gentleman*, of five hundred a year, is to be fitted out with a liberal education. Why should not a *merchant*, or capital manufacturer, whose clear income

income is perhaps three times as much, have the same advantage? What is there in the character of the fox-hunter, what in the place he fills in society, that requires so much more embellishment than those of the worshipful citizen? If the former may come to be of the respectable quorum, the latter may be alderman, sheriff, or mayor of the metropolis. The merchant is as likely to come to the station of a legislator in his country, as the squire. And perhaps it had been better for the commercial, as well as other interests of these kingdoms, if there had in all times been more of the mercantile rank in the British senate, than there have been. Supposing both country gentleman, and citizen, to pass through life in a *private* station, has not the general merchant, or capital manufacturer, as much occasion for extensive *knowledge*, and liberal *sentiment*, as the man of estate? Merchants have it as much (at least) in their power to promote, or prejudice the interest of their *country* as the landed gentlemen. That the exports and imports be duly regulated, is of the utmost consequence. If merchants be not men of a liberal education, and way of thinking, if they have never been taught to attend to any thing but sordid interest, they will, in their commercial pursuits, consult their own profit to the damage of their country. The *merchant-senator*, or member of the board of trade, has, I believe, as much occasion for all the qualifications of an able speaker, as the landed *gentleman* of the same station. How else is he to lay before the great inquest of the nation the real *state* of commerce; to point out the *grievances* which incumber it; or to direct the legislature to the necessary regulations for its advantage; matters of infinitely greater complication and difficulty,

difficulty, than any thing which touches the landed interest?

IT is notorious, that too many of our *nobility* and *gentry* have, of late years, laid aside the character and behaviour, which ought to distinguish them; and that while they pretend to be above useful and reputable commerce, they are not above the sordid traffic of gaming, betting, rooking, horse-racing, bribing, place-catching, and pension-hunting. On the other hand, we see many of the *bourgeoisie*, especially the younger, who have had the happiness of a better education, than those of the last generation, behave as the nobility and gentry, if they understood themselves, would do. There are no human means, yet discovered, more likely to inspire sentiments of probity, and generosity, than opening the mind, in the early, incorrupt, and unprejudiced part of life, to receive the pure illumination, which liberal education gives. And there is but one experienced, and therefore but one certain method of gaining this end; viz. By introducing youth to the acquaintance of the illustrious dead, whose thoughts, even if ill expressed, would have made succeeding ages wise, and whose language, had there been in their writings less depth of thought, would have charmed mankind into elegance of taste, and nobleness of mind. To teach a youth only how to compute the profits to be gained by the commerce he is to pursue; what is obtained by this, unless you qualify him to *enjoy* his income with taste and dignity, and to support a *character* worthy of his splendid fortune?

HERE

HERE arises, however, a kind of difficulty. One would imagine, *a priori*, that our people of fortune, who have had the advantage of dipping into the *antients*, and drawing from them, if they please, a sublime manner of thinking, should appear, as to principles and manners, in a light superior to the mercantile gentlemen, whose education, in the classical way, is generally narrower. But we see, on the contrary, our great men set themselves at the head of every vice, and every indecency; while the little principle that is left among us, is to be found almost wholly among the middling ranks.

THIS difficulty will vanish on considering the cruel disadvantages for virtue, which our men of fortune labour under. Beset, from their infancy, with flatterers and betrayers; debauched by evil example communicated from family to family, and from generation to generation; puffed up with their great fortunes and connexions, and led to think themselves above restraint; is it to be wondered, that their education should prove ineffectual for the purpose of regulating their manners?

THE *world* would be too strong for the ablest tutor; and as I have observed above, (p. 136.) it is not so much our plan of *education*, as our *manners*, that need amendment. Yet, I would not have it thought, that I approve of the education that is given our young people of fortune, at our public schools and universities. The *plan* itself is, in my opinion, and that of

of much wiser heads [*i*], incurably deficient, and ill contrived; and is besides, much worse executed than it might be [*k*]. But enough of this.

THE mere *filling up* of life (which business alone will not do) is an object, on account of which I should advise, that young persons intended for commercial stations, be educated in a more liberal manner, than that which custom has established for sufficient. If your son is to fill the station of a merchant, or considerable manufacturer, is he to have no *leisure-hour*, no remission from the endless drudgery of heaping up riches? Is he to have neither partner, nor clerk, nor broker? If he should have some relaxation, what will he do with it, unless you give him, in his education, some taste of reading, and improvement? Must he saunter away his time at the coffee-house? Must he be a mere *Quidnunc* or a card-player? Must he take a nap in his elbow-chair, till the club-hour recalls him to existence?

WHEN your mercantile son has amassed the desired sum, and is got into the decline of life, what is he to do with himself, after he has resigned to the young generation the commerce, by which he has obtained his riches? As you would wish him to pass, at least,

[*i*] See MILTON, BURNET, LOCKE, ADDISON, &c.

[*k*] In England, a man of fortune spends ten years at W. or E. in learning *words*; six more at O. or C. in learning *jockey-ship*; and four in Fr. and It. in learning *wh—ing* and *f—my*: If twenty years spent in his education, be not sufficient to qualify him for a ruler of the land, who is in fault? CRITO MINOR.

least, his *old age* like a *rational* being, do not oppose his having his mind in early youth opened to what is rational and liberal.

To sum up my meaning on the head of parental misconduct; it were to be wished, that many parents, especially in this great metropolis, would be pleased to use more diligent endeavours to correct their children's faults; to impress the minds of their young ones with a greater sense of the propriety of subordination; to curb their disposition to *insolence* and *disobedience*, and cultivate in them the amiable virtue of *modesty*; to avoid speaking *disrespectfully* (in the presence of their *children*) of those, to whom they commit the care of their education; to consider very carefully, and not follow too rashly, the opinions of *unskilful* friends concerning the choice of places of education; to attend, with great caution, to the complaints of their *children* against their masters, and to their *requests*, to be excused pursuing *useful* improvements; to be above *bigotry* with respect to the religious professions of masters, and to choose according to *personal* qualifications only; to *reward* the labours of the persons they employ in the education of their children, in such a manner, as to enable the former to apply themselves, without *anxiety*, to what they undertake, and to impress the latter with a sense of the value of education; to allow their sons, though intended for a commercial station, such a measure of education as may raise them above the character of *muck-worms*, may qualify them for such *honours*, as mercantile persons frequently arrive at, and may enable them to be more extensively useful,

useful, and to *enjoy* the riches they may, by their industry acquire.

IMPRUDENT conduct in parents is not, I own, peculiar to our times. For we find PLATO, XENOPHON, SENECA, JUVENAL, QUINTILIAN, and others of the ancients, remarking it in their several ages. Let those parents, who scruple to take my opinion on trust, endeavour to adjust their notions of the important subject of education by the perusal of these, and other of the venerable ancients, and, among the moderns, of LOCKE, MILTON, FABER, COWLEY, CLARKE, CAREW, ASCHAM, PHILIPS, WALKER, ADDISON, POPE, SWIFT, &c. And if they can find any judicious author, who advises to bring up youth in the manner I object to, let what I have said on the subject be condemned.

I WOULD not have it thought, that I mean to blame *universally* the conduct of parents with respect to their children. I know we have among us many, whose notions on the subject of education, are thoroughly judicious, and who govern their children as properly, as in such *licentious* times, is fairly practicable. I desire to avoid, as much as possible, *general* reflexions; and accordingly am ready to own, that there may, for ought I know, be some few laudable characters even among our *lawyers*, *bishops*, and *nobles*: nay, I will, to shew the great extent of my candor, add, that I know not, but a *statesman* may, some time or other, have been as honest as statesmen are, by those who know them, expected to be.

I HAVE

I HAVE above (page 136.) ascribed the miscarriage of youth to the weakness of human nature, the misconduct of parents, and the influence of the general example, they have at all times before them, which confirms them in the wrong principles, and sentiments they imbibe in their earliest years, in spite of the greatest care on the part of their educators. As to the corruption of the times, and universality of evil example, with their fatal effects in frustrating education.—at what part of a subject so boundless must a writer begin, who should propose to go through it? He, who undertakes such a work, may next attempt to count the number of the sands, which confine the ocean, or the waves, which roll on its surface.

LET a youth have been instructed by his parents, and masters, in the most rational and comprehensive moral principles, and allured, in the most effectual manner, to the observance of whatever is pure, temperate, modest, honourable, benevolent, godlike; the conflict, in which, on his entrance into life, he must engage, is really too much for any degree of virtue, which unhabituated youth can fairly be supposed to have attained. Can he, in this, or any other great city, walk the streets for one hour, without hearing or seeing what tends to hurt the delicacy of sentiment he has acquired? To pass through the principal thoroughfares of this great metropolis, what is it, but to walk the gallery of an immense seraglio, not peculiar to a Grand Turk; but at the service of every male individual of the public? At most tables what will he hear but discourses in praise of riches, and the luxury,

luxury, which riches procure ? At the club, what, but lewd songs, or jests ; unless a spiteful reflexion on some absent character, happens to interrupt their more vociferous mirth ? Can he mix in society without engaging in politics and party causes ? Can he enter a visiting-room without running the risque of having his passions excited, and his inestimable time murdered by the everlasting card-table ? At the theatre, between the acts even of a tragedy, the wanton caperings and gesticulations of a set of dancers, whose forms viewed at a distance, and set off by paint and dress, are at least apparently attractive to the eye of warm and unthinking youth ; produce a trial of modesty too severely unequal.

REFLECTING, how shamefully the redress of these, and innumerable other grievances, is neglected (rather, how notoriously the evils are *aggravated*) by those, in whose power alone it is to reform them, and who could with ease reform them ; I feel myself fired with honest indignation ; and therefore choose rather to throw down my pen, and ask the reader's pardon for taking so abrupt a leave of him, and the subject, than to go on in an ill humour, and draw upon myself the imputation of a *splenetic* writer.

ESSAY III.

THE thinking part of mankind have in all ages (as is known to most readers) been at a loss how to account for many particulars in the present state and course of the world, as having, amidst prevailing order and happiness, the appearance of partial evil, and disorder. Such are the barrenness of the earth, and consequent necessity of labour; its ruinous and deluged state; inclemency of seasons; famines, pestilences, earthquakes; sickness, pain, and death coming promiscuously on all, especially on innocent infancy; exorbitancy of passion and appetite, rendering our present state disadvantages for virtue; ferocity of wild beasts; destruction of animal life for the support of man; shame of nakedness, and pain of childbirth; with whatever else are the supposed unavoidable or incurable sources of promiscuous distress to the inhabitants of this world.

THE reader is desired to take notice, that in what I am to write on this subject, I do not so much

propose to decide concerning the *reality* of particular supposed *evils*, or disorders in the present state ; as to enquire a little into the difficulty of the origin of evil ; and, some other points connected with that interesting subject ; to collect some of the sentiments of different writers, pointing out the inconsistencies of their reasonings ; and to try, whether an account may not be given of some of those subjects, which may prove more satisfactory to the inquisitive mind, than those commonly offered.

EPICURUS (as quoted by LACTANTIUS) states the difficulty of the origin of evil, as follows ; “ Either “ God is willing to remove evil out of the world, and “ not able ; or able, but not willing ; or neither able, “ nor willing. If the first, he is impotent : If the se- “ cond, he is malignant : If the third, both impotent “ and malignant. But if God is both able and willing “ to remove evil, whence comes the evil which is in the “ world ? ”

SOME of the antients, in their angry moods, made no scruple of fairly scolding the gods for letting things go on in the confused manner they did ; as HOMER, who makes one of his heroes call JUPITER, to his face, a sad mischievous fellow [a]. In A. GELLIUS [b], we have the following genteel compliment on the gods ; *Hæc maxime versatur, &c.* “ This is “ the very injustice of the gods, that the worst men are “ safest, and that they do not suffer the good to be “ long lived.”

THE

[a] Il. I. ver. 365.

[b] Noct. Att. lxvii. c. ii.

THE coarser sort of the philosophers, on account of the confusion they thought they saw in the present state of things, concluded that the whole doctrine of the existence of gods, - rulers of the world, must be chimerical.

How shallow this reasoning was, will immediately appear, when it is considered, that the *general* state of things at present, is good ; that there is in this disorderly world, great happiness on the *whole* ; that the visible and originally-constituted *tendency* of things is to bring happiness on virtue, and misery on vice ; though it should be confessed, that there are sundry *particular* instances of apparent irregularity, and deviation from this *general* right tendency and good constitution. And the two-fold error of writers on the subject is, that the optimists will allow nothing to be *otherwise* than it ought, and the complainers insist, that nothing is as it *ought* to be.

SIMPLICIUS on EPICETUS says [c], Περὶ τῆς οὐποστολῆς τῶν κακῶν, κ. τ. λ. " The dispute about the nature " of evil, not being well stated, is both a cause of im- " piety, and has perverted the principles of good life, " and involves, in many insuperable difficulties, those, " who cannot account for the cause of it." He then enquires largely into this difficult subject. Shews the consequences which follow from ascribing evil to God; or from acknowledging two equal independent Principles of opposite characters. He says, evil is only

only a lower degree of perfection in the nature of things, and that it was proper, that God should create various ranks of things animate and inanimate; some more, some less perfect. Then he labours to shew, that many things in this world are only apparently, not really, evils.

MAXIMUS TYRIUS, in his dissertation on the origin of evil, wishes, that some oracle would explain the difficulty; and calls on JUPITER, and APOLLO, (tho' in other parts of his works, he objects to prayer as irrational) or if there be any other god, who has the necessary knowledge, and has any charge of mankind, that they would ease him of his doubts. He then gives a long detail of human miseries from birth to death, occasioned by the helpless and infirm state of the human body, the inclemencies of seasons, and violence of passions. He asks the grand question, Πόθεν το ξακον; Whence evil? And answers, " Not from "heaven, by any means." So PORPHYRY, Αδικιας εγι κα τας ωφιλειας, ε. τ. λ. " It is impossible, that the " same beings should be the authors of both good and " evil." But yet he says elsewhere, that nothing happens contrary to the will of God.

CICERO is in such doubt about evil's being from heaven, that he questions, whether serpents, and other noxious animals, did not get into being by some other means, than creation by God. Which puts me in mind of TAVERNIER's account of the Gauri, a people in the East Indies, whose opinion it is, that some hurtful animals were made by the devil.

BOETHIUS, in his Consolation of philosophy, endeavours to account for the origin of evil in the common ways; says, the question is the most important of all; and expatiates on the distresses of human life; *Anxia res est conditio, &c.*

CHrysippus, according to A. GELLIUS [d], made it a question, whether diseases were intended by God, or nature; Εἰ αἱ τὰς αὐθηπτὰς νοσοὺς καλα φυσιν γιγνοῖται. And he answers, that it could not be the direct design of nature, that men should be liable to diseases; but that evils adhere unavoidably to good.

SOME of the antients would not allow evil to be ascribed to the gods. MAXIMUS TYRIUS [e] accuses ELPENOR and AGAMEMNON in the tragedies, of impiety on that account. And PLATO, Οὐτοὶ αἱ εἰν μερι, ξ. τ. λ. “ We must thus conclude concerning “ the gods, that God is not the cause of all things; “ but of good only.” But he (like many others of the ancient philosophers) is not very easily reconcileable with himself on this point. For, in some places, he seems to deny, and in others to acknowledge, the reality of evil.

He argues copiously, that, evil necessarily adheres to good. But he ought then to have denied the possibility of the Elysian happiness universally received in his times. And the christian, who in this point, agrees

[d] Noct. Att. l. vi. cap. 1.

[e] Pag. 42.

grees with PLATO, must deny the possibility of a future heavenly state. If evil necessarily adheres to good, there can be neither God, nor angel, nor man, unreservedly happy in any state, past, present, or future.

PLATO farther insists, that evil, natural and moral, is inseparable from the necessary nature of imperfect beings. But we see, that the brutes, who are more imperfect beings than we, are less exposed to suffering. And the heathens, who held a plurality of gods, and christians, who believe the existence of angels, have always supposed those superior beings less obnoxious to suffering, than our species. Hence it is manifest, there is no necessary connexion between finite perfection or imperfection, and suffering. Besides, if promiscuous suffering be the necessary consequence of the nature of imperfect beings, there can be no future state of redress. For all created beings, in all states, are imperfect beings. Therefore promiscuous distress must prevail in all states, as in the present, which contradicts both the heathen and christian notions of the future state of good men.

SIMPLICIUS (on EPICTETUS, chap. xxxvi.) and others, argue, in the same manner, that the necessary variety and subordination of beings unavoidably includes in it a variety of distresses. But if this were true, the lowest ranks ought to have the greatest share of the evils of life. Whereas Dr. YOUNG teaches the direct contrary :

“ The *beasts* are *happy* : they come forth, and keep
“ Short watch on earth ; and then lie down to sleep.
“ *Pain* is for *man*.”

It does not seem easy to shew, that *subordination* stands naturally in any manner connected with *promiscuous* distress.

PLATO thinks low appetites proceed of course from an imbodyed state. But it is not so much the lowness of the appetite, as its exorbitancy, that makes the being unhappy. The ancients seem to have concluded, that an embodied state must, of course, be a state of slavery to irregular appetites. See CICERO, vol. iv. p. 86, *et pass.* Which opinion set them in arms against the christian doctrine of the resurrection. But those who believe the scripture account of the pure and celestial resurrection-body, will not be satisfied with PLATO's apology for our present inordinate appetites, as necessary in an embodied state, for they suppose that the future, tho' an embodied state, will be free from them. Which occasions the difficulty of accounting for our present subjection to them.

Dr. JENKINS argues well, (vol. II. pag. 249.) against the Platonic notion, of the souls of men being sent into the present bodies, obnoxious to disease, and unfavourable to virtue, as a punishment for sins committed by them in a pre-existent state, and says, "It is a very improper way of correction for past sins, " to be exposed to new ones."

PLATO thinks pain unavoidable to beings capable of pleasure. But if that were true, those beings, who are the most capable of pleasure, must be likewise obnoxious to the most severe pains. Angels must therefore be subject to much worse diseases than our gout,

or

or stone. PLATO goes on, and says, corruption is necessary, if generation be necessary. But though corruption were allowed to be necessary, it would not from thence follow, that the promiscuous distresses of human life, and its dreaded conclusion in death, are necessary. For we see, that the inferior creatures are less obnoxious to distress, than our species ; and dying might have been as little formidable, as the change of the insect species from one state to another.

PLATO and others taught, that the intractableness of matter, which the gods could not fashion to their liking, is the cause of the disorderly and promiscuous state of things. Some of the ancients carried this notion so far, that, when they speak of Hyle (matter) one would imagine they meant some evil dæmon, or mischievous god.

ONE would wonder, that those of the ancients, who believed the supreme God (by whatever name distinguished) to be properly omnipotent, should lay any stress on this account of the origin of evil. Because matter must be what God pleased to make it. If he could not make it as he pleased, he is not omnipotent.

PLATO says, necessity often resists God, and shakes off his bridle, *Αναγκη τολλα, κ. τ. λ.* This is the old doctrine of fate, superior to the gods themselves ; which is well confuted by SENECA, who says, that fate, so far from being superior to God, is nothing but the will of God. How PLATO can reconcile his notion of necessity's resisting God, with his other notion of

God's bringing good even out of moral evil, does not seem easy to imagine.

PLATO thinks much of what we commonly call evil useful; that pain, for instance, serves to give a relish to pleasure. But, if so, there must be a *quantum sufficit* of pain in heaven, else the joys of the blessed will grow flat. Cares, he says, excite beings to action. So VIRGIL,

— *curis acuens mortalia corda.*

But there may be too much of care, and labour to be consistent with happiness. And accordingly one fundamental constituent of the supposed happiness of the heathen Elysium, and of the christian heaven, is rest, and freedom from care.

PHILO, in his piece on providence, labours to shew the usefulness of tempests, earthquakes, tyranny, &c. So PHAVORINUS the philosopher is celebrated by his scholar A. GELLIUS, for finding somewhat to say in praise of the worst of characters, as that of THERSITES, and of the worst of things, as an ague. And so Mr. WISE, the abridger of CUDWORTH, vol. II. pag 716. “It is the skill of the great dramatist [God] to enrich the history of the world with such tragical trans-“actions as those before named” [plagues and earthquakes, intended, says the author, before, to hurry good men unexpectedly into heaven, and the wicked into hell] “without which, the spectators of this terrible “stage-play would even nod.” This passage is so strange, I know not what remark to make upon it. Perhaps it is too severe even to quote it.

ZENO

ZENO, and most of the Stoics, in order to be seemingly consistent, were obliged to deny the reality of evil. For with what face could they insist on the necessity of being equally satisfied with poverty, as with riches; with pain, as with pleasure; with sickness as with health; with life as with death; unless they argued (I do not say proved) them all equally good?

"LET us use the utmost wit we can to alter and amend what seems less agreeable at first sight, and we shall find, that we have only made it worse by tampering with it;" says CUDWORTH abridged, vol. II. page 714. And Bishop BUTLER *passim*, to the same purpose. But we know the ancient notion of the state of things in the golden age, and the scripture account of the paradisiacal state before the fall, and of the future state of renovation, when the paradisiacal state is to be restored; are, to all intents and purposes, preferable to the present irregular and unhappy state of things. Therefore the heathens, who believed a former happy state, and the christians, who believe a paradise, and a future state of happiness, ought to oppose this assertion, of the perfection of the present state, and say, that they know what would amend it, viz. Making it like the Elysian, the paradisiacal, or the future state of the blessed.

THE destruction of life by voracity, is one of the great difficulties in the present state. That nature should prey upon herself, seems to be the defeating of her own gracious ends. And were not man to protect the harmless part of the brute creation from the

voracious, the consequence to be expected, would be the extirpation of the former. However, not to insist on this, we do find, that in Britain, the destruction of the wolf-species, which was executed by authority of government, proves a salutary measure; and for ought that appears, it might be for the general advantage, that, in all the countries of the world, a total extirpation of all the beasts of prey were brought about. Which makes it difficult to understand why they were created.

BUT it will be said, man is himself the greatest of all devourers,

“ Of half that live, the butcher and the tomb.”

POPE.

On this point, writers differ, some condemning; others approving. Some of the antients argue very strongly against the use of animal food. PLATO says, in the Saturnian times, there was no voracity; οὐκ αγειον η γειν, οὐκ αλληλων εδωδαί. PLUTARCH writes a whole treatise expressly to shew, that animal food is unnatural, and to be avoided. “ If,” says he (tom. II. pag. 995.) “ animal food be, as you pretend, natural to you, kill an ox or a hog, as a wolf or a tiger does it, and eat them as the voracious animals do.” Εἰ δει λισεις τεφυκειας, κ. τ. λ.

IT is needless to mention here, as being universally known, the Pythagorean prohibition of animal food; nor the praises given by HOMER, and others of the ancients, to those nations, who lived on milk and vegetables, which sentiments we find adopted occasionally

ally by many of our modern writers, as DRYDEN, POPE, THOMSON, &c.

PORPHYRY in his book, *De Abstinentiâ*, lib. II. § 12. says, Nothing, but a deficiency of other provisions, put mankind on eating animal food. Yet he thinks the pretence of the necessity of animal food, not sufficient to justify the exorbitant voracity we exercise upon the animal creation. And mentions divers nations, in which no animal food was consumed, where yet no inconvenience proceeded either from want of food for man, or from a superabundance of animals. He quotes an ancient pretended oracle of APOLLO, restraining sacrifice. But if, as many think, APOLLO, and the other Heathen gods, were really evil dæmons, it is not very probable, that they who delighted, as it is thought, in *human* sacrifice, should restrain the offering of beasts. PORPHYRY quotes a distich of EMEDOCLES, in which that philosopher laments his having sacrificed, or eaten animal food.

ON the other hand, SPINOZA, so far from hesitating about the supposed deformity of animal life destroyed for the support of animal life, argues from the natural (as he thinks it) disposition of many of the inferior creatures to devour one another, that men have the same right to plunder one another, whenever they can; by which scheme of morals, right is swallowed up by power; which doctrine may not, perhaps please every reader.

SOME of the ancients defend the slaughter of beasts, on account of the necessity of offering their lives

by way of sacrifice to the gods, of which religious rite they give but unsatisfactory accounts ; as that the animal is put to death vicariously instead of the offender, to satisfy the divine wrath ; that sacrifice is a religious feast, to which the gods are invited, and regale on the smoke, which ascends to the skies ; and so on :

BUT LUCIAN, in his dialogue, entitled *PROMETHEUS*, ridicules, in his waggish manner, the heathen notion, that the gods were delighted, or fed with the smoke of the victims. It is very hard, says *PROMETHEUS*, that I must be nailed here to a rock, to have my guts torn out, over and over, by a wicked vulture, only for fetching a little fire from heaven to animate my man of clay. Pray, who was to have smoked you, Mr. *MERCURY*, and you Mr. *VULCAN*, and the rest of the celestials, if I had not made men ? You are all of you glad to snuff up the vapour, when it rises from the altars, and will hop away, as far as to the country of the blameless Ethiopians [alluding to a passage in *HOMER*] to enjoy the smoke of a hecatomb, and this is my reward for making the men, who treat you. But to return,

EPICETUS's whole philosophy turns upon the defensibleness of the present state, and all that besets men in it. " *HERCULES*," says he, " had never " been a hero, had there been no monsters to sub- " due, no hardships to struggle with." In his twelfth chapter on Equanimity, he asks, if any man can have the impudence to quarrel with the constitution of the universe because he is lame : Says, it is ridiculous to complain

complain of ill-natured parents, because your parents must be born before you, and you must be content to be descended from them, such as they were. In his first book on Providence, chap. 3d, he teaches, that the distresses of life are to be considered as inseparable from life, and are to be borne as the inconveniences of rain, dust, noise, and crowding, at the Olympic games, for the sake of the magnificence of the shew. In his twenty-sixth chap. on the Appearances of things, he teaches, that we ought to be content to go through the distresses of life, and the agonies of death, because they are unavoidable.

But the author of the *Dictionnaire Philosophique Portatif* shews (in his article *Tout est bien*, All is well, or Whatever is, is right) That the unavoidableness of the distresses, to which we are subject, is in no respect an alleviation of them, or an argument for contentment under them. " You make us nothing the wiser, says " he, by telling us, what every child knows, that flies " are made to be devoured by spiders ; spiders by swal- " lows ; swallows by kites ; kites by eagles ; eagles to " be killed by men ; men to be killed by one another, " and then to be devoured by worms, and afterwards " by devils, a thousand devils at least to one man. " This is, it must be confessed, a beautiful and re- " gular subordination among the creatures of different " species. And this beautiful order prevails through- " out. Thus, when a stone is forming in my blad- " der, the mechanism is admirable. The calculous " particles pass insensibly into my blood. They are " collected in my kidneys. They glide down through " the ureters, into my bladder ; there they assemble

“themselves in consequence of most curious Newtonian laws of attraction. The stone consolidates, and grows larger and larger. I suffer a thousand pangs worse than death! A surgeon, having perfected the art invented by TUBAL CAIN, plunges a sharp instrument into my body; seizes the stone with his pincers. By fixed mechanical laws the stone breaks, as he is endeavouring to extract it; and by fixed laws of nature, I expire in torments inexplicable. All this is well, all this is the evident consequence of unalterable physical principles, &c. Now, if we were insensible of pain, we should have nothing to say against this fine mechanism. But that is not the point. The question is, whether there are not severe *sufferings*, to which beings endowed with *sensation*, are exposed; and how this comes to pass. There are no evils, says POPE, or if there be partial evils, they compose an universal good. But this is a whimsical kind of universal good, that is made up of the stone, of the gout, of all sorts of crimes, all sorts of sufferings, of death, and damnation.—Let us therefore place, at the end of every chapter of metaphysics, the two letters, which the Roman judges were used to put, when they could not decide a cause, viz. N. L. *non liquet*. It is not clear.”

Thus far the author of the *Dictionnaire Philosophique*. Let us now hear another paragraph of EPICETETUS.

IN his twenty-eighth chapter, he says, all the supposed distresses of life even to the desolations, and massacres of war, are only evils in opinion. And in his

his tweaty-ninth chapter, “ If,” says he, a tyrant “ threatens to bind me, what does he do ? Why, “ threaten my hands and my feet. What are my “ hands and my feet to myself ? If he threatens to im- “ prison or banish me, he threatens only my body. “ And what is my body to myself ? ” An attack on the main body is not an object, according to this cool-headed old gentleman. “ If he threatens to cut off my “ head, what does he do ? Why threaten my head. “ What is my head to my self ? ” Most people, I believe, consider the head as a capital part of a man’s self. “ Labour and death are only evil in opi- “ nion, not in reality. Men fear them, as children “ do masks. Your son is dead. What then ? That “ is all. He is dead. Your ship is cast away. Well ; “ it is gone then ; think no more of it. All is very “ well, if you will but think so.” *Crede quod babes, et babes.* Only fancy my ale Burgundy, says BONNIFACE in the play. If the reader should observe, that this is but a ludicrous way of answering a philosopher, I can only say, Any answer is good enough for such ludicrous philosophy. Yet I own EPICTETUS’s merit, as a writer, was great ; as a virtuous man, greater.

EPICTETUS, though he argues strongly, that the supposed distresses of life are not real subjects of complaint, yet puts his reader in mind, that he may get rid of them by suicide, if he cannot bring himself to bear them ; which is a partial confession of the reality of the evils of life, and a confutation of all his fine-spun doctrine. “ The way out of life (says he, book III. “ chap. viii.) is open to thee, if thou dost not like “ thy condition. Walk off, discontented mortal, if “ thou

" thou choosest it. Or if thou wilt stay, do not stand railing at the gods." Yet the apology he makes for the gods, is, in my mind, but very indifferent. " You will, after death," says he, in his thirteenth chapter, " go to the friendly elements, from whence you came. Whatever of fire is in you, to the element of fire; of earth to earth; of air to air; of water to water. There is neither Orcus nor Acheron, Cocytus, nor Pyriphlegethon." Thus, according to this disinterested philosophy, we may fight for fifty or sixty years, with natural appetites, temptations to vice, persecutors, tyrants, pain, and sickness, racks and tortures. And after we have maintained the combat gloriously, without once swerving from virtue, however allured, however terrified we are at last to be dissolved into the friendly elements of fire, water, earth, and air; and the gods are to sit on their thrones, quaffing ambrosia all the while, and make no judicial difference between the tyrant and the sufferer, between the faithful soldier of virtue, and the cowardly deserter.

MR. POPE, or rather Lord BOLINGBROKE, argues, that we do not know enough of the characters of those we see exposed to distress, to be sure, that they do not deserve what they suffer. And if they do; and if they, who prosper in life, deserve their happiness, which, for ought we know, they may; then there is nothing promiscuous, but all adequate, in the present life.

BUT can any considerate person hesitate, whether the bloody persecutors (who in former times triumphed in power and wallowed in luxury, a length of volup-

voluptuous life, unstung by remorse, for what they had, by false reasoning, brought themselves to think innocent, or, by stupifying their consciences, had ceased to think of at all) met with an adequate retribution in this life? Or can any one imagine that the unfortunate patriots, and faithful martyrs, who lived in distress, and expired in tortures, suffered deservedly? If the former deserved punishment, and the latter reward, which who, that allows a difference in moral characters, can doubt; does it not follow, that happiness and misery are not distributed in the present state in an adequate, but a promiscuous manner? And is not this, an evil, or disorder? If not, down goes the moral argument for a future state to redress the evils of the present.

IT has been said, the sufferings of good men in the present state, are not an evil, or deformity; but a beauty. For suffering is necessary for the exercise and exhibition of virtue. But, if this be true, into what a stagnation must the virtue of the blessed in heaven sink! And how could any exercise of goodness be conceived of by heathens among their gods, or by christians among their angels? At best, supposing distress and suffering ever so useful for inculcating, exercising, or exhibiting virtue, this usefulness must undoubtedly be ascribed to the frailty of mankind, which is, itself, an evil. And, besides, it is manifest, that *promiscuous* suffering is not likely to be useful, whatever *adequate* punishment might be; and that prosperity falling to the lot of the wicked, is both hurtful to themselves and others.

IT will, I doubt, scarce prove satisfactory, to alledge, as has often been done, in defence of the present state of things, that mankind are vicious, and therefore ought to be unhappy. This might go some length toward a solution of the question, Whence evil; if the distresses of life were seen to fall regularly upon those who deserve punishment. But we see, on the contrary, that, as *SOLON* says, all things come alike to all; while we know, in point of merit, man differs more from man, as the poet observes, than man from beast. On the other hand, some writers, eager to unrealise the apparent evil in the world, have endeavoured to persuade, that a promiscuous distribution of happiness and misery is more proper for a state of discipline than an adequate. For, say they, virtue ought to be pure and disinterested. But, if adequate reward immediately followed every virtuous action, and adequate punishment every crime; the attachment, produced by such a state of discipline, would be merely mercenary. But do not those who believe a future state, expect it to prove more perfect than the present, on this very account, that retribution will be adequate; not promiscuous? Is not adequate retribution the means used by parents, by educators of youth, and by governors of nations, for attaching those under their care to obedience? And, though the virtue of the young and inconsiderate, and of the gross and mercenary part of a people, may have but little merit, is it not preferable to vice? And is it not a considerable advance toward disinterested virtue, to be even in the most mechanical manner detached

from

from vicious habits, and accustomed to regularity of behaviour?

BISHOP WARBURTON, in his *Div. Leg.* says, The providence which presided in the Holy Land, was so equal, that it never failed of rewarding and punishing in an adequate manner. The bishop undoubtedly judges such a state preferable to one like to our present, admitting promiscuous distress, and undeserved happiness.

It is amusing enough to observe, how reasoners, striving to establish an opinion at any rate, find means to use *contrary* arguments for the *same* purpose. Thus, on the present point, one labours to unrealise the apparent evil of the present state by *denying* the reality of the promiscuous distribution, and affirming, that the distresses of life are adequate punishments; while another endeavours to establish the same point by *acknowledging* the reality of promiscuous distribution in the present state, and insisting that promiscuous distribution is more proper than adequate. Thus they will absolutely make out the present state to be unexceptionably right. For if you will not grant them, that it is free from promiscuous distress, they will insist that it ought not [f].

To

[f] This puts me in mind of a gentleman, who, desiring to dispose of his horse, was asked by the buyer, whether he had not the spavin? answered, That he did not know what the spavin might be; but that he was sure, if the spavin was an advantage, his horse had it; if a disadvantage, he was free from it.

CRITO MINOR.

To say, with CUDW. abridged, vol. II. p. 714, "God acts, on set purpose, mysteriously, that free creatures may not, in their present state of trial, be compelled, but only drawn by reasonable inducements, to acknowledge their Creator;" is but a weak defence of the present promiscuous and disorderly state of things. Did ever wise government designedly behave in a mysterious manner, to try the obedience of their subjects? Do not all wise governments endeavour to render their conduct clear and unexceptionable to their subjects? Is not this the most probable means to engage their voluntary obedience? And is not every appearance of mysterious or arbitrary conduct likely to alienate their affections?

THE chimerical notion of a state of trial, which has no existence but in metaphysical brains, has drawn our reasoners into innumerable absurdities. "Moral agents, ought, (they say) to be exposed to *temptations*, to *try* their virtue." And this notion they run such a length, as to confine almost all virtue to the resisting of temptation. Whereas those very beings, whose virtue is the highest, are the most free from temptation.

BUT does any father, on purpose place his son or daughter in the way of temptation, merely with the arbitrary view of trying their virtue? Does an earthly father love his son or daughter more tenderly, than the father of the universe does his creatures? Is an earthly father more prudent; is he more anxious about preserving the virtue of his son or daughter, than

than the supreme Father of all? We know who teaches to pray, that we may not be led into temptation.

It has been argued by some, in defence of the present state, That if there be in it only an *over-balance* of happiness, or more of happiness than misery; it cannot justly be said to be otherwise than it ought to be. But might it not be said, that there was an over-balance of happiness in any country, in which a very great majority of the subjects were so happy, that they desired rather to live than to die? Yet in that very country, there might be many thousands of innocent subjects groaning under various distresses inflicted by tyranny. But would this tyranny be therefore right? I only advance this to shew, that the mere over-balance of happiness does not make the present state unexceptionable. Indeed the whole difficulty of the origin of evil, is only to account how the comparatively *little* evil we see in the world comes to exist.

Of all the evils of this present state death is the most tremendous to nature. We call it the King, or Chief, of Terrors. When we would represent any thing as peculiarly formidable, we take, in describing it, our allusions from death. Yet innumerable authors, and among others the excellent Dr. LAW, have laboured to persuade us, that death is not a real evil [g].

SOME

[g] Ὁ θανάτος παρα φυσιν, x. τ. 2. "Death came in to the world contrary to nature; but resurrection according to nature. For the first man, before he sinned;

" was

SOME, among the most distinguished vindicators of the present state, have, in carrying on their defence of the disorders, which appear in it, lost the thread of their pleadings, and run into palpable inconsistencies. The ancients argued, for instance, that death was not really an evil; because it delivered mankind from the troubles of life. But neither were the troubles of life, according to them, real evils. So that the wise man was not to regret his loss of life, because death delivered him from what he had no real reason to desire to be delivered from.

THIS way of building up with one hand, and pulling down with the other, puts me in mind of an ingenious writer of a little piece on the origin of evil, published about ten years ago, who, in complaisance, I suppose, to gentlemen and ladies of gallantry, apologising for adultery, as no great evil, observes, that it often brings money and good humour into a family. But the same writer, in other places, insists that poverty is not an evil, because it is only being deprived of what is of no real value. So that adultery is no evil, because it procures that which is good for nothing.

THUS, likewise, the optimists argue, that a medicine though nauseous, and a chirurgical operation, though painful, are often eligible, therefore not evils.

But

"was immortal. *Anagasis*, therefore is, q. d. *divitiae*
" *ταῦτα*, restoration." *Suid.* *voc. Anagasi.*

BENTL. SECUND.

But why do not those philosophers put on their short glasses, that they may see so far into the subject, as to observe, that the complaint which causes the necessity of taking the nauseous medicine, or undergoing the painful operation, is an evil.

I OWN, I am not much delighted with those refinements in philosophy, which oppose the common sense of all mankind, in all ages and nations. That the human species in general have looked upon pain, sickness, and death, as evils, is, with me, a stronger presumption that they really are so, than all the far-fetch'd and inconsistent arguments of a set of cobweb-spinners, to the contrary. And I think the difficult question, Whence evil, may be better answered by allowing the reality of the evils, and flatly denying their being turned to a greater good, than by all the quibbling subterfuges of our optimists.

BUT of death, particularly, I think it a little difficult to understand how a *christian* should attempt to represent it as no evil, when scripture declares, that a principal part of what the saviour does, is, delivering from it. This indeed, is nothing to the deists. It may, however, be more proper to add no more on this point at present. To proceed then,

IT is curious to observe, how reasoners differ, and to what extremities on opposite sides, antagonists, endowed with the true spirit of disputation, push their respective opinions. Some writers on the origin of evil, have been so out of all patience, on viewing the present disorderly and promiscuous state of things, as

to run headlong into atheism ; while others on the contrary, for the more effectual defence of the optimistical side, and to prove, that even whatever is wrong, is right, have laboured to shew, that *vice itself* is not an evil, or deformity in the universe.

PLATO, and most writers since his time, impute the existence of moral evil to the abuse of liberty. In which they are undoubtedly right. And if they would fairly own vice to be truly and properly an *evil*, producing an *uncompensated deformity* in the universe, I should, for my single part, understand them better than I do as they now reason. I can understand that God makes his creatures not wicked, but *capable* of being wicked ; for it requires less power to do evil, than to do good. The *creatures*, therefore, being free to good, or evil, make themselves wicked. And the evil they produce in the universe, is a *real deformity* ; but yet this partial deformity leaves in the universe a sufficient degree of beauty to make it worth while to have created an universe. A general gains the victory over his enemy ; but with the loss of ten thousand men. Are these men *not really lost*, because the victory is gained ? Is vice not a *real evil*, because it does not confound the whole creation ? But PLATO goes on, and says, God, in the end, gets the better of evil, and turns it to good, which is, says he, the greatest of all art. *Kαὶ τέτο μεγάντες τεχνάς, κ. τ. λ.* To which, probably, Lord BOLINGBROKE had an eye, when he wrote what Mr. POPE has, in his *Essay on Man*, versified ;

“ Th’ eternal art educating good from ill,” &c.

IF this were so, it would not be easy to defend either the heathen notion of condemnation to Tartarus, or the christian, of the punishments awaiting the wicked in Hell. Turning evil to good, is preferable to either prevention or punishment. If it were true, that God brings a *greater* good out of moral evil, which arises in the world, or if this were possible, would not moral government, legislation, sanction, punishment, have been thereby superseded? Nay, is it not probable, that what could be made to produce a *greater* good, would have been required; not forbidden?

Mr. ABERNETHY ventures so far as to say expressly, "that though moral evil is not approved by God, " yet he permits it, and foresees it without intending "to prevent it, which he could have done [b]. Do the optimistical gentlemen mean to say, that God could, as a *governor*, have prevented moral evil? As omnipotent, we know, he can prevent any thing. In case of murder, or any atrocious crime, whoever is found to have

[b] So NICOL. HANAP. patriarch of Jerus. *Sciebat Dominus, &c.* "God knew, that man would sin, and yet he "made him free to good or evil, and commanded him "not to sin, while he *could* have made him so, that he "should not sin." Exempl. Virt. et Vit. p. 7. Mr. POPE speaks of God's being the direct *author* of vice and consequent misery, where he says, God, perhaps,

"— pour'd ambition on a CÆSAR's mind,
"And turn'd young AMMON loose to scourge mankind.

have known of the intention, and has not endeavoured to prevent it, is, in the eye of our laws, an accessory, and in murder, accessories are the same as principals. But what should we think of a prince, who should punish an offence, he could, consistently with the order of his government, have prevented? The same author says afterwards, page 132, "If the "Divine perfections required, that sin should be absolutely prevented, or not at all permitted, they required, that such a being as man, in a state of probation, should not be created, which scarcely any considerate person will have the hardiness to affirm." Scripture speaks of man as falling into his present unhappy condition after his creation, ; not as created in his present condition. *Scripture-authority* is nothing with gentlemen of deistical principles. I do not therefore offer this, or any thing else, from the books commonly called sacred, otherwise than as *explanatory*.

Mr. ABERNETHY, vol. II. p. 100, says, the divine power is the direct cause of "natural evil and "unhappiness, as sickness, pain, and death. Both "being natural, the evil as much as the good, must "both come from the author of nature."

In a sound sense, this is true on every hypothesis. There had been no universe, had not God created it. And it is evident, that, no universe, no evil. But does it therefore follow, that the author of the universe intended every evil, which comes to arise in his universe? A good father begets six children. One of them proves wicked. Did the father intend this? If it be said, "The father cannot, by any means he "may

"may properly use, prevent his son's being wicked;" the answer is, Neither can the Father of the universe, by any means he may properly use, prevent his creature's making a wrong use of the powers given him. And if created beings may be conceived to have power to produce such evils as sickness, pain, and death, (of the possibility of which more hereafter) then it is not a true account of the origin of evil, to say with the good doctor, that those distresses come from the Author of nature.

Dr. LAW, in his note, KING's Origin of Evil, page 471, after setting forth the advantages from the fall (which blessed advantages, accordingly, Christ is supposed by christians to be highly rewarded for reversing) adds, "One may say of EVE, as the poet" (MARTIAL, I believe) "does of the hand of MUCIUS SCÆVOLA,

"Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus.

"EVE had not done so well, if she had not eaten the forbidden fruit."

He says (KING's Origin of Evil, page 463) "Vice is, in the world, the same as the discords in a musical composition, which, if heard separately, grate and offend the ear, but when mixed in concert with other notes, make the more sweet and agreeable harmony." But here arises a difficulty. For all who know any thing of musical composition, know, that discords are as necessary as concords, and are accordingly *prescribed* by the masters; and that there is great art in preparing and resolving them, and introducing them in their proper places. Whereas vice,

wherever it comes, produces mere deformity and mischief, and is wholly prohibited.

OTHERS are fond of comparing vice in the moral world to the shades in a picture. But does not every body know, that the shades are as necessary in painting as the lights? The optimists themselves have hardly ever, I think, gone so far as to pretend, that vice is *as necessary* in the moral world as virtue. If they had, it must have puzzled them, I imagine, to account for the conduct of the Author of the great entablature of the world, as condemning those who formed the shades to utter destruction, while he rewarded those who produced the lights.

Archbp. KING says, (page 464.) "God will pro-
"cure the good of the whole, no less by our folly
"than by our wisdom; by our sin than by our righte-
"ousness." And Dr. Law says, "Vice and wick-
"edness, though deformed in themselves, do not im-
"pair the beauty of the whole." It may be object-
ed, says KING, that this is making vice necessary.
And why then is vice to be punished? To which he an-
swers, "If all were vicious, all would be wretched;
"and if all were virtuous, all would be happy." This flatly contradicts what he had said before. Then it
is only the superfluous vice that is evil. A certain com-
petent number of perjuries, murders, rapes, treasons, blas-
phemies, and the like, (and the competent number is
precisely the number which have been committed)
are no more than the discords in a grand concerto, an
improvement on the harmony of the moral system.

BUT

BUT Dr. BENSON, on 2 Pet. iii. 9. *God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance*, writes as follows, "St. PETER does not say, God would have none of the *elect* to perish; but would have all of *them* to come to *repentance*. It is expressed both negatively and positively, and in the most general terms concerning *all mankind*.—And we may depend upon it, that God is sincere and in earnest. He does not tantalize poor helpless miserable man. He has no secret will contrary to, and inconsistent with, his reveal-ed." See Ezek. xviii. 23, 32. and xxxiii. 11. And on 1 Tim. ii. 4. he accounts how it comes, that all are not likely to be saved, though God wills their salvation, by shewing the impossibility of saving men by force.

AND let us hear, to the same purpose, the learned bishop of Gloucester. "To the lasting opprobrium of our age and country, we have seen a writer" [MANDEVILLE] "publicly maintain, in a book so entitled, that private vices are public benefits. "An unheard-of impiety wickedly advanced, and impudently avowed, against the universal voice of nature." Divine Legation, vol. I. page 79. The bishop goes on to shew the fallacy of this position, and, among other particulars, observes, that vice does not, by its *essential* qualities, produce any kind of advantage to states, but only by its *accidental*, which demonstrates, that it is not the vice, as vice, that does the pretended service; but the accidental quality,

quality, which might have belonged to virtue, as well as to vice. Thus, with respect to luxury, which vice, according to MANDEVILLE, is most remarkably serviceable to states, it is certain, that the only shadow of advantage to the public arising from it, is its prompting people of fortune to lay out their money liberally, by which the poor may gain a subsistence. But the giving a free circulation to money, is not peculiar to luxury; for it may be imagined to take place in a state, where luxury is hardly known. Of this truth the republic of Holland was, in Sir. WILLIAM TEMPLE's time, an incontestable proof. And on the contrary, it is notorious, that no one vice has ruined more states than luxury, which MANDEVILLE would persuade us, is absolutely necessary for a rich and powerful society.

It has been said, If vice produced a real uncompensated evil in the world, God, who foresaw which individuals would offend, must have avoided creating those individuals. But to this may be answered, that supposing God to have foreseen, that in an universe consisting of so many millions, so many hundreds, or thousands, would prove wicked, it does not follow, that any thing could have been done for preventing the commission of wickedness in the world, by keeping out any particular set of individuals. For if in ten millions, for example, it was foreseen that ten thousand would prove wicked, and all the individuals were particularly known; let those ten thousand individuals be thrown out: the number remaining will be nine millions, nine hundred and ninety thousand. Can any thing else be foreseen of this diminished

nished number, than that among them a certain proportion will prove wicked? Is there any assignable large number of free agents, of whom it can be foreseen, that none of them will deviate into vice? It seems therefore evident, that no admissible contrivance on the part of God could have prevented the entrance of vice into the universe. For prevention, if possible, would be incomparably preferable to permission, and consequent punishment.

No wise lawgiver forbids what may be admitted without injury to the whole; much less what will produce a beauty on the whole. Vice is, I should think, precisely that which cannot be turned into good, or answer any good end. Who would call that evil, which produced a greater good on the whole, than its own amount? When ZALEUCUS prohibited adultery, on pain of the loss of sight, did he mean only, that the Locrians should be *moderate* in the practice of that vice? Had he been an optimist, he might have confined the cuckold-makers to *semel tantum in mense*, as the statutes of some monasteries are said to have done their monks. But we see from the rigor of his behaviour, on the conviction of his own son, that he meant to prohibit every single act of the kind.

REASONERS on the optimistical side do not consider, that what they call the good effect produced by the moral evil, is not absolutely a good effect, but only a cure or palliation of a previous evil. A robber plunders me, for example, or a lawyer cheats me of my riches. I become a better man in consequence of my being poorer. Is it not visible here, that the

effect produced by the robber or the pettifogger, is only my being what I ought to have been without their villainy? Where is then the greater good produced by their villainy? What makes up for the evil of their villainy? Were this doctrine true, the present state would be preferable to the future; a state admitting moral evil, preferable to one, where there was none; that is, a worse state would be preferable to a better. But it is notorious, that the heathens believed a former state, previous to the present degenerate one, in which former state moral evil had no place; and likewise a future Elysian state, from which moral evil was to be excluded. And we all know what is believed to the same purpose by the christian world. Thus the established opinion of both heathens and christians is incompatible with the optimistical doctrine.

A COMPANY of foreigners, making their escape from the land of persecution and arbitrary sway, arrive in this happy country of civil and religious liberty. The moment they set their foot on the island, they conclude themselves safe. In travelling over the uninhabited downs on this side Dover, they are attacked by a band of robbers, plundered of their baggage, and cruelly wounded. Suppose the first man they meet to administer consolation to the injured strangers in the following speech: "Your case, gentlemen, is only "apparently, not really, calamitous. You are to con- "sider, that distresses and afflictions have often very "excellent moral effects. They tend to make men "humble, considerate, and tractable. You ought "therefore to suppose, that the government in this "country do, in their wisdom, employ those, and
"other

“ other such persons, whom you look upon as ruffians, to give strangers the same reception you have had, and with the most benevolent views. And you ought to conclude, that, the government of this happy country being wise and good, whatever is done in England, is right.”

WOULD the unfortunate strangers, supposing them to be of any country which produces skulls with brains in them, look upon such an apology in any other light, than that of a sophistical, or perhaps a humourous attempt on their understandings? Would they be at any loss to conceive, that the British government might be unexceptionable; and that there might yet arise irregularities and bad practices, directly opposite to the intentions of government, but which could no otherwise be prevented, than by confining, or putting to death, all suspicious persons? a measure utterly inconsistent with the nature of liberty, and the first principles of government.

or LORD BOLINGBROKE finds great fault with Dr. CLARKE, for building his proof of a future state on the necessity of a state of redress to adjust the disorders of the present; which disorders the doctor at the same time ascribes to God. And I own, I think Lord BOLINGBROKE has, in this point, the advantage. For what proof of a future state of redress can be drawn from the disorder of the present, if that disorder be considered as *intended* by God. If God intends disorder, disorder must be *proper*, consequently not to be expected to be redressed. If the English government intends robbery and murder, there is no reason to sup-

pose that the same government intends the redress of the injuries done by robbers and murderers. But God is a God of order, and not of confusion. Nor does he, I suppose, nor indeed any governor, intend disorder for the *shortest*, any more than for the *longest* period.

IF there is a species of action, upon the doing of which the actor can never, even at the distance of millions of years, reflect without self-approbation and pleasure; if there is a contrary species of action, on which the actor must, at the distance of millions of years, reflect with remorse and self-abhorrence; it cannot, I should imagine, be true, that God produces equal beauty from vice as from virtue. When, by means of seduction, an innocent person is betrayed into vice and final ruin; what is the superior good, on the whole, arising from this tremendous catastrophe? Will it be said, others have an opportunity of learning wisdom from the fatal consequences of folly? It may be so. But is it not an evil upon the whole, that one individual should go to destruction, to prevent ten others from ruin? The good on the whole would be, that all, without deduction, be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. What father could be brought to think it best on the whole, that one of his sons should be hanged, for an example to the rest?

CUDWORTH labours to shew, that vice serves to the display of the divine attributes, and is therefore useful, and fit to have been permitted. How, says he, could the divine mercy have appeared, had offence never

never come? But does any father wish, or (where he can prevent it) suffer his children to offend, that he may exhibit his paternal goodness in forgiving them?

Mr. ABERNETHY says, page 134. "God's purity is displayed in his abhorrence of sin, manifested by his punishing it." Is then the wickedness of man of advantage to God? Scripture tells us, our goodness does not extend to him. If our vices glorify God, while even our virtues are nothing before him, it would seem evident, we ought to be vicious. Besides, can any one think of a being infinite in moral perfection, as intending, or which is exactly the same, "permitting, when he could prevent it" (the author's own words) that moral evil, which brings final destruction on multitudes of rational beings; only—*horresco referens!*—to give himself an opportunity of displaying the terrors of omnipotence armed with vindictive wrath!

To observe how some optimists reason, one would imagine they meant to persuade us, that God's designs must stand still, till man pleases to be wicked. If JOSEPH's being treacherously sold into Egypt by his unnatural brothers, was (as JENKINS alledges) necessary for bringing about the gracious ends of providence; or, if CHRIST's being cruelly put to death by the Jews was necessary in order to man's salvation; then the purposes, which were the consequence of JOSEPH's being in Egypt, and of CHRIST's dying, must have been disappointed, if those atrocious crimes had not been committed. I cannot, for my part, see, that the vice and consequent misery of man is any other

way necessary to the perfection of the universe, than a flaw is to a diamond; a blot to a fine picture; or a ruinous wing to a noble palace. Good may, in a qualified sense, be said to come accidentally from evil. Not that the good might not have come, had the evil never existed. For surely, we cannot do much, if we cannot fathom such a shallow difficulty as this. Is it not easy to understand, for instance, how a government may, with too much certainty, depend for the completion of many of its inventions, on the bad dispositions of the subjects? The public expences must be borne. For this purpose money must be raised on the subjects. They will, if opulent, run into luxury. If the government taxes the articles of luxury, there arises a fund for supporting the national expence. But is luxury therefore an advantage to a people? Is it impossible without luxury to support government? Would not a wise and good people, of themselves, *voluntarily*, contribute to the necessary expences of government?

THE multitude of apologists for the present state of our species and our world, is very great. Among the ancients, ZENO, and all the stoical train, PLATO, EPICETUS, CHRYSIPPUS, SENECA, and innumerable others. And among the moderns, LEIBNITZ, SHAFTESBURY, KING, and his commentator, the excellent Dr. LAW, the learned CUDWORTH, the sagacious BUTLER, the elegant SHERLOCK, the pious ABERNETHY, the good bishop of Clogher, the melodious author of the Essay on Man (whose philosophy is indeed rather to be ascribed to Lord BOLINGBROKE),

BROKE), the jesuitical author of the Fable of the Bees, and innumerable others.

ONE would think these authors, or the greatest part of them, must have rather affected to vindicate the present promiscuous and disorderly state of things, than have thought it *really defensible*. For, first, those among either heathens or christians, who believed a future state, ought to have been cautious of over-defending the present promiscuous and disorderly state of things; lest they should, as above hinted, run into the error of demolishing the great moral argument for a future state of redress. For in proportion as the present state is made out to be good and orderly, and intended by God in the same proportion, a future state of redress becomes less necessary. And, secondly, the ancient heathens, who believed a golden age, and a degeneracy; and the christians, who believe a paradisiacal state, and a fall; ought to consider, that this belief is, in effect, owning the present state to be promiscuous and disorderly.

SOME writers, both antient and modern, acknowledge the *reality* of evil prevalent in this world to a certain degree.

THEOPHRASTUS says, "It is absurd, that there are many animals, whose lives are less valuable, and yet longer, than that of man." And CICERO says, it is unnatural that so many should die young. *Nobis vix, aut, &c.* "To us [men] food is by nature hardly "or at all furnished," says he [i]. And, speaking of

death (*Quis est enim, &c.*) "Who, at the approach of
 "death does not grow pale, and fly from it, if he can?
 "—Even unthinking animals, and infants, as well
 "as the great and wise, when they come to die,
 "are they not startled?"—*Quæ potest in vita, &c.*
 "What enjoyment in life can man have, when he re-
 "flects, as he often must, that shortly he must die?"
 —*Hæc quidem vita, &c.* "This life is but a ling-
 "ering death.—It is best not to be born; but,
 "if born, to die soon [k]."

IN

[k] οὐκ εἶνι δειλοις θδεσ, κ. τ. λ. "There is no cala-
 "mity expressible by words, nor misfortune in the power
 "of the gods to inflict, to which human nature is not ob-
 "noxious." EURIP.—Αεχνη μεν μη φυσι, κ. τ. λ.
 "It is best not to be born; and next to that to die as
 "soon as may be." THEOGN.—οὐκ εἶνι ὅτις πατεῖ ανη-
 συδαιμονει. "No man is altogether easy."—Αλλ' εἰ τα
 πλειστη χειρα, &c. "Think yourself well off, if you
 "have more good than evil in your lot."—Ω φυσει επα-
 θρωποισιν, &c. "O nature, what a step-mother hast thou
 "been to many.—Βιοις απας μεν. "The whole of life
 "is but wandering," says EURIPIDES.—Εύροις δ' αν οθεσ,
 &c. "You will find nothing good, in which there is not
 "some mixture of evil." MENAND.—Ο κοσμος σκηνη,
 &c. "The world is but a scene; life a passage. You
 "came; you saw; you vanished." DEMOCR.—Ημεις
 οποτ' ηρχομεθα ζην, &c. "From the moment we begin
 "to live, we begin to die. There is more in life of
 "what is vain, than what is useful." DIOG. LAERT.
 And PLATO, that great optimist, says, "We should
 "hasten out of this bad world." BAPT. CAMPOFULG.

IN his Consolation he expatiates on the miseries of human life. What follows, is abridged from him. *Fac enim nasci hominem, &c.* "When a human creature enters into life, you behold — not a lord of "the world, but a slave of misery and distress. His "infancy is passed in wailing and lamentation, in "pain of body, and incapacity of mind. His youth "lost in extravagancy and pleasure, without all "relish of what is useful or commendable. From un- "bounded indulgence in criminal pursuits, repentance, "disease, and self-abhorrence, are the consequences. "His mature age is but a scene of restless ambition, "and continual danger of fame, fortune, or life. His "advanced years are weighed down with infirmity, "pain, and sickness. So that his appearance presents "to the mind of the beholder the idea of living death, "or dying life. If we consider mankind as to their "several stations in life, is not misery alike the por- "tion of the high, the middle, and the lowest ranks? "If any one should boast the happiness of kings, let "him go, with DAMOCLES, to DIONYSIUS, and he "will teach him, that to be a king, is to have a sword "constantly hanging over him; to be in continual
"alarms

says, "No human being is happy, but ENOCH and ELI- "JAH, because they are well" (in heaven) "as to both "body and mind, free from the fear of death, and in- "stated in the happiness, which ADAM lost." Exempl. Virt. & Vit. II. 932. This author, by the bye, must have differed from the common opinion, that the souls of good men go directly into a state of happiness out of their bodies.

“ alarms of war from abroad, or sedition at home. If
“ he obtains a victory over his enemies, it is at the
“ expence of treasures wasted and thousands slaug-
“ tered. If he falls into the hands of his enemies,
“ captivity, ravage, contempt, and misery in its most
“ frightful shapes are his portion. Opposite to this
“ exalted station is that of the vulgar. And their
“ condition is so abject, that it affords no possibility
“ of alleviation. That miserable part of our species are
“ by their situation exposed to every distress. On
“ them fall naturally the weight of poverty, the sev-
“ ery of labour, the hardships of war, the rigor of
“ taxes, and the cruelty of oppression. If fortune de-
“ prives them of the smallest matter, that little is their
“ all. Nor are those of the middle rank exempted from
“ their share of distress. As their station is between
“ the highest and the lowest, so their condition par-
“ takes of the miseries of those above and those be-
“ low them. If we consider mankind with respect to
“ the division into two sexes, each has its respective
“ allotment of distresses; and those, which fall to the
“ share of the female sex, their weaker nature ren-
“ ders proportionally more severe, while their lot is
“ in one respect peculiar, that in no part of their
“ lives they are free from the controul of others.
“ Their parents rule them till marriage, and their
“ husbands afterwards, till death sets them at liberty.
“ As if the portion of distress, which nature assigns
“ to every individual of our wretched species, were
“ not sufficient, such is our make, that we cannot
“ help feeling the miseries of others, and suffering
“ from the distresses of those, with whom we are con-
“ nected; and the more extensive our connexions,

the

" the more various our sufferings. Thus it appears
" manifest, that none of the human species is exem-
" pted from suffering, none enjoys undisturbed felicity.
" Our very life is but a journey toward death. And
" the soul enjoys no true life, till it comes to be, by
" death, delivered from this state of imprisonment in
" the body, and to expiate free in the enjoyment of
" eternity. Therefore to those, who have been pecu-
" liarily favoured of heaven, and who have requested
" the greatest happiness that could befall mortals, sud-
" den death has been granted, as the supreme of all
" blessings."

THE main of this is, however, rather declamatory than solid. The rhetorical philosopher writes too much in the manner of those, who desire to carry a certain point. But the business is, to state the exact truth. And that, in my opinion, lies, as before-hinted, between the optimist and the complainer.

THOUGH PLATO, as quoted above, apologises for the apparent evil in the world; in other places, he teaches, that the distresses of the world are *real*, and are owing to the souls of men being condemned, for sins done in a former state, to inhabit these impure and diseased bodies, and unhappy regions; which, according to him, and the other philosophers, who were of the same opinion, makes this life a state of punishment, or kind of moderate hell. To which very generally prevalent notion was owing great part of the prejudice, which the heathens shewed against the christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

SIMPLICIUS declares himself very strongly against the optimistical doctrine. *Ἐχοντες δια την αιτιαν, κ. τ. λ.*
“Having then traced out the origin of [moral] evil,” (viz. the abuse of liberty) “we declare loudly, that
“God is the cause of no evil, because the mind freely
“wills evil, which is not decreed or intended by
“God.”

JAMBlichus (*De Myster.* sect. X. cap. v.) says, “Man is fallen from a better state, in which he enjoyed the communication of the gods.” And, ibid. cap. xviii. “The gods are not the cause of evils to men; but are altogether beneficent. Evil is not universally, but partially such, being caused by certain unavoidable incongruities in the material system.” But in other places, as in sect. IV. cap. vii. he ascribes all evil to dæmons.

THE scripture writers, considered only as ancients, deserve to be heard on the subject. And first, the very history of the disobedience of ADAM and EVE, and its consequences, seem decisive, as far as the authority of scripture weighs with the reader, for the reality of evil in the world. For MOSES tells us, that upon the first offence certain evils followed, as partly threatened before, viz. mortality, barrenness of the ground, pain in child-birth, &c. The supposition of a fall, or degeneracy, and consequent distress, supposes real evil to have taken place in this world.

THE apostle PAUL is very explicit to this purpose [1] "The creature [Gr. $\alpha \lambda \sigma \iota \varsigma$] was made subject to vanity, not willingly; but by reason of him [Satan, says Mr. LOCKE] who hath subjected the same; in hope, because the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know, that the whole creation [Gr. $\alpha \lambda \sigma \iota \varsigma$] groaneth and travelleth in pain together till now.

No author is more copious on this subject than SOLOMON. "Vanity of vanities, saith the preacher, all is vanity. What profit hath a man of all his labour, which he taketh under the sun? I have seen all the works that are done under the sun, and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit. The crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting, cannot be numbered. In much wisdom, is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow.—I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to do; and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun.—What hath man of all his labour, and of the vexation of heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun? For all his days are sorrows, and his travel grief. Yea, his heart taketh not rest in the night. This is also vanity.—I praised the dead more than the living. Yea, better [happier] is he than both they, who hath not yet been, who hath not yet seen the evil work, that is done under the sun." *Eccles. passim.* See Whitehead's *Notes* to *dead*.

AND

AND (to omit innumerable detached passages) the parable of the tares, Mat. xiii. 25. describes this world as in a disorderly state, occasioned by the interposition of a powerful hostile being ; of which more hereafter.

THE general strain of the preceptory part of the N. Testament directs to despise and rise above this world ; which would be unaccountable doctrine, if all were orderly in this world. And it is, by the way, very remarkable, that all truly great minds have ever shewn themselves thus disposed. Nor is it congruous to conceive of divine wisdom and goodness as placing rational creatures in a state, which they are to shew true magnanimity by despising. Nothing is great, the ancients used to say, the contempt of which is great. And to despise what the divine wisdom and goodness provided for us, would be gross impiety. The matter seems therefore reducible, on the whole, to this alternative ; either, the present state is orderly and good, or it is not. If the former, we ought not to affect to be above it. If the latter, it is altered, by some means or other, from its original constitution, and the optimistical doctrine is false.

As the first book of the Bible describes all things at the creation as perfectly good, and man in a state of happiness ; and immediately afterwards represents this world as under a curse, and man become obnoxious to labour, pain, and death ; so the concluding book of that wonderful collection of originals represents

fents the adventitious evil, as at an end ; a state of renovation come on, and all things restored to the good and happy condition, from whence they had fallen. See the *Apocalypse*, chap. xx, xxi, xxii.

AMONG the moderns, likewise, there are some, who acknowledge the reality of evil in this world, as the able and learned BARROW, whose words follow : " It hath always been, and it will ever be, an universal complaint and lamentation, that the life of man and trouble are individual [inseparable] companions, continually and closely sticking one to the other ; that life and misery are but several names of the same thing ; that our state here is nothing else but a combination of various evils (made up of cares, labours, dangers, disappointments, discords, disquiets, diseases, pains, and sorrows) ; that all ages, from wailing infancy, to querulous decrepitude, and all conditions, from the careful sceptre, to the painful spade, are fraught with many great inconveniences peculiar to each of them ; that all the earth is overspread with mischiefs, as with a general and perpetual deluge ; that nothing perfectly sound, nothing safe, nothing stable, nothing serene, is here to be found ; this, with one sad voice all mankind resoundeth ; this our poets are ever moanfully singing ; this our philosophers do gravely inculcate ; this the experience of all times loudly proclaimeth. For what are all histories, but continual registers of the evils incident to men," &c. And below, " How many of our brethren in this world may we observe conflicting with extreme penury and distress ; how

" many

“ many undergoing continual hard drudgeries to
“ maintain their lives ; how many sorely pinched with
“ hunger and cold ; how many tortured with grievous
“ sickness ; how many oppressed with debt ; how ma-
“ ny shut up under close restraint ; how many detained
“ in horrible slavery ?”

Dr. YOUNG’s Estimate of human life is a professed detail of the various evils, to which humanity is subject.

Mr. HUME, in his Essay entitled, *The Sceptic*, ridicules the optimistical doctrine, as exhibited by POPE and the antients, and acknowledges that “ such is the disorder and confusion of human affairs, that no perfect œconomy, or regular distribution of happiness and misery, is ever, in this life, to be expected. Not only the goods of fortune, and the endowments of the body (both of which are of great importance), not only these advantages are unequally divided betwixt the virtuous and vicious, but even the mind itself partakes, in some degree, of this disorder, and the most worthy character, by the œconomy of the passions, enjoys not always the highest felicity.” HUME’s Essays, vol. I. p. 292.

AND the elegant Dr. THOMAS BURNET, in his Theory of the Earth ; in which he every where calls this world a ruin. Vol. I. p. 203. “ I have often suggested, that the first order of things is regular and simple, according as the divine nature is ; and continues so, till there is some degeneracy in the moral world. I have also noted, upon several occasions,

“occasions, the deformity and incommodousness of
 “the present earth, and from these two considera-
 “tions we may reasonably infer, that the present earth
 “was not original; but is a state of subjection to va-
 “nity, wherein it must continue till the redemption
 “and restoration of all things.” And p. 162. “A
 “poor shipwrecked mariner, when he hath run his
 “vessel upon a rock in the middle of the channel,
 “expostulates bitterly with nature, who it was that
 “placed that rock there; and to what purpose? Was
 “there not room enough, saith he, upon the land,
 “or the shore, to lay your great stones, but they must
 “be thrown into the middle of the sea, as it were in
 “spite to navigation?” And p. 229, he finds fault
 with the brevity of human life, the unsavourableness
 of seasons, and mean quality of the productions of
 the earth, and the niggardliness of nature, which
 yields with difficulty and labour, a poor subsistence to
 wretched man. Again, vol. II. p. 286. “What is
 “there in this present world, natural and moral, if
 “I may ask with reverence, that could make it worth
 “while for God to create it, if it never was better, nor
 “will be better? Is there not more misery than hap-
 “piness, is there not more vice than virtue, in the
 “world? As if it had been made by a Manichæan
 “god. The earth barren, and the heavens incon-
 “stant; men wicked, and God offended,” &c.

It is true, that several authors have undertaken
 to confute what the good doctor has advanced. Among
 others, Dr. J. CLARKE (Orig. of Evil, p. 160)
 argues for the necessity of this world’s being deluged
 as it is at present, in order to its being watered by
 rains,

rains, &c. and quotes Sir ISAAC NEWTON's *Principia*, pag. 473. Sir ISAAC's words are, " *Nam quemadmo-*
" *dum maria ad constitutionem terræ hujus omnino requi-*
" *runtur; idque ut ex iis, per calorem solis, vapores copi-*
" *ose satis excitentur, vel in nubes coacti decident in plu-*
" *vias, et terram omnem ad procreationem vegetabilium*
" *irrigent et nutriant; vel in frigidis montium verticibus*
" *condensati, decurrant in fontes et flumina, sic ad con-*
" *servationem marium et humorum in planetis requiri*
" *videntur cometæ,*" &c. To dissent from Sir ISAAC NEWTON, is as if one were to say to an angel (Luke I. 34.) " How can this be ?" But, with all due submission to the divine sagacity of the prince of philosophers, I cannot see why three fifths of a planet must be rendered uninhabitable, in order to its being habitable in the other two. I cannot help thinking, that the wisdom, which formed this world, was equal to the making of it habitable throughout; nor do I think there is any great difficulty in supposing our planet to have been originally very different from what it is at present, in this, and other respects. As to the necessity of such a disproportionate extent of ocean, for the purpose of furnishing a sufficiency of exhalations; we do see that vast inland regions are sufficiently watered by rains, tho' they cannot be supposed to receive much benefit from the exhalations which are raised from the surface of the ocean, as we cannot well imagine clouds to be carried in the atmosphere, (in which they do not rise to the height of three miles) to places distant from the oceans four or five hundred miles. Nor do we, in general, find, that inland countries are worse watered by rains, than those near the seas and oceans; which, I imagine,

gine, would be the case, if the watering of the earth depended upon its surface's being almost wholly deluged.

IT is common to alledge in defence of the deluged state of our globe, the pretended convenience of seas for transporting the different articles of commerce to and from the most distant regions. But (without entering deeply into such questions) may it not be said, that the earth was not probably put into its present state of inundation with any view to commerce [*1*]; because that end would have been better answered by a multitude of navigable rivers at convenient distances from one another, as in the American, and other continents, than by covering the greatest part of the surface of the globe with immense oceans, whose frightful vastness, and mountainous rollings, so discouraged navigators, unfurnished with the compass, and unskilled in their art, that almost five thousand years elapsed before one half of the globe came to be known to the inhabitants of the other.

WHAT Dr. CLARKE advances in defence of the necessity of mountains, is, likewise to me, as little satisfactory. We know, that in many parts of the

[*1*] IN the same manner our best philosophers argue, that the fixed stars were not created merely to give us a glimmering light, which could have been incomparably better effected by one additional moon.

world there are none of those hideous ruins ; nor is the want of them complained of ; but on the contrary, those parts of the world are the fittest for inhabitants, both human and of the inferior species, which are the freest from them. Nor can the doctor defend the usefulness of tempests, or hurricanes ; since it is certain, that gentle, or at most brisk gales would answer all purposes of purifying the air. Nor does it seem reasonable to imagine, that the subterraneous matters which cause earthquakes, would, in any other than a ruined world, like ours, have come to be so jumbled together as to produce the terrifying effects, which only to read makes the hardiest tremble. All such portentous phænomena seem best understood as punishments, and ruins, not as originally intended to have any place in a flourishing and happy world. But though it may be asserted, that our present state has much of apparent evil and disorder, the absence of which we ourselves can very well imagine, without detriment, and even with great advantage to our present happiness, and to our improvement in virtue ; it may not yet be so easy to determine with precision, all the particulars, which removed, or changed, would render our present state more desireable.

My Lord BOLINGBROKE, so far from denying the *reality* of the evil, that is in the world (though he writes so strongly on the optimistical side : a Lord, you must know, is not obliged to be consistent) is startled at it to such a degree, as to doubt, on that account, the reality of the divine attribute of goodness. And the royal philosopher of *Sans Souci* writes as broad atheism as a *DIAGORAS*, or a *VANINI*.

MOSHEIM,

MOSHEIM, author of the excellent Ecclesiastical History lately published, says, "The first principles of the oriental philosophy seem perfectly consistent with reason; for its first founder must have argued in the following manner: There are many evils in this world, and men seem impelled, by a natural instinct, to the practice of those things which reason condemns; but that eternal Mind, from which all spirits derive their existence, must be inaccessible to all kinds of evil, and also of a most perfect and benevolent nature; therefore the origin of those evils, with which the universe abounds, must be sought somewhere else than in the deity. It cannot reside in him, who is all perfection; and therefore it must be *without him*," &c.

THERE are many other writers, who acknowledge, in opposition to the optimists, the reality of disorder in the world; whom to quote would be tedious to the reader.

By some of those, who have acknowledged the reality of evil in the world, the origin of it has been ascribed to the agency of subordinate *invisible beings*, who, in consequence of the constitution of the universe (of any possible universe) come to have power to affect us and our world to our prejudice. And if the *existence* of beings invisible to corporeal eyes may be admitted as having in it nothing contrary to reason; if, among such beings, different individuals may be imagined to be, as those of our species, of different moral *characters*, some well-disposed, others the contrary;

trary; if the *agency* of such beings may, without absurdity, be conceived to have *effects* on us and our world; if the tyrannical influence of such beings may (as that of human tyrants) be supposed to prevail to a considerable *degree*, and through long periods of *time*; if these things may be admitted without violence to reason, and consistently with analogy, so far as analogy reaches; here starts out, at once, without straining, without metaphysical quibbling, without storming reason in her citadel, a satisfactory solution of the grand problem [m]. Yet I do not pretend to say, that it is easy to understand how, respecting many *particulars* of the disorder now prevailing in the world, the introduction of them may be ascribed to the secondary agency of malignant spirits. Only in general, there seems to be no difficulty in imagining that the agency of such beings may prove detrimental to a world. A mere mortal, possessed of the art of rendering himself invisible, and as knowing in chemistry and other parts of

[m] "It is not easy for those, who are not philosophers, to understand the nature of evil; and it is enough for the people to be taught, that evil is not from God," &c. says CELSUS. Orig. contr. Cels. lib. IV. Οὐ μη ἐφίσιος γνωσται, κ. τ. λ.

"No one who does not understand rightly concerning the devil and his angels, who the devil was before, and how he came to be wicked, and how his angels came to revolt with him, can understand the origin of evil. And it is necessary to know, that the dæmons are not the work of God as dæmons, but as rational only." Orig. contr. Cels. lib. iv. Οὐδεὶς μη διαλαβεῖ, κ. τ. λ.

of physiology, as a BACON, or a BOYLE, and maliciously disposed, what mischief might he not produce!

My Lord SHAFTESBURY, the author of the *Dictionnaire Philosophique Portatif*, and many others, oppose the hypothesis of evil brought into nature by ill disposed spirits, for that it is inconsistent with rational notions of the Deity, and his government, to imagine his permitting any of his creatures to deface any part of his works. Let the learned CUDWORTH answer them. "As if," says he, "because God allows some derivative power to his creatures," [how could they be agents without power?] "therefore he himself cannot be almighty. The Devil, by nature, and in the rank God made him, is superior to men; and what absurdity is it for God to permit him to abuse his power, any more, than because men are capable of sinning, therefore, whenever men commit sin, God is the author of it."

LET us now endeavour to trace a little way the sense of mankind on this point. And here we shall find a wonderfully extensive agreement. For, as the learned HOOKER says, "Natures superior to us, and inferior to the Divine, have been held by all, from JOB, MOSES, the prophets, CHRIST, and his apostles, ORPHEUS, HESIOD, the Chaldeans, and the whole company of the ancients [n.]"

The idea of *invisible* beings endowed with power, and producing, by their agency, remarkable effects,

is not likely to have been struck out by human reason. The notion has, however, universally prevailed. How did mankind come by it at first? "The only spirit, whose existence we may be said to know," (says Mr. LOCKE, *Hum. Und.* B. IV. ch. xi. sect. 12.) "that is, perceive to be necessary, is God. All others we believe only from revelation."

EVEN my Lord BOLINGBROKE, who seems to have been careful enough not to believe too much, owns, that there may be various intelligencies, superior to man, though he opposes the opinion of their having power to produce important effects on our world.

IT is generally thought, that MOSES, and some of the other writers of the books commonly called sacred, are the most antient, of whom any remains have reached our times. I need not mention, that the scriptures are full of a spiritual hostility. "Take away" (says the bishop of Clogher) [o] "the supposition of invisible intermediate spirits acting between God and man, and the whole history of the Bible falls to the ground."

THE scripture doctrine is briefly, that, in very ancient times, there arose a contest between two sets of spiritual beings, of high rank, under their respective leaders; the event of which has proved hitherto detrimental to our species, and our world, and will end in the utter destruction of the rebellious party, and of those

those of our species, who have taken part with them; and the triumph and established happiness of the good-part of both the angelic and human species, with reparation of the evil brought on our world by the apostate spirit, and his associates, to be brought about by the great Patron of this world, who originally reduced it into its present habitable state, redeems it from the tyranny of the enemy, and is to be its judge.

IT is remarkable, that the main of this doctrine is found in all religions antient and modern, and has been received in all nations of the world, as far as our knowledge of the religious opinions of mankind can ascertain; the Epicureans, Sadducees, and some individuals among the moderns, excepted. And some learned men have given it as their opinion, that even the Sadducees, in denying angels and spirits, questioned rather their *appearance*, and occasional agency in the affairs of men, than their *existence*.

The oriental philosophy, whose antiquity is so great, as to be almost beyond the reach of our researches, is, according to what little traces we have remaining of it, full of the doctrine of other spiritual beings acting in the universe, besides, and contrary to the Supreme. But which of their doctors held the hostile being, or beings, to be necessarily existent, and which created, is not easy to determine. This philosophy was, however, in some particulars, either inconsistent in itself, or the accounts we have of it have misrepresented it; for it seems sometimes to teach, that the infinite unoriginated mind produced all things, and that the evil which prevails in the world, was brought into it by

a subordinate being in opposition to the divine intention ; sometimes it seems, if we may believe the accounts handed down to us, to have taught, that it was not the divine intention, that there should be any material system ; and that the visible creation, with all the evil it contains, is the work of the hostile being. This last notion the Gnostics, one of the first sects that became remarkable after the rise of Christianity, seem to have adopted. But nothing can be more absurd ; because order and happiness are manifestly to a great degree prevalent, and the disorder and evil (though *real*) are comparatively of little consequence ; which demonstrates the author of this world to be on the side of goodness.

SARISTHAN, quoted by HYDE, says, the antient Magi held two principles, one good, called by them Oromasdes, the other evil, called Arimanus, or Ahdriman ; of which two beings, the *former* only (contrary to the Manichæan doctrine, as generally understood) was eternal. That darkness was *produced* by Ahdriman ; but that light [*p*] existed from eter-
nity, of its own nature. That Ahdriman was once a
good

[*p*] From hence the antient Persian rite of carrying the sacred and unextinguished fire before their armies, and their custom of marching at the rising of the sun. Fire and light have indeed been essential to all religions, that have admitted any outward rites, from the most antient times, down to the present. Perhaps the hint was taken from the fiery law given from Mount Sinai, and the luminous appearance, called the Shekinah, in the first Jewish temple.

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good being; but afterwards fell. This is the scripture doctrine of the fall of Satan. It is thought by some, that ZOROASTER had his religion from ABRAHAM. If so, this coincidence is not to be wondered at. The Persian evil Being was sometimes expressly named Satan; and they taught, that there is a time coming, when this evil Being, the author of plagues, famines, &c. will be destroyed.

PLUTARCH gives different explanations, by various authors, of the mythological history of OSIRIS, TYPHON, &c. As, 1. That it holds forth the actions of antient kings and heroes. But he rejects this as humanizing the gods, and leading to atheism. 2. That by it are meant the adventures of neither men nor gods; but of genii, or dæmons, beings of a middle nature, some good, others bad. He thinks the gigantic wars, the cruelty of SATURN, and the combats between APOLLO and PYTHON, &c. all mean the same. He says HOMER believed good and bad genii, or dæmons, and therefore he applies the word *δαιμονος* either by way of praise or blame. He says PLATO had the same opinion; that XENOCRATES thought there were in the aërial regions certain powerful beings of gloomy and malevolent dispositions; and that EMEDOCLES said the evil genii were liable to punishment for their offences. TYPHON is, says PLUTARCH, a being full of malice and envy, and guilty of the most horrid crimes, &c. 3. A third explanation of the doctrine of OSIRIS, &c. given by PLUTARCH is, that they were figurative of the Nile, the land, the sea, &c. 4. That by TYPHON is meant the orb of the Sun, and by OSIRIS that of the moon, &c. 5. That the

mythology signifies eclipses, &c. He then teaches, that no one of these explanations separately, is the whole truth; but that all taken together contain the just meaning of the mythology. That by **TYPHON** is to be understood all that is hurtful and destructive. That God could not be the author of evil; therefore no single Principle could be the author of all things, there being in nature so great a mixture of evil. The good that is in the world, he says, is as the concords in music, and the evil as the discords. But he says afterwards, that the malignant being puts a stop to the natural course of things, and turns them from the right and good way, in which they would otherwise proceed. This is absolutely inconsistent. For the discords in harmony are as necessary as the concords. And it would be strange to imagine a master of music putting the concords, and his enemy the discords. And that would be a strange sort of musical composition, in which there was somewhat, which put a stop to the course of the music, and turned it from the right and good way, in which it would otherwise proceed; and all this intended. **PLUTARCH** should, therefore, to be consistent, have kept out his supposed necessary discords. But it is less to be wondered, that this honest heathen should bewilder himself in the labyrinth of the origin of evil, when we see our enlightened modern writers lose themselves in the blind manner they do.

ZOROASTER's doctrine, according to **PLUTARCH**, was, that there is a good principle, viz. **OROMADES**, or God, and an evil, viz. **ARIMANIUS**, who is only a **dæmon**, or inferior being, and **MITHRAS**, a middle

middle nature between the two. ZORASTER taught, he says, to worship both OROMASDES and ARIMANIUS, the former by way of prayer, the latter of deprecation. That OROMASDES sprung from light, and ARIMANIUS from darkness. That there were ancient contests between those two beings. That ARIMANIUS is at last to be destroyed; the consequence of which will be general and unmixed happiness. THEOPOMPUS, he says, was a Zoroastrian. The Caldæans, according to him, held the same doctrine; and the Greeks to the same purpose had their JUPITER OLYMPIUS, and their HADES, or PLUTO.

IN his piece, on the failure of the oracles, page 44, he makes one of the speakers in the dialogue observe, that it is not likely, the oracles were both given, and abolished, by the gods: That the gods are not the sole cause of all the phænomena we observe; but that matter, and dæmons produce considerable effects in nature. ZORASTER, ORPHEUS, and PLATO, reasoned well, he says, to this purpose, and solved many difficulties otherwise inextricable. *Εν μεν εν λεγοσιν, κ. τ. λ.* pag. 414 415. "They, "who take away all notion of genii, or dæmons, take "away all intercourse between the gods and men— "or force us to confound all things, bringing God "down to human affairs and concerns." Ibid. The genii, or dæmons, must therefore, according to him, have given the oracles.

HE imagines the obscene and frantic rites, and human sacrifices, which disgraced heathenism, were intended by men to appease the cruel or lustful dæ-

mons, and avert their mischief. Ibid. 417. The antient christian writers ascribe them to the invention of the dæmons themselves.

He gives a particular account of one of the Pythiæ, possessed by a dumb and wicked spirit, *αλαλυ κακη πνευματος*, so as to terrify the priests, the consulters, and even NICANDER a prophet. She lost her senses and died in a few days. Ibid. 438.

CUDWORTH, in the argument to his IVth book, says, PLUTARCH drew all the heathen philosophers after his time into the opinion of two Principles. That learned author doubts, whether the Persians really thought their evil god ARIMANUS independent. He says, the intelligent part of the heathens had no doubt about the unity of the deity, though they held many inferior spiritual beings, of whose existence they received the notion from the scripture accounts of angels and dæmons. And he thinks the heathens were justly chargeable with worshiping the fallen spirits, though they did not worship them as such, because those evil spirits were, he thinks, the authors of polytheism and idolatry, delivered the oracles, and taught impious and obscene rites, and human sacrifices.

IT is remarkable how much all nations have gone into this dual doctrine, or notion of a spiritual hostility. The Egyptians had their OSIRIS and TYPHON; the fabulous Jews (according to SELDEN) their GAD and MENI, and the orthodox, as the Christians, their GOD, or MESSIAH, and SATAN, (which last bore among the Jews various names, as SAMMAEL, AZAZEL, &c.)
the

the Persians their OROMASDES and ARIMANIUS; the Greeks their *daimones arachnes* and *xaxoi*; the Romans their JOVES and VEJOVES, their *superi* and *inferi*, and so forth. VOSSIUS makes no doubt of the derivation of the dual doctrine from that of scripture, concerning the hostility between GOD or CHRIST, and SATAN. Which occasioned CELSUS's accusing the Christians of his time of Manichæism.

THE golden age of ORPHEUS, HESIOD, PLATO, LUCRETIUS, VIRGIL, and OVID, with their Nectar and Ambrosia, by which the immortality of the gods was sustained, and their Panacea, or universal medicine, sometimes called Moly, are thought by many of the learned to be mythologised from the scripture account of the state of immortality, innocence, and happiness, before the fall of man, when God saw, that all things were good. The silver, brazen, and iron ages, are supposed to be taken from the scripture account of the ruin of the world, since which time the creation has been in a state of groaning (Rom. viii. 20,) and of earnest expectation of deliverance: And the gradual and total destruction of TYPHON, is the bruising the serpent's head, predicted Gen. iii. 15. and completed Rev. xx. 10.

THE opposition between OROMASDES and ARIMANIUS, is much the same with the scripture doctrine of a grand hostility between SATAN on the one side, and GOD and CHRIST on the other. HERMES's notion of the supreme God's having given authority to another god named EMEPH, is thought to be taken from the scripture doctrine of God's creating, go-

verning, and judging the world by his Anointed. ZORASTER'S MITHRAS, a mediator-god on the side of OROMASDES, and against ARIMANUS, is but a very little way from the scripture-doctrine of two Beings, besides the supreme, with which we are greatly concerned.

THE Manichæan doctrine is very strong to the same purpose, viz. of a spiritual hostility. CUDWORTH says, Manichæism is only a deification of the devil. One BECKER, a Dutch divine, quoted by CUDWORTH, accuses all, who believe, that SATAN has any concern with mankind, of Manichæism. But he was, says CUDWORTH, well answered by M. BINET in his *Traité Historique des Dieux, et des Demons du Paganisme*. And Dr. ABERNETHY [q] allows, that Manichæism, supposing the evil Principle dependent, does not militate against the goodness of God.

SUIDAS (*voc. MANES*) says MANES lived in the time of the emperor AURELIAN. That he pretended he was Christ, and sometimes the Holy Ghost; that he rejected the Old Testament, and denied the good Principle's being the creator of the world, because of the evil he saw in it. That he admitted the New Testament to be inspired; only he denied the real appearance of CHRIST on earth. He introduced many profane and obscene abominations for religious rites.

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THE doctrine of a spiritual hostility is, however, much more antient than **MANES**. The annotator on **JAMBlichus**, p. 208, says " **MANES** learned from " the Chaldaean magi, that the Devil is the prince or " ruler of the material world." And, p. 253, " That " **ZOROASTER** was the original teacher, among the " orientals, of the doctrine of a good and evil Prin- " ciple."

THERE is less regard due to the opinions of **MANES**, and the other heresiarchs posterior to the rise of christianity, and even of the fathers themselves ; because their notions have so little of original in them, being manifestly little else than their own imaginations grafted on christianity. It may, in the same manner, be alledged, with great, but not equal probability, that those philosophers, who, prior to the christian times, taught the doctrine of two Principles, and of a spiritual hierarchy, had their notion, originally, from the Old Testament. But to proceed ;

HYDE thinks the orthodox Magi believed God eternally existent, and the Devil created. But the Manichæans, according to him, thought both Principles independent. The same learned author thinks, the antient Persians held God to be eternal, and the evil Being created ; and says, the word **ARIMANUS**, or **AHDRI-
MAN**, signifies impure, or deceitful, and that they used to write that name in inverted letters by way of contempt. The Peruvians, he says, had nearly the same theology.

“ We ought not, says he, to blame the Magi for
 “ their notion of the war between God and the Devil ;
 “ because we ourselves are supposed to believe it, and
 “ because Rev. xii. 7, 8, 12, confirms it. This doc-
 “ trine is much more antient than the Apocalypse.
 “ And in the Apocalypse the antient tradition is hand-
 “ ed down to us from the patriarchs. From whence
 “ we conclude, that it has always been the opinion
 “ of the orthodox in the east, and their manner of
 “ speaking on the subject.” HYDE’s Religion of the
 antient Persians, page 294.

EUSEBIUS, in his Evangelical Preparation, page 549, shews, that PLATO favoured the dual doctrine, and believed the existence of a number of spiritual beings of both kinds, between whom a violent hostility subsisted, which had important effects on our world. He traces PLATO up to the scripture doctrine of a spiritual hostility, from whence he supposes that venerable antient drew his theory, and refers to Job. i. Psal. ciii. &c.

THE dual doctrine of ZOROASTER, as explained by PLUTARCH, coincides remarkably with sundry scripture views. “ OROMASDES is of the light, and “ ARIMANIUS of darkness,” says ZOROASTRES. God is light, the father of light, dwells in light, says 1 John i. 5. In the civth Psalm, God is said to cover himself with a garment of light. The kingdom and power of darkness, that is, of the grand Enemy, is frequently mentioned in the New Testament, as Luke xxi. 53. Ephes. vii. 12. Colos. i. 3. And

And darkness is represented as his future punishment.
2 Pet. ii. 4, 17. Jude 6, 13, &c.

THE ancient Bramins, according to STRABO, believed, that the supreme God VISTNOU, produced a secondary or subordinate god, or spirit, called BRAAMA, and gave him power to create the universe. This is the scripture doctrine of the Son of God, the head of the obedient angels. Some writers, however, derive the name Bramins, from ABRAHAM, *q. d.* Abrahams, supposing that the Bramins had their religion from that antient patriarch.

HERMES TRISMEGISTUS teaches (says JAMBlichus) that the supreme God has given authority to an inferior god named EMEPH, as chief of all the ethereal, empyrean, and celestial spirits. This is the scripture doctrine of all power in heaven and earth given to the Son of God, Mat. xxviii. 18.

HESIOD says, from Chaos came Night; from Night Æther; from Æther Light; then the stars, the planets, the earth, and the gods, who govern all. In other places, he mentions the Giants, the Titans, and their wars; makes Night the mother of Earth; gives a copious account of the golden age, and misery of the present world. *Αυταρ επι κει τυτο γενος, κ. τ. λ.*
" But when they" [the Saturnians, or race of the golden age] " came to be extinct, they became δαιμones, " good separate spirits, by the will of great Jove, con- " versant on earth, and guardians of mortal men, ob- " serving their good and wicked actions."

EUSEBIUS (Præp. Evang. p. 184.) quotes some verses of EMPEDOCLES, in which that antient describes impure dæmons as in a state of punishment. *Αἰθέριον μετ' γαρ σφε, κ. τ. λ.* The sky thrusts them down into the waters of the sea. The sea throws them out on the land. The land exposes them to the scorching rage of the sun; and the sun to the violence of the whirlwinds of the sky. Thus they are tossed from element to element, and always in torment and horror. And PLUTARCH, quoted, *ibid.* p. 188, gives an account of TYPHON, which very nearly resembles the scripture-description of the character and punishment of SATAN. He speaks in the same page, of Typhœan and Titanian battles, and the expulsion of those beings, and the punishment inflicted on them for their sins by God [*ὑπὸ Θεοῦ*].

THE TYPHON, or TYPHOEUS, is by some of the antients described as a giant, by others as a fiery spirit, *πνεῦμα θερμόν*, who proved rebellious against JUPITER, and attempting to dethrone him, was thrown by him down to the earth, and buried under mount Ætna. See HOMER, HESIOD, EUSTATHIUS, OVID, LUCAN, HERODOTUS, DIODORUS SICULUS, &c. The same word signifies in some other antient authors, a storm, and a fiery meteor (as *πνεῦμα* signifies sometimes breath, and sometimes a spirit): see PLUTARCH, EURIPIDES, SUIDAS, ARISTOTLE, A. GELLIUS, PLINY. And Acts xxvii. 14. we have *αὐτοῦς τυφωνικος*, a violent wind. *Τυφωνία* signifies madness. The Titans are by the antients represented as concerned in the attempt to get possession of heaven. Of them

them see HOMER, HESIOD, and VIRGIL. ATHE-
NEUS mentions an antient poem, now lost, entituled
Titanopayxa, on the war between JUPITER and the
Titans.

THE author of PHILEMON to HYDASPEs, brings
quotations to shew, that it was thought the Egyptians
meant the Sun, both by OSIRIS and TYPHON. The
Sun was OSIRIS when he produced fruits, herbs, &c.
and TYPHON, when he sent drought and pestilences.

THE Egyptians (says SPENCER De Leg. Jud. p.
346.) held TYPHON to be the author of all evil,
and the murderer of OSIRIS. BOCHART thinks OSI-
RIS is MOSES. But I should rather incline to seek
for a resemblance between OSIRIS and CHRIST.

SOME of the learned think the name of SATURN
comes from a Chaldaic word, which signifies a de-
stroyer. If so, the worthy father of the great JUPI-
TER himself, is no other than the *Ἄπολλυν* of Rev.
ix. 11. the Devil, in the dress of a heathen god.

PLATO in his Πολιτ. p. 112. edit. Basil. treats co-
piously, but wildly of the happiness of mankind un-
der the reign of SATURN, in a former revolution, or
period. That in those times God was governor of
all: whereas now, the different provinces of nature
are under particular superintendants [*ὑπό θεῶν αρχοντῶν*]
and certain dæmons, or spirits [*θεοὶ δαίμονες*] have
charge of the animal creation according to the ap-
pointment of the Supreme.

EUSEBIUS (Præp. Evang. p. 549.) shews, that PLATO held the hostility between good and evil spirits, which had important effects on our world. He says, PLATO got this doctrine from the scripture. DIOG. LAERTIUS, Procem. says, the Egyptians believed a good and an evil dæmon.

Παρακεντινως δε τω περι Θεων λογω, κ. τ. λ. “ To the enquiry about the gods is to be added that concerning the dæmons and heroes. THALES, PYTHAGORAS, PLATO, and the Stoicks, held that the dæmons are natures like to souls, and the heroes are souls separated from their bodies. Those, which were good in the body, are good in the separate state, and contrariwise. EPICURUS says nothing on this head.” PLUT. quoted by EUSEB. Præp. Evang. p. 145.

EUSEBIUS, Præp. Evang. p. 184. argues, from PLUTARCH’s accounts of the heathen gods, that they were no other than dæmons.

Παν το δαιμονον μεταξυ ετι Θευ και θντων. “ Every dæmon [r] is between what is god and what is mortal.” PLAT. Smpof. Love, he says, is one of the dæmons; which shews, that the word δαιμων does not always signify the soul of a departed mortal, as has been alledged by some learned men.

MARSILIUS FICINUS says (Arg. in Apol. Socr.) “ An atrabilious constitution of body fits a man for being

[r] PLATO, in his Cratylus, says δαιμων is from δαιμων, sapiens. BENTL. SECUND.

“ being the receptacle of noxious spirits.” PLATO, in his VIIth epist. speaks of DIONYSIUS, as tempted by an evil dæmon; δαιμων, not κακοδαιμων. He says (*Arg. in Apol. Socr.*) PLATO learned from the Egyptian mysteries, that God had formerly thrown down many bad spirits from heaven, who ever since had been the enemies of mankind. In his argument to PLATO’s Phædr. he gives the following account of the antient dæmonology, “ *Antequam peragat anima-
rum tractatum, &c.* Before he gives a particular
“ account of souls, he speaks of souls, or spiritual
“ beings in general, viz. the soul of the world, which
“ he calls JUPITER, and under him twelve souls or
“ spirits, the guardians of the twelve spheres of the
“ world, to whom he subjects as many orders of dæ-
“ mons, and as many of particular souls, &c. It is
“ worth observing how much the Pythagoræan descrip-
“ tion of the fall of the spirits resembles that of the
“ scripture. — It is needless to mention, that
“ PERSECYDES SYRUS speaks of such a fall of dæ-
“ mons, or spirits, and adds, that OPHIONEUS, was
“ the chief of that army, which rebelled against the
“ supreme Being.” He says, in his argument to the
Apol. for Socr. “ The antients held some dæmons,
“ which were originally such, and others foreign, viz.
“ the souls of men translated into aërial bodies.” PLATO
says, in his book, *De Legibus*, that the youth should
be taught to worship the gods, the sons of the gods,
and the dæmons.

Ἐν μὲν εὐ λεγοσι, κ. τ. λ. “ They speak well,” says PLUTARCH, “ who confess, that PLATO has deli-
“ vered the philosophers from great difficulties, by
“ account.

“accounting for the evils in the world by the in-
“tractableness of matter. But they seem to me to
“solve more and greater difficulties, who, supposing
“an order of dæmons [δαιμόνων] between the gods and
“men, shew, that there is thereby formed a con-
“nection and chain of being” [s], &c.

MAXIMUS TYRIUS, in his first dissertation, on the nature of God, teaches, that the orders of spirits are various, their number countless, their gradation continued from the Supreme to mortal man, and that all space is filled by them from the highest heavens down to the earth.

Εἰναις τε πάντα τον αερα, κ. τ. λ. “He [PYTHAGORAS] supposed, that the whole atmosphere was full of spiritual beings, which are called dæmons, and heroes, and are the authors of dreams, visions, omens,” &c. DIOG. LAERT. in Pythag. So did THALES, HERACLITUS, &c. according to the same author, PLUTARCH and VARRO, &c.

PHILO, in his treatise Πίστι γιγαντών, says, there are spirits continually flying through the air, “And let no one imagine what is here said to be fabulous. For it must be, that the world in all its parts is full of life.”

“THE universe is full of gods and genii, says EPICTETUS, chap. xiii.

POR-

PORPHYRY says (p. 256.) the Egyptians ascribed to dæmons a very extensive sphere of superintendency, over the earth, the sea, the sun, &c.

OUR atmosphere is an immense ocean, of a species more fluid than water, and more and more æthereal, as its regions rise higher and higher, till at the height of fifty miles, (as conjectured) its subtlety is such as to be rather æther than air. Here we may imagine as many different ranks of spiritual inhabitants, as the different regions of the atmosphere will receive, and each rank placed in a region suited to their more and more refined vehicles, and more and more delicate manner of existence, till we come to those, whose essence is subtle enough to be fit for dwelling in the Newtonian æther, which may be supposed to extend through all space. But confining ourselves to the atmosphere of this planet, let it be considered how many times the number of the inhabitants of this earth an element surrounding the globe, and rising to the height of fifty miles, will furnish room for ; especially as three fifths of the surface of the earth are lost by being deluged. If this vast receptacle is wholly uninhabited, its sole use is for respiration; and sustaining clouds, for which purpose, it would have answered as well if it had been but three miles high instead of fifty. But of the manner of existence, or place of abode of such beings, who can affirm any thing positive? All I mean by what I have here said of our atmosphere, is only to insinuate, that there is nothing of impossibility in conceiving it to be the receptacle of innumerable orders of spiritual

spiritual beings. But to leave this matter to the reader's consideration, and proceed;

Φασι δε ειπει κατα τηνας δαιμονας, κ. τ. λ. "They" [the Stoics] "hold, that there are certain dæmons, who "sympathise with men, and are the inspectors of human affairs," says DIOG. LAERT. in his account of ZENO. See also HESIOD. Τοι μεν δαιμονες εισι, κ. τ. λ. And PLUTARCH, quoted by CASAUBON, in his note on D. LAERTIUS, says, THALES, PYTHAGORAS, and PLATO held dæmons, a sort of middle spirits between gods and men. PLUTARCH speaks of departed spirits of good and bad men, as becoming respectively a sort of good and bad dæmons. The antients supposed some of their spiritual beings, genii, nymphs, and the like, to be mortal, though longer lived than man. See PLUT. Defect. Orac. pag. 415. of the death of the god PAN. HIEROCLES, JAMBЛИCHUS, SIMPLICIUS, and others, use the word δαιμονες and αγγελοι indiscriminately. PROCLUS says, every god presides over some order of dæmons. And there is an innumerable multitude of dæmons attending upon every god. Φασι δε οι φιλοσοφοι, κ. τ. λ. "The philosophers say, there are dæmons, who are affected "with human passions." DIOG. LAERT. in ZEN. CICERO, quoted by the commentator on DIOG. LAERT. translates δαιμονες by the Latin word *Lares*. So does CASAUBON. Therefore the *Larvati* are dæmoniacs. Some of the ancients thought the *Lares* were good spirits, and the *Lemures*, bad [t]. SOCRATES's accusation

[t] "If we must speak plainly, what the effects of the "power of dæmons are, we shall say, they are famines, barrenness

tion runs, that he had introduced *καννα δαιμονια*, new gods [u]. D. LAERT. in SOCR.

PYTHAGORAS, according to DIOC. LAERT. taught that there are three species between the supreme Being, and man; the gods, the heroes, and the souls; and that the whole immensity of space was full of intelligences.

SOCRA-

“barrenness of vines and other fruit-trees, excessive droughts, by which the crops are hurt; and plagues, destroying sometimes men, sometimes beasts.” Orig. contr. Cels. lib. viii. p. 398. Αλλ' ει χει αποτολμητατα λεγονται, κ. τ. λ.

SENNERTUS and FERNELIUS, eminent physicians, in their writings expressly ascribe diseases to spirits.

[u] LUCIAN gives a whimsical account of the ancient canonizations, or manufacture of gods and demi-gods. A dead hero is half carcase, half god. Accordingly, TROPHONIUS, while the mortal part of him was rotting in his grave, as other honest people do, was, as to his god-part, giving oracles in Boeotia. Lucian. Menip. p. 116. edit. Bourdel. Nothing indeed shews human reason in a more humiliating light, than to take a view of its theological, and mythological reveries. Let the most inventive genius study for absurdity, what will he imagine more ludicrous than the worship of calves, serpents, monkies, onions! What more ridiculous than gods and goddesses in hell [PLUTO, and therest], a goddess of necessary-houses [CLOACINA], a dog-god [CERBERUS], a horse-god [PEGASUS], a fish-god [TRITON], goat-gods [the Satyrs], dead-gods [PAN, and others]. And Christianity, as travestied by Popery, is nearly as ridiculous as Heathenism.

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SOCRATES, in PLATO's *Apology*, teaches, that there are subordinate gods. Heathenism is full of spiritual beings of both characters. And PLATO believed, that there were many inferior originated gods, who also were makers, or planters of other creatures, and these secondary gods may, according to him, have been generated from eternity. So also ARISTOTLE, PHILO, PLUTARCH, and ALEXANDER APHRODISIUS.

PLUTARCH's allegory of the birth and mischiefs of TYPHON, and the fables of the gigantic and Titanian wars against the celestials, are but a little way from the scripture accounts of the rebel-angels. The three furies of the poets, ALECTO, TISIPHONE, and MEGÆRA; the Numina lœva; the hurtful gods, ROBIGUS and AVERRUNCUS, and VENJVES, of which A. GELLIUS gives an account [x]; the HADES, or invisible one, the cause of plagues and famines; the evil Being of the Manichæans, the TYPHON of the Egyptians and Greeks; all these seem to be no other than the fallen angels, disguised by fable and mythology.

THE Chinese hold, that antiently universal happiness and perfection prevailed. That afterwards a general confusion came on. The heavens and the earth were shaken. The heavenly bodies changed their places and motions. The earth burst, and the waters gushed out. That a time will come, when all

[x] Noct. Att. L. iv. cap. 6. and v. 12.

all things shall be restored by a suffering heroic Being, whose name is Ki-un-tse (suffering supposes hostility) which word signifies shepherd-king, whom they also call the Most Holy, the Universal Teacher, and Sovereign Truth; and is probably the same with the Mithras of the Persians, the Horus of the Egyptians, the Apollo, Mercury, or other son of Jupiter, of the Greeks, the Bramâ of the Indians, and the Adonis of the Syrians. And all these seem to be taken from the scripture account of the suffering conqueror of the enemy, and restorer of all things.

“THE Chinese,” says DU HALDE, vol. III. p. 16. “pay an adoration, but in a subordinate manner, to inferior spirits depending on the Supreme, which, according to them, preside over cities, rivers, mountains,” &c. He says, they believe magic, dæmons, possession and dispossession, *ibid. passim*. And pag. 56. “There are a number of plain texts in their antient books, which speak of spirits.”

THE Mahometans believe angels good and bad, an angel of death, and guardian angels. This doctrine they had of the Jews, and many of their traditional notions of spirits from the Persians and Magi. MOHAMMED calls the devil EBLIS; and says, he was thrown down from heaven for refusing homage to ADAM. They likewise believe genii, a middling species of beings between angels and men. See SALE’s Koran, and Prelim. Disc.

“The Mexicans believe magic, and consult spirits,” says HUET. Præp. Evang. p. 84.

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*or the Jews drew from the common
spring -*

PORPHYRY gives a sort of system of the theology of his times, in his book *De Abstinencia*, § 38. "All spirits proceeding from the soul of the world, and superintending the regions under the moon — governing according to reason, are to be called good genii, δαιμones αγαθοι, and it is to be believed, that they regulate all things to the advantage of what is within their respective provinces, as animals or fruits, giving favourable seasons, &c. They have communicated to mankind the arts of music, &c. These beings are not the authors of both good and evil. With these are to be reckoned the messengers, or travellers, πολιτευονται, as PLATO speaks, who are ambassadors between gods and men, carrying our prayers to the gods, and their warnings to us. But whatever spirits do not regulate their affairs rightly; they are to be called dæmons, but wicked ones. All these are naturally invisible to men. But they make themselves visible when they please. The evil dæmons too sometimes change their vehicles. These beings are passible and corruptible as to their vehicles, and their vehicles waste, and require nourishment. Their vehicles have a certain symmetry as the organized bodies of visible creatures. But those of the evil dæmons are deficient in respect of this proportion. Their place is the region next to the surface of the earth, and they produce disorders in these lower spheres. They are the authors of the calamities, which come upon the earth, as pestilence, famine, earthquakes, while they persuade mortals, that they are the givers of every blessing: Then they excite men to supplications and sacrifices,

“ as if the good gods were offended. Thus they give
“ men false notions of the gods, and allure them to
“ worship themselves instead of the good gods. They
“ are pleased to see and tempt men to act wickedly;
“ whence war, and every vice. They even calum-
“ niate the great gods, and persuade men, that they
“ are the authors of the confusion, which is here be-
“ low. Whence it comes, that many even of the
“ philosophers give very disrespectful accounts of the
“ origin of evil. But, as PLATO says, it is as absurd to
“ ascribe evil to the good gods, as freezing to heat,
“ or fusion to cold. When the evil genii are preparing
“ to bring distresses on mankind, the good send
“ them warnings of their designs by dreams, or vi-
“ sions, and often avert what men can neither see
“ nor prevent. And if men were capable of under-
“ standing the premonitions of the good genii, they
“ would know beforehand all the designs of the
“ wicked daemons against them. These evil genii are
“ also the authors of enchantments, and those who
“ practise enchantments, worship the evil genii, and
“ their chief [τον προετωτα αυτων]; they are full of
“ craft and art, the authors of philtres, tempters to
“ vice, the fathers of falsehood, giving themselves out
“ for gods, and delighting in libations and fumiga-
“ tions, by which their vehicles are nourished.”

IN his book *De Abstinentia*, lib. II. § 58, he speaks of gods and daemons, as the Christians do of good and bad angels, οτι δε εις θεοις, αλλαζ δαιμονισ, τας θυσιας των αιματων, x. τ. λ. According to EUSEBIUS, and JEROME, he accused Christ and his apostles, of working their miracles by the power of daemons.

JAMBЛИCHUS's book, *De Mysteriis*, is a general system of the pagan faith, as it stood in his times, viz. the fourth century, concerning the spiritual world. His gods, dæmons, heroes, souls, spiritual archons, angels, archangels, &c. are a jumble of paganism and christianity. The dæmons, he says, are subject to the gods. They are the most perfect and spiritual work of the gods; the heroes next, and the souls after the heroes. It is diverting to observe how minutely he describes the appearances and characters of those aerial beings, as if he had known them as well as we do the common wild fowl of this country. The gods, he says, appear always for salutary purposes; the archangels are terrible, but mild; the angels milder; the dæmons frightful, &c. He makes these last the authors of evil to men. This he apparently drew from scripture. Yet, in conformity with heathenism, he holds good and evil dæmons; which notion comes originally from the scripture doctrine of the good and evil angels.

JAMBЛИCHUS, in his VIth sect. chap. v. says, there is a sort of spiritual beings of a brutal nature, that may be threatened by the priests into any thing. SCUTELLIUS thinks he finds nine different species of spiritual beings in JAMBЛИCHUS. The annotator on JAMBЛИCHUS, p. 255, says, "It is not to be doubted, that there are such brutal spirits; but it is much to be doubted, whether they can give assistance, or even hear the addresses of those, who call on them." *Non est dubitandum, &c.*

GALE, the annotator on JAMBlichus, says, the Sadducees among the Jews did not deny the existence of angels and spirits; but their existence as separate from the divine nature; from which, they pretended (as did some of the heathen philosophers) all spiritual natures were excerpted, and to which they again returned, and were absorbed into it.

PORPHYRY, quoted by the annotator on JAMBlichus, p. 208, says, the adverse powers are imperceptible to human eyes; but they sometimes embody themselves in a pleasing form. Thus, 2 Cor. xi. 14, SATAN is said to transform himself into an angel of light.

JAMBlichus (sect III. cap. xxx.) speaks of a head of the dæmons, ἡγεμῶν δαμονῶν. And the annotator adds a quotation from PROCLUS to the same purpose, and says, *Zabii quoque deum dæmonum honorarunt. Vid. HOTTINGER.*

EUSEBIUS asserts, p. 178, that the oracles were given by dæmons, and for proof, brings the fact, of their being silenced at the coming of Christ. And SUIDAS relates, that AUGUSTUS consulted the oracle, to know who should reign after him. The PYTHIA answered, "An Hebrew child, who rules over the blessed gods, commands me to leave this temple, and retire to hell. Therefore go silent from my altars." On which AUGUSTUS erected an altar in the Capitol, to the first-born God.

EUSEBIUS, p. 179. quotes PORPHYRY's words, *Νῦν δὲ θαυμαζεσθεν, κ. τ. λ.* " Does any one wonder, " that the city should labour under this epidemical " distemper so many years, when AEscULAPIUS, and " the rest of the gods, have withdrawn themselves from " the society of men. For since JESUS has been wor- " shipped, no one has had any help from the gods."

THAT the heathen oracles were given by evil spirits has been believed by many. And it is not otherwise easy to account for all that is handed down to us of those oracles, but by denying the facts, as the story in HERODOTUS, of the tortoise and the lamb, &c. For priestcraft alone will not account for such phænomena. St. PAUL (1 Cor. x. 20.) seems to represent the sacrificial worship of the heathens as directed by evil spirits. BEELZEBUB is said (2 Kings, I. 3.) to be the god of Ekron; and the primitive Christians expressly renounced dæmon-worship at their baptism.

THIS brings to my mind the antient Clarian oracle, quoted, if I remember rightly, by MACROBIUS, *Φραγέο τοι πάνων υπάτου Θεού εἴμεν λαος*. " Declare, that the greatest of the gods is ISOJAO." Which word is almost the same with the Hebrew name of God, יהוה. Supposing this oracle to have been genuine, and oracles to have been given by evil spirits, there seems here to have been either a design of the apostate spirits to get into favour again by acknowledging the supremacy of JEHOVAH, or

else, on the contrary, to discountenance the Jewish-theology, by giving out JEHOVAH as a heathen god.

AND this naturally leads us to reflect on what occurs so often in the N. Testament, of the behaviour of the spirits in the daemonicas [this is supposing spirits really concerned, which, however, almost every reader knows, is controverted by many, as MEDE, SYKES, FARMER, &c.] who shew a mighty promptitude, on all occasions, to acknowledge JESUS to be the Christ, and are by him restrained from speaking, because they knew him, says our translation; but it might as well have been rendered, "He suffered them "not to tell that they knew him;" not desiring such attestation as they could give.

I do not desire to push any hypothetical or conjectural notion one hair's-breadth beyond what reason, or analogy will support. Having, myself, been always more afraid of believing too much, than too little; I shall hardly ever be the promoter of credulity in others.

Dr. TAYLOR (Scheme of Script. Divin. pag. 265.) supposes that spirits might assist the Egyptian magicians. CUDWORTH says the Devil assisted APOLLONIUS TYANÆUS. That the Cumæan Sibyl did really prophecy of CHRIST, and that VIRGIL took his 4th Eclogue from her verses. But FABRICIUS, I think, oversets that notion.

IN Deut. xii. the people of Israel are warned not to be drawn away from the worship of the true God

by prophecies given out for that purpose, even though the prophecies should come to pass. CUDWORTH thinks this unintelligible without supposing evil spirits concerned. The case is the same of the false miracles spoken of in the N. Test.

LACTANTIUS pronounces, that the Sibyls and oracles were inspired by evil spirits. So says HUETIUS, *Præp. Evang.* p. 127, though in other places he seems to doubt it. EDWARDS, author of the *Survey*, affirms the same. And HALLET: "God might permit "them" [magicians, witches, or wizards] "by the "Devil's help, to discover secrets, and to foretel "some future events, as he did sometimes permit "them to work miracles, as is plain in the case of "the Egyptian magicians." Notes on pecul. Texts, Vol. L p. 56 [x].

CHALCIDIUS has a good deal concerning the spiritual hierarchies. But, as he lived after CHRIST, and is alledged by some writers, to have been a Christian, though commonly reckoned a Platonist, his opinion

[x] Whoever would see more concerning those ancient witches or fortune-tellers, the Sibyls, may consult *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Diodorus Siculus*, *Plutarch*, *Tacitus*, *Aristophanes*, *Solinus*, *Isidorus*, *Varro*, *Pausanias*, *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*, *Cicero*, *Suidas*, *Jamblichus*, *Agathias*, *Zosimus*, *Tatian*, *S. Augustine*, *Clement of Alexandria*, *Erasmus*, *Schmidius*, *Onuphrius*, *Castellio*, *Sixtus Senensis*, *Baronius*, *Fabricius*, *Vossius*, *Cudworth*, *Bayle*, *Wagner*, *Blundel*, *Petit*, *Colly*, *Hyde*, *Vandale*, and many others.

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opinion is of the less consequence, as well as that of some others, which yet I have occasionally quoted.

THE supposition that the evil, which partially prevails in this world, is brought into it by the power of malignant spirits, is not affected by the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of apparitions. Disorder may have been introduced into this world at periods long since past. And spiritual beings may be conceived to act, or to *have* acted, without their making themselves visible. It is, however, certain, that grave authors have declared their firm belief of apparitions, as, among others, our great naturalist Mr. BOYLE; but he, it must be owned, shews himself to have been, in many instances, too credulous. The learned CUDWORTH thinks APOLLONIUS TYANÆUS was assisted by evil spirits in performing a sort of miracles to discountenance Christianity. He likewise holds the literal account of possession by spirits; and says, "For a man to assert that apparitions are impossible, " is to pretend that he knows not only all that is, or " has been, but all that is possible; or else, that an " apparition implies a contradiction."

VISIBILITY, or invisibility, have nothing to do with reality or non-entity. No eye ever saw the element of air. Even when condensed to the greatest degree, it remains invisible as much as when in its rarest state. Yet we have no more doubt of the reality of such an element, than of the three others. Dr. CUDWORTH gives it as his opinion, that angels, both good and bad, are embodied in a finer kind of vehicles. And PORPHYRY, in his letter to ANEBO, the

Egyptian priest, mentions the heathen notion, that the gods had etherial, the dæmons aerial, and the souls terrestrial bodies. One cannot help here recollecting the apostle PAUL's philosophy (1 Cor. xv. 40.) of bodies celestial and terrestrial, corruptible and incorruptible.

Nor does the question concerning *possession*, affect the point in hand, of evil brought into the world by the power of malignant spirits. Yet we may throw together a few paragraphs, shewing, that the notion of such a commerce between spiritual beings and mankind, has at all times prevailed.

THE opinion of good and evil dæmons attending men, and the fables of unaccountable terrors struck into people by the god PAN, and of the *Lympbati* (*Nympbati* as corrected by some critics) persons possessed by the nymphs, of the *Cerriti*, and *Larvati*, people possessed by CERES, and the *Dii Lares*, are direct contradictions to MR. MEDE's assertion, that, "in other nations besides that of the Jews, we hear of no dæmoniacs." CURTIUS relates, that on a mad woman's advising ALEXANDER to return to his companions, when he was going to bed after a long drinking-match, and would probably have been murdered by his pages, who had conspired against his life, the maudlin hero answered, "The gods advise well." Alluding to the common notion of mad people's being inspired, or possessed. And VALERIUS MAXIMUS writes, that after ANTONY's defeat at the battle of Actium, CASSIUS PARMENSIS, who had been of his party, fled to Athens, and there several times in his sleep was

terrified, possessed, or haunted by an apparition in a human form, which, on his asking it who, or what it was, answered it was *κακοδαιμον*, his evil genius; and that soon after CASSIUS was proscribed and put to death. And the story of BRUTUS's apparition before the battle of Philippi is known to every body. Which shews that the ancient heathens were used to think it possible that spiritual beings might have communication with men. Nor was any thing more common among the ancient heathens, than the notion, that diseases were inflicted by gods or *δαιμones*. Therefore it is not to be wondered, that the evangelists do not speak of the great number of *dæmoniacs* in CHRIST's time, as an unusual thing, because the notion of the influence of invisible beings, of both characters, over mankind, was then generally prevalent, both among Jews and heathens. Nor should I choose to make oath, that spirits are not now concerned in madness, though medicines are useful towards curing that complaint. A disorderly state of the body, particularly of the brain, curable by the physical art, may be imagined to render the mind accessible to spirits, as we know strong liquors give a designing person an advantage over him, who is intoxicated, which he could not gain over the same person sober. We may err in rejecting, as well as in receiving, too arbitrarily, opinions, where we want data to ground our belief, or our disbelief upon. The king of Bantam shewed weakness in opposing the possibility of freezing, merely because he had never seen ice. But to proceed;

THE agitations of the votaries of BACCHUS, with which a whole army was said to have been suddenly seized; the Delphic and Sibylline prophetic fury, and other like instances, shew how familiar the notion of possession was to the antients.

ZALEUCUS, in his laws, speaks of evil dæmons tempting men to wickedness; and EURIPIDES of the possibility of an evil dæmon's giving out oracles instead of APOLLO.

SOCRATES's dæmon is the most celebrated personage of the kind in heathen antiquity. Ετι γαρ τι θεια
μοιξα παρεπομενον, π. τ. λ. "There is, by divine ap-
" pointment a certain dæmon, which has followed me
" from my youth. It is a voice, which when uttered,
" always signifies to me a warning not to do what
" I am about; but he never excites me to do any
" thing." PLAT. *Theolog.* and *Apol.* *Socr.* He
mentions predictions given by it, of the events of
battles, &c.

PLUTARCH, in his piece on the genius of Socrates, says, the genius did not utter any audible voice, or exhibit any visible appearance; but made an internal impression on the mind of the philosopher, which being defecated from all matter, was more easily accessible to the impressions of the spirit.

THE Erinnyes, or Furies, are by the ancients represented as infernal goddesses, the punishers of the wicked in hell, and as authors of contentions, wars
and

and mischief on earth, as promoters of vengeful and irascible dispositions, by getting possession of the minds of unhappy persons. Instances of which notion may be seen in HOMER, SOPHOCLES, VIRGIL, HORACE, OVID, &c.

PSELLUS, PORPHYRY, CELSUS, and many of the fathers say, impure spirits disturb sleep, and inflict diseases. PSELLUS says, they inhabit the earth and lower regions of the air. See PLATO, ORPHEUS, COELIUS RHODIGINUS, and the latter Platonists. JULIAN (in a fragment quoted by the commentator on JAMBЛИCHUS, p. 228.) says, people have been so agitated by dæmons, as to leave human society, and live in mountains and deserts. PORPHYRY says, "Spirits, who are the cause of the evils, which come upon mankind, pretending to be the removers of them, have drawn foolish men to worship them as their benefactors, when they are, in fact, their enemies."

SOME opposers of the literal notion of possession, lay great stress upon the word *δαιμων*; by which, they pretend, the antients always understood a departed human spirit. And as it is irrational, say they, to imagine the soul of a dead man shooting itself into the brain of a living person, the notion of dæmoniacs, or possessed persons, must be understood to mean only people; whose brains are dismounted by natural insanity, without any spirit really concerned. It is not my design either to oppose, or defend, the literal notion of possession. But I do not think the account of the supposed antient sense of the word *δαιμων*, as being

being confined to departed human souls; will go far toward oversetting it. 'Tis true, JOSEPHUS says expressly, that the departed souls of bad men did commonly possess people. And he speaks of a curious operation, unknown, I imagine, to our surgeons, by which the spirit was extracted from the brain of the possessed, through the nose. It is the more to be wondered, that JOSEPHUS should entertain such a notion; as the Old Testament generally represents the dead in a state of total inactivity. The heathens, I say, did not always use the word *δαιμων*, for a departed human spirit. Where PLATO says, Επειδαν αφικοται οι τετιλευτησοτες, &c. when the dead arrive at those mansions, to which *Δαιμων* brings every one who has passed this life rightly, &c. Is this *Δαιμων* the departed spirit of a man? PLUTARCH calls his evil principle *Δαιμων*. Can he mean, that the evil principle was once a human being? HOMER uses the epithet *δαιμονος*, in both senses, viz. sometimes to signify god-like, and sometimes what we should call *devilish*. When PLUTARCH and JAMBЛИCHUS speak of *δαιμονα* as the first introducers of evil among men, they cannot mean departed human spirits. For what solution of the difficulty of the first appearance of evil among mankind would it be, to say, that it was brought in by departed human spirits? And when OREHEUS, quoted by EUSEBIUS, (*Præp. Evang.* p. 100.) says, "There is one government, and one lord, viz. the supreme Being," Εν οργανω, εις *δαιμων*, does he mean, that that this one *dæmon*, or lord, is the departed spirit of a man?

ORIGEN says, the Christians of his times, which were early, always understood the word *δαιμόνιον* to signify an evil spirit; *πνεύμα δαιμονίον ενειπε φαντάσιον*.

Cont. Cels.

as *Ipsi putatis eos esse deos* (says TERTULLIAN) *quos nos dæmones scimus*. These passages shew, that the Christians commonly meant fallen angels by the word *δαιμονίον*. It is true JUSTIN MARTYR seems to have been of JOSEPHUS's way of thinking about possession. But the fathers did undoubtedly many times depart from the scripture notions. However, it is enough for my present purpose to have made it appear, that possession was not always ascribed to departed human spirits.

THE word *Δαιμόνιον* among the antients, signifies either the supreme God; or one of the inferior celestials, as APOLLO, MINERVA, &c. or the *Dii Lares*, *Indigetes*, *Manes*, and the like; or noxious gods, as the Furies, &c. or spirits of departed heroes, or of departed wicked men; or the good or bad geniuses of particular persons; or fortune, good or bad; or fate or death; or fallen angels. It is found in these senses in HOMER, HESIOD, PLATO, ARISTOPHANES, ÆSCHINES, PLUTARCH, ATHENAEUS, XENOPHON, HERODOTUS, and the sacred writers. *Δαιμονίον* has nearly the same signification. The adjective *δαιμονιός*, signifies sometimes divine, admirable, blessed, fortunate; sometimes wicked, miserable, contemptible. *Δαιμονικός*, and *δαιμονοζόμενος*, in the sacred writers, signify possessed by an evil spirit. But in the profane writers,

writers, *δαιμονῶν* is found in the same sense as *δαιμονίων*, in the sacred.

But, indeed, though it could be made out, that the heathens understood always by the word *δαιμὼν* a departed soul, it would not follow, that the evangelists mean to represent the dæmoniacs as possessed by the separate souls of wicked men. The evangelists, it is certain, did not mean by the word *Θεος*, what the heathen vulgar meant by it. The word *Ἄγγελος*, among the antient heathens, never was understood to signify any thing but a messenger, whether celestial or terrestrial. The evangelists mean, by it, an order of spiritual beings below archangels, and above men. And so of many other words. The evangelists were obliged to make use of such Greek words as were in use in their times. But I do not, as I have said above, pretend to decide any thing concerning the true notion of possession.

LET us now pause a little, and see whereabout we are got in our subject. We have seen, that the learned have differed in their opinions concerning the reality of evil in the world, some affirming, others denying. We have seen, that many of those, who acknowledge the reality of evil, have ascribed it to an intermediate and subordinate agency. We have seen, that the existence and agency of invisible beings, has been believed by the professors of all religions. Let us not, however, be too hastily decisive.

EVERY

EVERY *plausible* solution of a difficulty is not the *true* account of the matter. But we commonly think ourselves in the way toward obtaining light in an obscure subject, when we have got so far, as to be able to give such an account of it, as is not self-contradictory. Is the solution of the grand difficulty, of the Origin of Evil, here offered to the reader, plausible or not? Is it irrational to allow (what our senses are every moment inculcating upon us) that there is in this world of ours much of *real* evil and disorder, both natural and moral; much of what must be displeasing and deformed in the eye of the *Supreme*, as well as of every good *subordinate* being, to whom our world, and its present condition, are known? Is it absurd to suppose invisible beings to exist? Is not that which thinks [*y*], and acts, in us, invisible?

MAY not invisible beings be conceived of, as endowed with powers greatly superior to ours? Is it absurd to suppose invisible subordinate agents, possessed of powers equal to the making and governing of worlds and systems?

How

[*y*] The author of the *Dictionnaire Philos. Portat.* thinks the whole notion of a *soul* in man, needless. "You think," says he, "with your head, as you walk with your feet." But walking, and thinking, are, in my conception, operations as specifically different, as the striking of a clock, and the solving of a geometrical problem.

CRITO MINOR.

How, if all systems, as *systems*, be the productions of subordinate agents? May we not suppose that Omnipotence did from eternity create the staminal principles of whatever now exists, or ever will exist, in infinite space, whether material or spiritual? Is it unreasonable to suppose, that out of these eternally, though dependently, existing stamina, all worlds are created and peopled?

MAY there not be imagined to arise among beings endowed with great powers, as well as among their inferiors, differences in opinion?

MAY there not be imagined to arise among beings, whose stations are higher, as among those who are lower, differences as to moral character? Do superior abilities imply superior virtue? Do we find this to answer in our species?

MAY not direct hostilities be conceived to arise among superior, as among inferior beings?

SUPPOSING worlds and systems to be under the peculiar patronage of superior spirits, of good characters, is it irrational to conceive of the hostile party of ill-disposed beings, as wrecking their vengeance on the dominions of the powers whom they oppose?

Una agencia de servicios de salud en el país

Is there any thing inconsistent with reason or analogy in supposing, that the case of our world is, in some such manner as this, *peculiarly* distressful [z].

IT is not my present purpose to write in defence, any more than in opposition, to scripture. But I think thus much may be worth enquiring, *viz.* Whether there may not be a plausible scheme of scripture made out, by understanding it as communicated to mankind, merely to inform our species of certain facts, which reason would not have suggested; as, That this world (scripture nowhere hints a *plurality*) was originally formed into its present state by a great and good Being of high rank under the Supreme. That between this great and good Being, and another great, but degenerate and wicked Being, contentions and emulations did, in very ancient times, arise. That we, and our world, have suffered various inconveniences, and are become liable to sundry distresses, in consequence of these contentions, from which otherwise we should, as, probably, other worlds are, have been wholly free. And that the present promiscuous and distressful state of things, is only temporary, and of a short duration, compared with that for which we are intended, and in which order and good, both natural and moral, will universally, and without mix-
ing golodiver has delayed his own part of the scripture, made to no good end to shew the old M. and most end to no good end to shew the new M. and most

[z] MOSES BAR-CEPHA says, God cursed the Serpent as the author of evil, and did not prevent his committing it, upon the same principle as he does not restrain wicked men. Grabe, *Spicileg. Patr.*

ture, or exception, prevail and increase through all future eternity.

SCRIPTURE says, a thousand years are, before God, as only one day. If, therefore, this world were to be conceived of as under oppression by a malignant tyrannical spirit for six or seven such days, that is six or seven thousand whirls of the earth round the sun, what great matter is it? To beings much inferior to the Supreme, a world is probably but a ball in a sling; a sun a taper; and a system an orrery. What wonder if things go wrong for a short space, where their going wrong for a short space is comparatively of little consequence, is unavoidable, and leaves it still worth while to have created the world?

But CELSUS asks the Christians, against whom he writes, whether they think the Son of God is really baffled by the Devil? with more to the same purpose. Or whether they only teach enigmatically and mythologically, with the Egyptians, HERACLITUS, PHERECYDES, SYRUS, and HOMER; in their gigantic and Titanian wars, their contests between SATURN and OPHIONEUS, and their histories of TYPHON, OSIRIS, HORUS, &c. that the universe subsists by elemental strife. To which ORIGEN answers, that these fictions are not the inventions of the Egyptians nor of HERACLITUS, &c. but are disguised and mythologised from the Mosaic account of the deception of ADAM and EVE by the Serpent, and of the dejection of the rebellious angels, &c.

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THE Fathers, both Greek and Latin, are full of the doctrine of a spiritual hostility. Which notion they ground on scripture. It may, however, be as well to quote them but sparingly. Most readers will, I imagine, pay as much regard to the opinion of our own modern writers, as to that of those venerable persons. Indeed the whole authority of both fathers and moderns, must be drawn from the conformity of their sentiments with the views given in Scripture, which are of great antiquity, and are, besides, originals, furnishing to, not borrowing from, other writers. Thus much might be acknowledged by a person professing the orthodox, that is, the deistical faith.

A counsellor may plead well in defence of a cause, which he may not think unexceptionably just. If therefore any deistical reader, from observing, in these pages, any thing worthy of his attention, should be concerned to think the author weak enough to believe revelation; let him, if he pleases, consider him as an unbeliever, and acting the lawyer, who is to make the most of his cause. The reader has very little concern with the author's belief. The only point is, what he makes out to be true, or probable. Indeed, there is nothing with which any man is so little concerned as another man's belief. Let us now hear the sense of Scripture on the present point, as understood by some able and learned moderns.

Mr. LOCKE explains — “him who hath subjected
“the world” to death, Rom. viii. 20. of the Devil,
and refers to Gen. iii. of the Serpent’s tempting Eve,
and to Heb. ii. 14. — “him, who hath the power of
“death, that is the Devil,” and to Coloss. ii. 15.
“having spoiled principalities and powers” (that is,
SATAN and his legions) “he made a shew of them,”
as in triumph. “In these words” [the Prince of the
power of the air] “St. PAUL points out the Devil, the
“Prince of the revolted part of the creation, and head
“of that kingdom which stands in opposition to, and
“was at war with the kingdom of Christ.” And the
same author (vol. ii. p. 573. fol. edit.) “We know not
“what need there was to set up an head and a chief-
“tain in opposition to the prince of this world, the
“prince of the power of the air, &c. of which there
“are more than obscure intimations in Scripture.

AND the great Dr. BARROW, vol. II. p. 325.
“CHRIST has acquired us by just right of conquest,
“having subdued the *enemies*, unto whom (partly by
“their fraud and violence, partly by our own consent)
“we did live enslaved and addicted. Them he van-
“quished, having spoiled *principalities* and *powers*,”
&c. And p. 339, “There was great *power* wanted
“to remove those huge obstacles, that crossed our sal-
“vation, to subdue those *enemies*, which opposed it, to
“command and conquer nature, to vanquish the
“powers of *hell*, and abolish *death* in our behalf.”

“THE Devil, that enemy, that accuser, that mur-
“derer, that greedy lion, that crafty serpent, the
“strong

“ strong one, the mischievous one, the destroyer, who
“ usurped an authority, and exercised a domination
“ over mankind, as the prince of this world, &c. him
“ hath our Saviour destroyed or defeated (*κατέκυντο*) de-
“ jected from heaven (I saw SATAN like lightning fall-
“ ing from heaven, Luke x. 18.) him he hath cast out.
“ Now is the judgment of this world; now is the
“ Prince of this world cast out, John xii. 31. For this
“ cause (faith St. JOHN xvi. 11.) the Son of God ap-
“ peared, that he might destroy the works of the Devil.
“ He combated this strong one, this mighty and dread-
“ ful foe of ours, baffled, bound, and disarmed him,
“ taking away (*παραπλάνει* *αὐτόν*) his whole armour, and
“ spoiled him (*τα σκέυη δηρπάτε*) rifled his goods, bore
“ away all his instruments of mischief — leaving him
“ unable — to do us mischief.” Vol. III. p. 481.

THE learned Dr. WHITBY on Matth. iv. allows the truth of an important hostility between CHRIST and SATAN. On Mat. xii. 24, 25, he goes upon the supposition of possession by evil spirits, and their being cast out, by the Jews, by the name of the God of ABRAHAM, ISAAC, and JACOB; besides him (Luke ix. 49.) who cast them out by the name of CHRIST, though not one of his disciples. On verse 28th he speaks of the kingdom of SATAN, as overthrown by CHRIST's power, and the kingdom of God as set up by him who was stronger than SATAN. On Mark i. 34. he affirms that the casting out of devils by CHRIST was not merely the curing of madness, or any other disease, but the literal ejection of spirits. He explains CHRIST's leading captivity captive, Eph. iv. 8. to be his conquering SATAN and death. And the redemption of
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the purchased possession, Eph. i. 14. he understands of the raising of the body.

IN his general preface to the epistles, vol. ii. page xxvi. he argues strongly for CHRIST's victory over the evil spirits. On Heb. ii. 14. he quotes, without disapprobation of the opinion in general, the Jewish notion, That the Devil, whom they call SAMMAEL, has literally the power of death. He holds the literal account of CHRIST's temptation; quotes TERTULLIAN, ORIGEN, and CHRYSOSTOM, and agrees with them in understanding "Deliver us from evil," [*εκ των πονηρών*] of the evil one. He understands Matth. viii. 29. CHRIST's tormenting the devils before their time, to be his condemning them to hell.

DR. BURNET thinks SATAN no mean person, as appears from his words, Theor. vol. II. p. 282. "I had rather know the history of LUCIFER, than of all the Babylonian and Persian kings, nay, than of all the kings of the earth. What the birth-right was of that mighty prince; what his dominions, where his imperial court and residence; how he was deposed; for what crime, and by what power; how he still wages war against heaven in his exile; what confederates he hath; what is his power over mankind, and how limited; what change, or damage, he hath suffered by the coming of CHRIST, and how it altered the posture of his affairs; where he will be imprisoned in the millennium, and what will be his last fate and final doom; whether he may ever hope for a revolution, or restoration," &c.

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“We, who, together with diverse superstitions, (says MEDE, p. 40, fol. edit.) have justly neglected these “vain and ungrounded curiosities” [of worshipping angels, &c.] “are fallen into the other extreme, “having buried the doctrine of angels in silence, making little or no enquiry what God in his word hath revealed concerning them, which yet would make “not a little for the understanding of scripture.”

THE same author, (p. 33.) allows, that the sentence on the wicked is to be understood of a condemnation to the place of punishment literally prepared for SATAN and his crew, “the place of the giants,” [Heb. שָׁמָן] Prov. xxi. 16. so explained by Rabbi SOLOMON, says MEDE, p. 32. in *cætu Gebennæ*. The same word, *Re-paim*, is found, Prov. ii. 18. and ix. 18. and Isa. xiv. 9. It is remarkable, that the heathen poets should say so much as they do of giants attempting to scale heaven, &c. which is probably the scripture doctrine of SATAN’s rebellion mythologized. However MEDE understands the giants [*Re-paim*] of the antediluvians, whose longævity, stature, and strength, preserved some resemblance to that which man had before the fall.

He explains the “enemy and avenger,” Psal. viii. 2. and xliiv. 16. and the *enemy* mentioned Luke x. 19. to signify SATAN; and the kingdom of God so often mentioned in the New Testament, to be the Christian religion in opposition to the kingdom of SATAN. And he supposes the seven-headed dragon in the Apocalypse, to point out the same tremendous being.

“ UPON the supposition, that the fallen angels were a part of our system, Dr. HUNT thinks the punishment of wicked men together with them, appears the more congruous.” Bens. on Jude, vol. II. p. 137. It seems no way unnatural to think of a tyranny by a spiritual being belonging to our system, when we must own the fact of tyrannies by embodied beings of our system.

THE bishop of Clogher, in his *Vindication*, &c. p. 257. has the following passage ——— “ While we acknowledge, that there are other beings, which are manifestly superior to the laws of our nature, it is not contrary either to nature or reason to assert, that they may interpose in human affairs, and sometimes perform wonderful and supernatural works,” &c. And, p. 421. “ Take away the supposition of invisible intermediate spirits acting between God and man, and the whole history of the Bible falls to the ground.” He treats very copiously, in many places, of the importance of SATAN, and of a hierarchy of spirits.

THE learned bishop of Gloucester allows the reality, and great importance, of the hostile agency of SATAN. In the third vol. of the Divine Legation, pag. 10, 11. he ascribes the remarkable agreement among the various heathen pretenders to revelations and inspirations (which prevented their accusing one another of falsehood, and preferring each his own to the others, which would not probably have happened, had these impostures been the sole agency of men) to the management of SATAN, who being at the head of all of them

them in general, and his interest equally advanced by them all, did not choose to have them set a-disputing among themselves. See SPENCER *De Legib.* and LUCIAN.
" Thus," says he, " I suppose the Fathers reasoned, " and I believe our free-thinkers, with all their logic, " would find it difficult to shew, they reasoned ill."

THE religious wars of the Egyptians, on occasion of the killing of some of their sacred animals; particularly between the Connibenses and Tentyritæ are, however, exceptions, if there be no other, to this agreement among the antients about their several superstitions. For of these latter we learn from history, that they quarrelled about their religion, went to war, killed, and ate one another [a]. Which was carrying their pious zeal a considerable length.

THE same learned author, pag. 281, 282, shews it to be his opinion, that the account we have in Scripture of SATAN, so far from leading to Manichæism, or the doctrine of two independent Principles, is the very best security against that error, as teaching, " that SATAN, or the evil spirit (whose history, misunderrstood, or imperfectly told in the first ages of mankind, much favoured the notion of an evil Principle) was, like all other superior immaterial beings, a creature of God, at enmity with Him," &c.

[a] Exemp. Virt. et Vit. Vol. I. pag. 553.

DR. MACKNIGHT, in his learned work entitled, *The Truth of the Gospel History*, p. 169, 170, *et passim*, sets forth amply, that one design of CHRIST's coming was, to open to us the invisible world, so far as is useful for us to know; to demolish polytheism, and Manichæism; to shew how mankind are benefited by good angels, and what we suffer by the malignity of evil spirits; whose agency, in his times at least, was tremendously evident to the very senses of men, in the cases of the dæmoniacs. These, the Doctor thinks, were peculiar to CHRIST's times, as other miraculous phænomena, and therefore not to be hesitated about. He says, p. 173. in the note, " Many diseases — may be brought on, and continued " by the operation of evil spirits. Other mischiefs " of various kinds they may be instrumental in " producing. For the scriptures attribute to the devils " much more influence in the affairs of the world, than " most people are willing to allow them;" with much more to the same purpose, and concludes the para- graph as follows. " If any one takes upon him to " disbelieve these things, he ought to remember, that " they are matters of fact, which he cannot reason " upon, because he knows nothing of the invisible " world; and that Jesus having come from that world, " deserves to be credited in the account which he " has given of it." He thinks the literal account of CHRIST's temptation, and not those of LE CLERC, or FARMER, is the true one. Again, p. 77. " CHRIST " revealed the state of the invisible world by giving " an account of the inhabitants both the good and the " bad, their power, their dispositions, and the influence

" they

“ they have on human affairs, and so made mankind sensible of the connexion, which subsists between the two worlds.”

“ THE Devil,” (says HALLET, vol. I. pag. 358.) “ had power to hold mankind in a state of death for ever, till CHRIST JESUS, by his death, purchased authority to abolish the power of the Devil, and to raise all men from the dead.”

PETERS, on Job, thinks, that the expression, of God’s charging his angels with folly, refers to the fall of those beings. And that Isai. xiv. 12. “ How art thou fallen from heaven, O LUCIFER, son of the morning!” and Ezek. xxviii. 14. “ Thou art the anointed cherub,” &c. are allusions to that important event.

IF readers of the general, that is, the *deistical*, persuasion, will bear with me, while I endeavour, merely as a matter of speculation, to make out a *consistent* scheme of revelation; the minority, I mean the *believers* of Christianity, ought, I think, to consider themselves as not a little obliged to me for my laudable attempt: for, I am sure, a *rational* system of Divinity is enough wanted: as will, I imagine, presently appear. If any of the authors above quoted, who acknowledge the doctrine of a spiritual *hostility*, had, in their writings, stuck to that *alone*, as leading to a *rationale* of Christianity, we should at least have understood them. But it is notorious, that even those of our divines, who *confess* the reality of a spiritual hostility, do yet lay the main stress of Christianity on somewhat *else*.

ONE leading theory tells us, Christianity is CHRIST's suffering as an *expiatory* sacrifice, to satisfy divine justice; or his suffering *vicariously* in the stead of mankind, and procuring by his *merits*, *pardon* for sin, both original and actual: his righteousness being, by I know not what inexplicable *imputation*, transferred to them, and their guilt to him. This form of sound words without meaning, is displayed by the famous CALVIN, in such elegant Latin, as must incline those of his readers, who differ from him in opinion, to wish that he had chosen a subject, which might have been as instructing as his language is pleasing. And this hopeful scheme of Christianity is adopted by sundry partially reformed churches, as may be seen by looking into their legends; and by many manufacturers of bodies of divinity. Yet there are some more rational divines, to whose *understanding* it would be doing injustice, not to clear them of the weakness of embracing opinions so absurd [c].

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[c] Our un-articled dissenters in England have, in this point, a very material advantage. *Subscribing* divines, the less they *believe* of Calvinism, Athanazianism, &c. the more culpable they are. Happy they, who have nothing to charge themselves with on this head; who spontaneously believe every word of every subscribed article in its natural grammatical sense! I can make allowances for divines subscribing in the earlier part of life, to doctrines, which

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THERE are some who disclaim Calvinism, and explain Christianity thus; That CHRIST did, by his obedience and sufferings, *make it fit*, which it was not before, that offending man should be forgiven. This is, however, still Calvinism, with only a new nap set upon it, as JACK CADE says. Yet, be it remembered, the principal defender, if not first proposer [d], of this scheme of Christianity, is a character deserving (on account of extraordinary sagacity, and great goodness) of high esteem and veneration. Freedom of sentiment on theological subjects can scarce be expected from the greatest parts trammelled with the entanglements of subscribed church-articles?

SOME among us hold, that CHRIST did, and suffered certain things, by which he obtained the pardon of our guilty species as a *reward*. This is, as the former, a manufacture of a different appearance, but fabricated out of the same materials, viz. Calvinism. To throw together a few cursory remarks (and truly there is no need of many) to shew the inconsistency of these schemes with reason, and our best notions of the divine moral government;

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maturer examination, and more extensive reading may shew to be irrational. But I can make no allowance (will there be allowance made at the day of judgment?) for their concealing their second thoughts? Why do not all who change their sentiments, on subscribed doctrines, imitate the honest example of WHITBY, CLARKE, WHISTON, HOPKINS, and a few others?

CRITO MINOR.

[d] Dr. S. CLARKE.

IN the first place, What, I pray you, is it (*literally* speaking) to suffer as an *expiatory* sacrifice? What is *vicarious* suffering? What is *imputation*? Have we any ideas to these words? When it is said, that a hero fell a sacrifice for his country, we do not, I believe, understand that the patriot had his throat cut by a priest, and his limbs burnt on an altar. We do not understand, that LEONIDAS, the DECII, the FABI^[e], or our brave WOLFE, could have done their respective countries any service by *dying* merely. No more, I will answer for it, could CHRIST have done for mankind, by *dying* merely. Why then should divines amuse us by giving us *literally*, for an *explanation* of Christianity, what the scripture writers, being Jews, and accustomed to *sacrificial* terms, wrote *figuratively*, and by way of mere *accommodation*. Why do not our theologians tell us, upon the same principle, that Christianity is CHRIST's being killed, that we might eat him [f]? He says his "flesh is meat indeed, and his blood

[e] CICERO explains the antient self-devotions into nothing more, than a desperate resolution of those heroes to sell their lives as dear as possible; in consequence of which, attacking the enemy with unrestrained fury, they made a successful impression, and gained a victory; falling upon the slaughtered heaps they had made. CALPURNIUS FLAMMA, however, did not lose his life, though he gained his point. Which must, one would think, convince even the people of those superstitious times, that the patriot's *death* was of no service.

BENTL. SECUND.

[f] When King ALPHONUS had heard his astronomers explaining, in their aukward manner, the system of the

"blood is drink indeed." So he says, he is "a door, a vine, a shepherd." So he says, "This is my body." By taking which last plain metaphor literally, we know how ridiculous the papists have made Christianity.

When scripture says, CHRIST died for us [*ὑπὲρ οὐν*] can any person seriously think, the meaning is, that he died in *our stead*, as DAMON was willing to die for PYTHIAS, or PYLADES for ORESTES? Can any one think of *justice*, of *divine justice* as demanding, or even accepting the punishment of the *innocent* for the *guilty*? What should we think of a magistrate, who, instead of inflicting on a convicted offender the punishment appointed by the law, should propose to the culprit, that, if he could find a person of the first quality, and most eminent virtue, to suffer for him at the whipping-post, he would let him go free, imputing to the nobleman his guilt, and to the offender the nobleman's innocence? *Imputation* of guilt to the *innocent*, and of innocence to the *guilty*, is the *very essence* of *injustice*, as being the diametrical opposite of

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the universe, with their cycles, and epicycles (the Newtonian astronomy being then unknown) the monarch told them, that if he had been present at the creating of the world, he would have proposed a system much less operose. No body blames that Prince's behaviour on this occasion, as if he had meant to reflect on the Creator; his intention being obviously to ridicule the clumsiness of an unphilosophical theory. By the same rule it will be but fair to judge of the author's meaning in these sneers; that they are not directed against Christianity; but against *Calvinism*.

BENTL. SECUND.

that, which TULLY, and every body else, holds to be the perfection of justice, viz. *adequate retribution* according to merit and demerit, which being unchangeably *personal*, cannot be transferred.

IN the times of ignorance, when such doctrines, as this of imputation, were proposed and received, there was nothing to do, but to call the grossest absurdity a sacred mystery, and it was immediately swallowed. It has long been a maxim with many, that common sense has nothing to do with religion. Accordingly, when these two respectable personages chance to meet, which is not often, they are observed to eye one another with such an air of reserve and diffidence, as shews them to be but very superficial acquaintance. Yet it is certain, there ought to be no friendship more intimate than theirs. Religion is Reason's younger sister. I mean, dropping the figure, that religion presupposes reason, ought ever to be consistent with reason, and is, at most, only an addition to, or improvement of reason. If reason be not previously necessary to religion, there is no absurdity in imagining a visible church composed of honest quadrupeds. In such a church, reason would be certain never to prove troublesome by breaking in upon orthodoxy, or by starting heresies; which would ensure that *peaceful* uniformity which has been with such *turbulent* earnestness pursued by almost all churchmen, as the object and end of religion. But this *en passant*; to proceed;

That the whole of *literal* expiation, imputation, satisfaction, vicarious suffering, merit, fitness, &c. in order to man's *pardon*, is irrational, seems manifest

from

ESSAY III. 275

from this single consideration, That the supposition of a necessity for any such contrivance, implies a fundamental error, or deficiency in the original *constitution*. For, supposing the appointed penalties for vice to be *adequate*, why may they not be inflicted? To say they are not fit to be *inflicted*, would be saying they are too severe: and what idea would this give us of the Legislator? Who ever heard of a well regulated state, in which it was thought wise or good, to *rescue* convicted offenders from the punishment appointed by *law*? We see, in this most exuberantly charitable of all countries, foundations for all sorts of benevolent purposes. But no body has yet thought of a charitable institution for rescuing convicts from prisons, pillories, and gibbets. Hence it seems to me unavoidably to follow, that all schemes of Christianity, which represent redemption as the delivering of mankind from God, or from the penalties annexed to his *laws*, must be incongruous. The necessity of a *contrivance* to deliver a whole species of creatures from distress, supposes somewhat peculiar and *adventitious* in their condition, and that they are not in the state in which they were *originally* placed at their creation. This gives the hostility-scheme an unrivalled advantage above all others, for explaining the necessity of *redemption* for mankind. And scripture, so far from representing man as in want of deliverance from God, or his laws, ascribes, every where, the scheme of redemption to God, and speaks of the evils from which man is to be delivered, as coming from a quite different quarter, viz. the malignity of the grand enemy.

Ano.

ANOTHER scheme of Christianity represents CHRIST as saving mankind by teaching them. Now, we can undoubtedly understand how one coming from above, may communicate, or explain, to blind mortals important truths unknown, or imperfectly known, to them before. But is it rational to think of the Governor of the moral world, as *himself* placing (for this theory takes no notice of an hostility) his creatures in a state of such ignorance, as to be *perishing* for want of this teaching? Let it be considered, likewise, how dear this teaching *cost* the Teacher. Which last particular militates, in my opinion, invincibly against this, and all schemes of Christianity, which exclude a spiritual hostility. For who can think of Divine wisdom as voluntarily placing a species in circumstances requiring deliverance by the cruelly operose and expensive means, which scripture tells us ours cost? Could not the universal Governor have provided, in the *original* constitution, that man should (unless hindered by *other* than *divine* agency) attain, as the inhabitants of other worlds, without trouble to any other being, his competent happiness? On the hostility-scheme, no *reflexion* can fall on the Divine wisdom; because the whole necessity of deliverance being on that scheme, produced by the grand *enemy*, he alone becomes *chargeable*; and the evil, produced by him, could by no means, consistent with moral *government*, have been *prevented*, any more than that which is produced by *human* tyrants [g]. But, to go on;

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[g] The author of the *Diction. Philos. Portat.* and others, insist, that charging the present distressful state of mankind

HAD this teaching been of such essential *importance* to mankind (Scripture every where represents the world as *perishing* without CHRIST's interposition), can it be imagined that it would have been *put off* till four thousand years, from the beginning of the world, should be elapsed? that it would have been communicated to so *small* a part of the human species? that its light would have been suffered to be almost *extinguished* by *popery*?

BESIDES, if we appeal to scripture (and it is the *scripture scheme* we are to explain) we find, that though CHRIST is indeed represented as "a light come into "the world, a teacher come from God," &c. yet he is held forth as a deliverer from other and incomparably greater evils than *ignorance*; viz. The tremendous calamity of *death*; and the adventitious *consequences* of adventitious *vice*, of that *atrocious* vice, which, probably the influence of the author of all evil has introduced, and which, without his influence, had

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mankind on an evil being, is little better than elephantising; for that the objection still returns, Why the universal Governor did not *himself* provide, that neither *Satan*, nor any *other* being, should prove *wicked*. But the answer to this seems to me not difficult, viz. That, if the Deity had proposed thus to over rule, by *force*, the wills of free agents (that he has made the best possible use of *moral* motives, we are to take for granted) he must have *counteracted* his own *design* in creating them *free*; which would have been inconsistent conduct in the Deity. Now it is, of two evils, the least (tho' still a *real* evil) that *Satan* act *improperly*, than that *infinite Wisdom* act *inconsistently*. But this requires much explanation.

never been [g], any more than, without him, there would have been such a punishment as Hell (which deliverance, I suppose, is what scripture means, when it speaks of *pardon* through CHRIST); from neither of which evils any *teaching* whatever, could naturally deliver mankind, circumstanced as they now are. Teaching, though effectual in reforming the moral character of an offender, does not, we find, restore to a spendthrift, the estate he has lost, or the constitution he has destroyed, or raise to life the parents whose hearts he has broke; or himself, when debauchery has hurried him out of the world, or the iron hand of justice has shortened his days.

THE scripture account of an hostility must either be taken *literally*, or *wholly rejected*. An *allegory* it cannot be, any more than CHRIST's being a sacrifice, a propitiation, an altar, a door, a vine, a shepherd, and so forth, can be understood *literally*. If there be in scripture, no *real*, but only an *allegorical enemy* of our world [SATAN], there is no *real* but only an *allegorical patron* and deliverer [CHRIST]; if there be no *real* Devil and his angels, with whom the wicked are to be punished, there is no *real* punishment to be feared by wicked men. If there be no *real* evil Being, who has the power of death, there is no *real* Saviour, who comes to destroy death, and him who has the power of death; if there be no *real* kingdom of SATAN, there is no *real* kingdom of CHRIST; if by SATAN is to be understood only a poetical personification of evil, then

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[g] This particular requires more explanation than there is room for here.

by CHRIST we are only to understand a figurative personification of good ; if, in short, there be no real spiritual hierarchy, there is no infinite Spirit. For all are alike asserted in scripture, and must either stand or fall together. The scripture-doctrine of an hostility taken *literally*, is intelligible, and solves the difficulty of the origin of evil ; taken *metaphorically*, it is unintelligible. The scripture doctrines of expiation, vicarious suffering, &c. taken *metaphorically*, are, as any other metaphors, admissible ; *literally*, are without meaning. And, by this canon may be determined universally, what scripture views are to be taken *literally*, and what *metaphorically*, so as to obtain *intelligible* schemes of scripture doctrines.

It is contrary to all just methods of philosophizing, to advance *superfluous* causes in accounting for effects, or phænomena. If, therefore, the scripture-doctrine of a spiritual hostility will *alone* account for the necessity of Christianity, all *other* explanations of it into expiation, imputation, vicarious suffering, merit, satisfaction, fitness, reward to CHRIST, mere teaching, and if there be any other, ought to be thrown aside, as *not wanted*, even if they were consistent, which they are not.

SUPPOSING it granted, that the true account of the apparent evil, both natural and moral, which prevails in this world is, the effect of the hostility of powerful malignant spiritual beings ; and supposing it likewise granted, that Christianity is the deliverance of our species from this peculiar and adventitious distress, as an enslaved nation is, by a patriotic hero, delivered from

from tyranny ; supposing all this granted ; it would be still more satisfactory, if we could solve some particular difficulties, which encumber such enquiries ; as, how contests are carried on between hostile spirits ; how such beings gain advantages and conquests over one another ; how particularly the hostile party may be imagined to have proceeded in their operations against our world ; how they produced, in the elements, in the human body, and by consequence, in the human disposition, those irregularities, which we lament ; and how, especially the most formidable evil of death (w'ich according to Mr. LOCKE, and many other capital reasoners, is, naturally, utter extinction) was introduced into a world, where, originally, it had no place ; how, on the other hand, the great Patron and Deliverer of this world proceeded in undoing this extensive mischief ; how, particularly, his coming into this world, not in his own super-angelic character, but in that of a mortal man, and how, especially his being himself a certain time in the state of death, and returning again, to human, but immortal life ; contributed to the attainment of this grand object. All this contains undoubtedly matter of much speculation, as well as of considerable difficulty. But what subject of enquiry is not attended with difficulty, if we attempt to investigate it minutely ? And what solution of such difficulties, as these, can be expected to be wholly unexceptionable ?

10 JY 60

The END of the FIRST VOLUME.

E R R A T A.

Page Line

10 3 from the bottom, for maxims, read maxim.
19 7 from the bottom, for 1761, read 1763.
20 1 from the top, for 1761, read 1763.
70 4 from the bot. for That I might, read 2. That
I might.
82 5 from the bot. for put him, read puts him.
95 14 from the top, for encourages, read encourage.
129 19 for revelation) ? If without, read revelation ?)
if without.
158 5 and 6, for worshipful citizen, and respectable
quorum, read respectable citizen, and wor-
shipful quorum.
176 6 from the bot. for δ ι, read δ ι.
198 18 from the top, for land, read lands.
200 4 for any governor, read any good governor.
202 10 for inventions, read intentions.
222 15 for SARISTHAN, read SARISTHANI.

·A 宏 A 五 月 2

1865-66
1866-67

